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ABSTRACT 
A STUDY OF INCOME MAINTENANCE POLICY FORMATION 
IN SELECTED UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Pak, Po-Hi 
This is a comparative case study of income maintenance policy formation 
involving six economically underdeveloped countries, i.e. Bolivia, Ceylon (now 
Sri Lanka), Ghana, Mauritius, Thailand and the United Arab Republic (now 
Egypt). 
The major questions raised are: what are the types of income maintenance 
programs in the selected countries?; are there specific factors associated with the 
adoption of those programs? If so, what are they?; and what are the conditions, if 
any, under which certain factors may become active in association with the 
program types? 
In this study, the income maintenance program was defined as a body of 
statutory measures designed to help assure a minimum income for selected or all 
sectors of population through direct transfers of cash or benefit-in-kind. The 
specific program components examined were food subsidies, public education, 
public health, demogrants, modified negative tax and public assistance in the non-
occupational sector and social insurance, provident fund, corporative profit-
sharing and subsidized commissary in the occupational sector. 
For the purpose of cross-national analysis, four basic program types 
determined by the level of pertinent expenditures, the number and type of 
components involved, population coverage and the relative balance between 
occupational and non-occupational components were delineated and employed. 
In addition to exploring the substantive questions, this study attempted to 
formulate a conceptual model which may be useful for future studies in terms of 
defining the problem, generating hypotheses and comparing the findings of one 
study with those of another. 
The basic problem of the study relates to theories of choice in the social 
field. 
The selection criteria of the study settings were: the level of economy as 
represented by per capita income (US$137-157 and US$209-211 brackets), the 
income maintenance program variation and data availability. This study covers 
various historical junctures of the post World War II period, usually coinciding 
with the life span of one government in each country. In one country only 
(Mauritius) a period of nearly 20 years was covered because the evolvement of 
the income maintenance program in that country took that long. 
Of existing theories and hypotheses of public policy, the study findings 
generally support a political one, particularly those involving the political self-
interest theory of Anthony Downs, Theodore Riker, Daniel Ellsberg and others. 
This, however, does not rule out the secondary or conditional significance of non-
political factors such as needs, resources, economic context, demography, 
technical assistance, socio-cultural and institutional factors and external factors. 
The overall concept of income maintenance policy determination 
emerging from the study findings· as a whole is represented by a systems model 
distinguished by politico-kinetic dynamics among all the underlying factors. In 
this model, the policy-making environment is envisaged as a kinetic field in 
which the movements of and the relationships between all underlying factors of 
income maintenance policies are controlled by a shifting balance of forces among 
political factors, such as pressure group influence, power requisites of political 
leadership, the leadership orientation and commitment, ideology, and so on. These 
political factors are conceived to change not only in their relative strengths but 
also in their aims or directions, and thus cause modifications in the income 
maintenance program. With the changes in the controlling factors and their 
relationships, the non-political factors are regarded to change also in terms of 
their relative strengths and dispositions in relation to the political factors as well 
as in relation to one another, thus undergoing changes in their powers of influence 
upon the program. The pattern of inter-factor relationships represented in the 
model is regarded to hold at any given moment in time as well as over a period of 
time. 
The conceptual model that best embodies the above dynamics among the 
underlying factors may appropriately be termed a politico-kinetic paradigm. 
To the Memory of Dr. Helen Kim 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This study was undertaken under the auspices of Ewha 
Womans University. I am indebted to the University for the 
Ewha Development Decade Professorial Fellowship that 
supported my study at Columbia University School of Social 
Work (CUSSW) and enabled the undertaking of the present 
study. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Helen Kim, President 
Emeritus, and Dr. Okgill Kim, President, of the University for 
generously arranging to support my study endeavor. 
Special thanks are due to Professor Samuel Finestone for his 
invaluable assistance during the difficult phases of organization 
and writing of this dissertation. He was not only unsparing of 
his time but most acute in his understanding of where and how 
help was needed and ever generous in giving it. I am truly 
appreciative of the experience of working under his guidance. 
Professor Alfred J. Kahn, overall advisor for my study at 
CUSSW, and Professor Vera Shlakman provided valuable 
ideas and suggestions that contributed toward conceiving the 
study in its outline. I am grateful for the interest they have 
shown in the present study. 
Miss Essie Baily (secretary, CUSSW) undertook the difficult 
task of preparing the manuscript. I am greatly appreciative of 
her competent help and cooperation in pressing circumstances 
of time. 
CONTENTS 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDy .............................................................. 1 
PROBLEM CONTEXT .................................................................... 2 
STUDY ApPROACH ...................................................................... 3 
CHAPTER II. CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL POLICY DETERMINATION -
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ......................................................... 4 
PLAN OF REVIEW ........................................................................ 4 
FORMAL CONCEPTS .................................................................... 5 
NORMATIVE THEORIES ...................................................... 5 
DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES .................................................... 9 
EXPERT OBSERVATIONS ............................................................ 13 
RESEARCH FINDINGS ................................................................ 20 
OVERVIEWS .............................................................................. 23 
SUMMARy ................................................................................. 25 
CHAPTER III. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL .... .26 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................. 26 
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS ......................................................... 26 
THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM .......................... 27 
THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM COMPONENT ...... .28 
THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MODEL ............. 29 
ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................... 31 
THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL. ....................................... 36 
CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................ 39 
STUDY ApPROACH .................................................................... 39 
SELECTION OF STUDY SETTINGS ............................................... 39 
PHASE I ............................................................................. 39 
PHASE II ............................................................................ 42 
SOURCES OF MATERIAL AND THEIR COLLECTION .................... .43 
TREATMENT OF MATERIAL ....................................................... 45 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDy ................................................... ..4 7 
CHAPTERV. COUNTRY DISCUSSION .............................................................. 49 
PLAN OF PRESENTATION .......................................................... 49 
BOLIVIA ............................................................................ 50 
CEYLON ............................................................................ 61 
GHANA .............................................................................. 79 
MAURITIUS ....................................................................... 96 
THAILAND ....................................................................... 11 0 
UNITED ARAB REpUBLIC ................................................ 125 
CHAPTER VI. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS .................................................. 146 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 146 
CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS 
BY TYPE OF MODEL " ............................................................ 146 
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INCOME MAIN-
TENANCE PROGRAM MODELS OR COMPONENTS .................... 148 
FACTOR COMBINATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INCOME 
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MODELS OR COMPONENTS ......... 159 
SUMMARy ............................................................................... 169 
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 171 
THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL ..................................... 171 
EMERGING CONCEPTUAL TRENDS .......................................... 171 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL ........... 177 
EMERGENCE OF A POLITICO-KINETIC PARADIGM OF 
INCOME MAINTENANCE POLICY FORMATION ...................... .180 
ApPENDIX I. SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS AND WELFARE EXPENDITURES IN 
LESS THAN US$300 PER CAPITA GDP COUNTRIES IN 1967 ......... 182 
ApPENDIX II. SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN STUDY 
COUNTRIES (CIRCA 1966-1970) ................................................... .183 
























Tables and Figures 
Countries Selected for Study .............................................................. .43 
IMPCs, Cost and Population Coverage (Bolivia) ................................ 50 
Selected Education Indices (Bolivia) ................................................... 51 
IMPCs, Cost and Population Coverage (Ceylon) ................................ 61 
Household Income Distribution in 1969-70 (Ceylon) ......................... 62 
Government Expenditures on Food Subsidies, Education 
and Health, 1950-68 (% of GNP) (Ceylon) ................................... 66 
School Enrollment (Ceylon) ................................................................ 70 
Physicians, Hospital Beds, Public Health Expenditures, 
1938-1970 (Ceylon) ....................................................................... 74 
Number of Trade Unions, Memberships, and Strikes, 
1948-1961 (Ceylon) ....................................................................... 75 
IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (Ghana) ................................ 79 
Schools Enrollment, Number of Schools, Teacher Training, 
1951-1959 (Ghana) ........................................................................ 84 
Number of Persons on Wages & Salaries and Unemployed 
Persons, 1954-61 (Ghana) .............................................................. 89 
IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (Mauritius) ........................... 96 
IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (Thailand) .......................... 11 0 
IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (UAR) ................................ 125 
Government Expenditures on Price Subsidies, Education 
and Health (UAR) ........................................................................ 129 
Selected Economic Indicators, around 1952 and 1960 (UAR) ......... .143 
Evaluation of the IMP by Level of Expenditure & Number 
of Components ............................................................................. 147 
Ranking of Study Countries' Income Maintenance Program 
Models (IMPMs) ............................................................ 148 
Distribution of the Levels of Social Indicators by Per Capita 
Income and Income Maintenance Program Model (IMPM) .......... 149 
Literacy Rate v. Expenditure on Education ....................................... 149 
Health Service v. Expenditure ........................................................... 150 
Wage Level v. Occupational Components ......................................... 152 
Figure 1. Four Basic Program Types .................................................................. .30 
Figure 2. A Schematic Presentation of the Working Conceptual Model ........... .36 
Figure 3. The Revised Conceptual ModeL ....................................................... 179 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is twofold: to investigate the factors associated 
with income maintenance policy decisions in a number of economically 
underdeveloped countries, and to develop a conceptual model for defining the 
study problem, generating hypotheses to guide future investigations in the subject 
field as well as serve as a framework for comparing the findings of differing 
country studies or differing research. 
Both aspects of the study purpose relate to an existing need in the field 
which is apparent when social provisions of various underdeveloped countries are 
reviewed. More orthodox notions concerning social welfare in general and 
income maintenance programs in particular view social provisions to be direct 
outcomes of decisions based on some objective assessments of prevailing social 
needs and available resources. A review of actual situations reveals, however, 
that this is not necessarily the case except in very general terms. 
It is true that in the global context there is a positive relationship between 
the indices of economic resources and social welfare. I Within a limited range of 
economic development, however, the relationship tends to disappear. Among 80 
countries with less than US$300 per capita GNP in 1967, for instance, social 
indicators including private consumption, infant mortality, population per 
physician, per capita food supply and adult literacy were wide-ranging and the 
levels of major social welfare expenditures as percentages of national income 
were also highly variable (see Appendix I). In the income maintenance field, the 
provisions went from a heavy reliance on universal measures such as free health 
services, subsidized basic food items for all and demogrants2 to an emphasis on 
selectively targeted schemes such as social insurance, provident funds, public 
assistance and other types of cash grants. 
What is significant about these differences is their seeming lack of 
correlation to the levels of national income, although they are all at various stages 
of underdevelopment. Burma, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia and India, for 
example, were countries with less than US$100 per capita income in 1967.3 But 
ISee Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning, McGraw Hill, New York, 1967, pp.117-125, 
Figures 15-19. 
2 A form of cash transfer based on demographic characteristics, such as sex or age that is paid 
to an individual irrespective ofher/his income or wealth. 
2 
India has a rapidly expanding Employees State Insurance Scheme and provident 
funds, along with a dozen or more measures for public employees.4 The Congo, 
on the other hand, resorts to work-related family allowances and other insurance 
. schemes of limited coverage.5 In Burma (Myanmar), the measures are truly 
contingency-oriented covering only sickness, maternity, work injuries and funeral 
costs.6 Ethiopia aims still lower and extends benefits to civil servants and the 
members of the armed forces only.7 
PROBLEM CONTEXT 
The obvious questions arIsmg from the above observations are: What 
factors underlie the program divergence? Do even marginal differences in 
national income bear significantly on public decisions relating to income 
maintenance provisions?; if so, to what extent? Are there other factors entering 
into a country's social policies and/or programs? If so, what are they? 
It is a historical fact that all just societies regarded freeing their members 
from basic want as one of their fundamental functions and, through the ages, 
countless ideas have been put forth, and many acted upon, in the hope of fulfilling 
that goal. It is also a fact, nevertheless, that, today, the greater number of the 
human race still go unfed or underfed. Why? What does this gigantic ideal-
reality gap stem from? Are the resources lacking, the ideas inadequate, the 
technical know-how to translate ideas and beliefs into action yet imperfect? Or 
is it that man and his society are under other equally compelling constraints that 
undermine efforts to link goals and actions? 
In macrocosm, there are grounds for supporting the proposition that 
should there be the will, there may be the means to eradicate some of the worst 
threats to security in all human communities in a relatively short time. This is 
not the place to argue the case at length, but it is useful to note that, in 1967, the 
world's per capita income was approximately US$650, more than double the 
upper limit of per capita income of a majority of the world's population. 8 
3UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 184. 
41LO, The Cost o/Social Security, 1964-66, Geneva, 1972; International Social Security 
Association Bulletins (lSSAB), 1952-70 inclusive, sections on India. 
5ISSAB, August/September 1963, pp.267-270. 
6Ibid., Aug. 1955, pp.303-307 & Oct. 1961, pp.610-614. 
7Ibid., Jan/Feb. 1962, pp.56-58; ILO, op.cit., section on Ethiopia. 
8Computation based on data in the UN Statistical Yearbook and Demographic Yearbook, 
1970. 
Total World Population in 1970: 3,635,195,000. 
GOP, 1967: developing countries $281,831 million. 
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However crude the assessment, it does nothing to prevent the speculation that, in 
setting the course of action to counter poverty, the intangible and apparently non-
objective requirements of society may be as decisive as, or perhaps more decisive 
than, the objective ones. 
What are some of the intangible requirements? A good deal of literature 
is available on the subject of decision making in the public domain. By and 
large, however, they offer what should and might determine policies and very 
little in terms of what actually does determine them. Research in the latter area 
is quite scarce and this is particularly true in the context of underdeveloped 
countries. 
STUDY ApPROACH 
Interest in the conceptual aspect of this study arose because of the lack of 
a solid knowledge base upon which to build a more controlled inquiry into the 
subject field. This study starts with a preliminary conceptual model that 
encompasses most major factors presumed to underlie public policy decisions. It 
also expresses the relationship assumed among such factors. The model was 
designed based on a preliminary exploration of various country data and review of 
literature on existing theories of decision making. The model served as a guide for 
data gathering and analyses in the country investigations but was used as an open 
system since an important aspect of its use in the study was to test its potential as 
an alternative conceptual framework for study in the subject field. 
This study included six economically underdeveloped national settings: 
Bolivia, Ceylon,9 Ghana, Mauritius, Thailand, and the United Arab Republic lO • 
It is a comparative case study that draws data from secondary sources. 
In order to provide a theoretical background to the research questions and 
related assumptions to be considered in Chapter III, a review of pertinent 
literature will be presented in the following chapter. The study method will be 
discussed in Chapter IV and the study findings in Chapters V though VII. 
developed market economies $1,633,125 million. 
centrally planned economies $398,522 million. 
Average per capita income, 1967: developing economies $180. 
developed market economies $2,232. 
centrally planned economies '$1,183. 
9Sri Lanka since 1972. In the text, its old name will be used since this study deals with that 
period. 
IOReverted back to "Egypt" in 1971. In the text, "UAR" will be used since this study deals 
with that period. 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL POLICY DETERMINATION -
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
PLAN OF REVIEW 
Of the bulk of the literature with potential relevance to various issues of 
social policy, the present study focused on materials dealing with policy choice or 
decision-making. These materials were not always explicitly with reference to 
the social policy field but shed light on how people, individually and in groups, 
choose policies and why they decide on one course of action rather than another. 
The central query of the study - why the governments and the leaders of 
the selected countries adopted the income maintenance measures that they have -
is related essentially to the choice or decision behavior in the public domain. 
This is not to imply that public decision-making behavior in general and income 
maintenance policy-making behavior in particular may be equated. But because 
materials from the immediately applicable field are meager, it was both necessary 
and desirable to draw from other related fields so as to render the overall 
conceptual background more adequate. The disciplines of economics, sociology, 
political science, psychology and business administration are the main 
contributors to existing decision-making theories. At the more practical, if less 
formalized, level, they are augmented by the contributions of expert practitioners 
in policy and planning. 
In the following section, selected materials are presented in four parts. 
The first part reviews formal concepts, including both the normative and 
descriptive theories of choice. There is a proliferation of such theories, but this 
review covers only a few which are either central to other choice theories or are 
directly relevant to the present study. None of these theories has evolved from 
nor been tested in the context of underdeveloped countries. However, the 
possibility of their application to underdeveloped countries clearly exists and 
therefore warrants consideration. 
The second part reviews materials stemming directly from the context of 
underdeveloped countries. These are all in the nature of expert observations, 
opinions, and commentaries. These materials were selected, in part, because 
they depict the trends of the underdeveloped world in general and those of certain 
regions with which this study is concerned. The third part discusses a small 
volume of research findings on social security programs and their determinants. 
In the fourth and final part, a number of authoritative overviews are presented. 
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All the materials address both the substantive and conceptual aspects of 
the study, although the first part gives greater attention to the conceptual aspects 
than to the others. The theoretical material in the first part will progress from 
single factor concepts to more complex ones. This arrangement is to facilitate 
the comparison of those perceptions with the conceptual model that this study 
begins and concludes with. The arrangement of the second part is topical, while 
those of the third and the fourth are shown simply by reference to the author. 
FORMAL CONCEPTS 
A. NORMATIVE THEORIES 
Pareto Criterion and the Optimizing Principle 
While it is founded on a composite concept involving both qualitative 
and quantitative precepts of Pareto, i.e. utility and maximization, I the Pareto 
Criterion as it is employed in present-day theories of decision is essentially a 
quantitative basis of comparing alternative social states. It stipulates, 
that: 
State A is better than State B if someone is better off in 
State A and no one is worse off. 
If in State C, the sum of utilities of all concerned equals 
the maximum attainable in that state, then a Pareto 
Optimum exists in State C.2 
Most choice models are built on this principle3 and rest on the premise 
1. If value preferences can be explicitly stated, and 
2. All alternatives leading to the satisfaction of the value requisites are 
known, and 
ISee Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings, Praeger, New York, 1966, particularly pp. 99-
103 (discussion of utility, ophelimity (economic satisfaction) and the tasks of social science). 
2Cf. Richard Zeckhauser & Elmer Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory", 
The Study of Policy Formation, ed. Raymond A. Bauer & Kenneth J. Gergen, Free Press, New 
York, 1968, p. 43. 
3Including mathematical models, the game theory, the price system, the social welfare 
criteria, the Theil-Tinbergen model and others. 
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3. The alternatives can be ranked in relation to the stated order of 
preferences, 
4. Then it is possible to choose the best course of action in terms of 
utility maximization.4 
In the above proposition, values may be a prIOrI, requiring no 
redefinition; rationally arrived at through sampling, opinion polls, delegation of 
decision responsibility to the leader, a computer, the experts, and so on; or 
arbitrary, representing subjective preferences. Whichever the case, the system of 
optimization as the means to a stated ends remains unaffected since its sole 
requirement is that its values be made known. 
A number of problems are involved in the optimizing model. Among 
others: 
(1) It assumes a one-dimensional decision system embracing a single 
set of value preferences and priorities. This is inconsistent with reality which is 
multidimensional5 and open 6 to contending sets of values and interests. A 
particular difficulty arises in this connection: the difficulty of reducing different 
sets of values into a common one. 7 Even if this presented no problem, the 
question, "What would constitute the single system of values against which to 
judge the solution?"g still remains. 
(2) It assumes values are quantifiable and measurable and, thus, made 
objective. This is not tenable in view of the wide range of interpretations to which 
values are subject. Despite certain areas of crossover, the qualitative and 
quantitative parameters occupy essentially separate domains. 
(3) It is impossible to identify all alternative solutions to a problem. 
Apart from the problem of values, there are two other conditions that must be 
satisfied if the list of alternative solutions is to be complete. First, all factors 
pertinent to the decision system must be known. Second, there must be no 
significant time limit. Neither of these conditions can be met in normal decision 
contexts. 
4Cf. Ibid., p. 29; Joseph L. Bower, "Descriptive Decision Theory", from Administrative 
Behavior, Ibid., p.106. 
SBower,op. cit., p. 107; R. S. Rolan, "Emerging Views ofPlanning",JAIP, July 1967, p. 234. 
6Raymond A. Bauer, et aI., The Study of Policy Formation, etc, Free Press, New York, 1971, 
p.15. 
7Bauer, 0p. cit., p. 2. 
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(4) The principles of optimization are themselves of limited merit. 
Since the late 1960s when the concepts of "disproduct" and "dis welfare" gained 
currency, the optimizing principle has undergone steady erosion. A few of the 
recent contributors to the trend are the Club-of-Rome/MIT project researchers9 
and Illich. IO The former argue that the optimizing model characterized by 
unrestrained growth is ultimately self-defeating. They maintain that the 
relationship between the positive and the negative "feedback loops", the first 
incorporating the exponential growths, such as industrial capital and population, 
and the second, the constraints of these growths on the world system, i.e. 
pollution, depletion of non-renewable resources, and famine, is such that "the 
negative loops become stronger and stronger as growth approaches the ultimate 
limit. Finally, the negative loops balance or dominate the positive ones, and 
growth comes to an end." II 
Illich, while in general agreement with the above, focuses on the 
dysfunctional potential inherent in all functional systems. The over extended 
highway networks which, beyond a certain point, tend to be self-obstructive, and 
the educational system which contributes to the graduates' sense of frustration, 
even failure, in many countries where opportunities are seldom commensurate 
with training, etc., well illustrate his argument. 
Incremental Rationality 
Braybrooke and Lindblom 12 sought to circumvent some of the 
problems of the optimizing model by substituting optimum utility with marginal 
utility. The result is a model involving a greatly reduced choice perimeter and, 
therefore, a far less number of alternatives to contend with. 
While an incremental criteria would be most useful in decision-making 
systems where the primary concern is with extending the frontier of the existing 
utility perimeter, it would be inadequate where the concept of utility itself must be 
redefined and, therefore, the utility perimeter must be redrawn. Such a situation 
exists, for example, in societies in transition from feudal to industrial or capitalist 
to socialist systems where existing social programs may call for a complete 
overhaul based upon radically new perceptions of needs, rather than small 
adjustments on the basis of marginal utility gains. 
9Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers & William Behrens III, The 
Limits to Growth, Inverse Books, New York, 1972. 
IOIvan IIIich, Deschooling (check word) Society, and Outwitting the Developed Countries, 
World Development: An Introductory Reader, ed. Helene Castel, Macmillan, New York, pp. 280-
296. 
I I Meadows et ai., op. cit., p.156. 
12David Braybooke & Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, Free Press, New York, 
1963. 
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Arrow's Impossibility Theorem/3 
Based on the hypothesis that no one group's welfare requirements are 
acceptable in total to another group (social welfare function is "intransitive"), 
Arrow holds that it is impossible to formulate a decision criterion that satisfies all 
the groups in a decision environment. The problem may be solved, he suggests, 
by attaching different weights to different groups' utilities. Group A, for 
instance, rather than Group B, may be assigned a higher priority so that the 
former's utility always comes first. 
Arrow's theorem is a marked departure from the strictly rational stance 
of the optimizing model and, indeed, offers a solution of sorts. But it is a 
solution that relies heavily on the personal variables of the decision maker and 
leads to another problem of intransitivity. 
Heuristic Approach 
In a comprehensive discussion of the application of the general 
problem-solving principle in systems design, Boguslaw cites the heuristics of 
functions, or means-end, liberty and other social values, the command and 
prohibition heuristics, the relativist heuristics, and the instrumental v. value 
heuristics. 14 The significance of the heuristic approach lies in the fact that its 
position relative to the decision criteria remains unfixed. Being an effort to 
replicate the human brain in computerized decision processes, it leaves the 
problem solver free to adopt the most desirable or workable approach to solving a 
problem. 
It can be seen that in the above normative theories, decisions are 
conceived to be based on anything from a single, purely quantitative parameter, 
i.e. utility maximization, to a composite, qualitative-quantitative one involving 
preferences, values, the heuristics of workability, etc. That all of these 
parameters enter into various aspects of public decision-making at different 
stages, either separately or simultaneously, is not difficult to conceive, and it will 
be part of the task of this study to see if they apply in any of the study settings. 
In due course, how the theories relate to this study's own conceptual framework 
will also be clarified. 
13Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Cowles Foundation Monograph, 
No. 12, 2nd ed., John Wiley, New York, 1963. 
14Robert Boguslaw, The New Utopians: A Study of Systems Design and Social Change, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965. (paperback) Also see, A. Newell, J.C. Shaw & H.A. 
Simon, General Problem-solving Program for a Computer", Computers and Automation, VIlI, No. 
7 (July 1959), pp.1 0-17 and H.A. Simon, Modeling Human Mental Processes", Proceedings of the 
Western Joint Computer Conference, May 9-11, 1961. 
9 
B. DESCRIPTIVE THEORIES 
The Institutionalists 
Theories falling under this heading share in common the perception 
that decisions take place in an environment of complex individual and 
institutional relationships. According to Barnard, for instance, individuals 
choose "on the basis of (1) purposes, desires, impulses of the moment, and (2) the 
alternatives external to the individual recognized by him as available.,,15 In 
effect, this is an interactional concept of decision-making which includes an 
element of compromise between the individual and institutional re~uirements 
which may be at odds with one another. Selnickl6 and Thompson 7 are two 
other authors of institutional theories, and their theories differ from Barnard's in 
emphasis only. Selnick stresses the infonnal and spontaneous nature of the 
individual-organizational interactions, while Thompson places significance on the 
competitive motivation in corporate decision-making. 
Clearly the institutional model is close to commonly observable day-
to-day decision behavior. Whether it is equally close to the decision-making in 
the public domain remains to be seen. 
The Political Economists 
A number of works in the political science field stresses self-interest 
and its maximization factors in decision-making. With reference to party 
politics, Downs holds, 
Party members have as their chief motivation the desire to obtain 
the intrinsic rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate 
policies as means to holding office rather than seeking office in 
,J • d I" 18 oruer to carry out preconceive po ICles. 
Riker similarly maintains, 
Given social situations within certain kinds of decision-making 
institutions ... in which exist two alternative courses of action with 
15Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, 
p.17. 
16Phylip Selnick, Leadership and Administration, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1957. 
17Victor Thompson, Modern Organizations, Knopf, New York, 1961. 
18Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1957, p.296. 
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differing outcomes in money, power or success, some participants 
will choose the alternative leading to the larger payoff. Such 
choice is rational behavior and it will be accepted as definitive 
while the behavior of participants who do not so choose will not 
necessarily be so accepted. 19 
The last fonnulation has the effect of stating the obvious because it 
restricts choices to more or less the same parameters. But it serves, as does 
Downs', to support the proposition that decisions are based on self-interest, 
whether it is office, money, power or simply success. 
The Ellsberg findings on the United States presidential decision-
making vis-a-vis the Vietnam War support the political self-interest motif such as 
Downs stipulates. Based on an analysis of all the materials that were accessible 
to him during his tenure at the Defense Department and the Rand Corporation, he 
concludes that in the two decades of choosing between alternative policies 
towards Vietnam, all the United States presidents concerned, from Truman to 
Nixon, consistently opted for those that were politically expedient in their 
respective circumstances and times. Of the many ingredients that entered into 
the expediency parameter, getting re-elected, getting a certain legislation passed 
by not provokin~ certain political sectors, not losing the war "now", etc., were the 
more important. 0 
The Sociology of Policy-Making 
There is an abundance of sociological concepts applicable to decision-
making in the public or political domain. Schoettle discusses some of them in a 
framework that brings out the inter-relationship between policy-maker and policy-
making system.21 
The first relevant factor is the policy-maker's political orientation. In 
Parsons' tenns, "orientation" refers to the "internalized aspects of objects and 
relationships" and includes "(1) cognitive orientation, or knowledge of and belief 
about the political system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs 
and outputs; (2) affective orientation or feelings about the political system, its 
roles, personnel and perfonnance; and (3) evaluation orientation, the judgments 
and opinions about political objects that typically involve a combination of value 
19Theodore Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, New Haven, . 
1962, p.23. 
20Daniei Ellsberg, Papers on the War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1972. See particularly 
"The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine", pp. 42-135. 
21Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle, The State of the Art in Policy Studies", The Study of Policy 
Formation, etc., pp.149-l79. 
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standards and criteria with information and feelings.,,22 Political orientation acts 
as a filter affecting both the policy maker's perception of external reality, i.e. 
policy demands, and his or her response to them. 
Another highly elaborated sociological concept pertinent to policy-
making is the role theory. It stipulates that individuals behave according to role 
expectations. It conceives the political system as a structure of roles which 
patterns social interaction?3 It regards individuals interdependent in various 
systems of action, including that of political action, by virtue of "mutual 
expectations about the attitudes or behaviors of significant others ... ,,24 
Somewhat differing from, if not unrelated to, the above concepts of 
decision-making is the theory of the elite. Treated extensively in the writings of 
Pareto, the theory holds that in any social system there are the select few who, by 
virtue of their particular capabilities, place themselves in governing positions and 
other positions of influence and, once in such positions, attempt to remain there 
through persuasion or force. 25 The elites are " ... a minority of individuals whose 
preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preference in key political 
issues. ,,26 Galbraith identifies such a group in the United States social structure, 
particularly the corporate structure,27 and the studies of Mills28 and Hunte~9 
provide findings to the same effect. 
The elite theory has long been somewhat controversial, with the critics 
arguing that the power structure is pluralistic. Considering all the governments 
and empires that fell in confrontations with the "will of the people", the argument 
is difficult to dismiss. But its validity seems to hold only over a fairly long time 
period and, even then, the group replacing the fallen elites is likely to consist of 
more elites, if with differing orientation and style. In practical terms, therefore, 
the elite theory has a greater potential in elucidating policy formation. 
22Ibid., p.152. 
23G.A. Almond, "Comparative Political System", Journal of Politics, XVIII, 1956. 
24H. Eulau, Journey in Politics, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1964, p. 256. 
25Vilfredo Pareto, "Social Systems", Sociological Writings, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 
123-142; S.E. Finer, "Introduction", op. cit., pp.5I-54. 
26Robert Dahl, Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", American Political Science Review 
(APSR), LU, No.2 (June 1958), p. 464. 
27John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1978. 
28c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959. 
29Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill, 1953. 
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The application of the descriptive theories reviewed so far to the 
present inquiry is fairly obvious. They variously maintain that decisions are 
based on a compromise between the individual and institutional requirements; 
policies are chosen according to political self-interest and expediency; it is the 
elites of government and society who decide outcomes; and" the elite political 
orientations and role perceptions are particularly significant in relation to what 
and how policies are chosen. 
Taken together, these theories offer a considerable body of factors 
associated with policy formation in the public sector, as well as providing an 
insight into the relationship that might exist between them. In terms of the last 
contribution, the elite theory and the theories of political orientation and role 
perception can combine to form the proposition that policies are determined, at 
least in part, by the political orientation and the role perception of the political 
leader(s). As another example, the institutional theory and the elite theory 
jointly suggest that the political leader or the policy-maker encounters (and must 
deal with) "significant others" who may be influential individuals or groups, or 
the polity at large. 
Systems Theories 
A logical culmination of the preceding theories of choice would be a 
schema capable of encompassing them all in a structural whole. The closest to 
such a scheme to emerge so far are formulations of systems theory. In a 
sociological context, these formulations refer to the concept of society as a 
problem-solving and goal-satisfying system in which the selection of goals and 
the method of their attainment greatly depend upon the interplay of the system 
components. The key system components are belief-knowledge; end, goal or 
objective; norm, status-role or position; ranks; power; sanction; and facility. 
System functions include communication, boundary maintenance, systematic 
linkage, institutionalization, socialization, and social contro1.30 In a political 
context, it is an action system oriented toward specific social goals and the action 
emerging from the system is representative of the nature of shared interest and 
values.31 
The view that decisions are the product of systemic processes rather 
than those of one or more variables representing only part of the system is the 
main contribution of systems theory. Outside the descriptive context, this 
holistic concept of decision-making and action has been routinized into an 
30AIfred J. Kahn, Theory and Practice of Social Planning, Russell Sage Foundation, New 
York, 1969. (Chapters V, VI). Also see Charles P. Loomis, Social Systems, Van Nostrand Co., 
Princeton, N.J. 1960. 
31Talcot Parsons, Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action", Approaches to the 
Study of Politics, ed., Roland Young, North Western University Press, Evanston Ill., p. 286. 
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instrument of policy formation and programming. Kahn's paradigm of social 
planning32 is an integrated example of the instrumentalized systems theory. 
EXPERT OBSERVATIONS 
Outside the formal framework there are volumes of material bearing on 
policy formation. In the following section, only those with direct reference to 
the underdeveloped context are reviewed topically. 
Viable Values and Value Commitment 
Delving into the literature on development planning and policy-making in 
underdeveloped areas, one is truly impressed by the amount of attention devoted 
to questions of value redefinition and value commitment. In one sense, the need 
for more viable values arises out of a new perception of the consequences of 
pursuing certain old ones, such as modernization without development and social 
change in terms of the breakdown of old systems without the prospect of finding 
new and better ones. In another sense, it is a matter of preference. This applies 
in many of the underdeveloped countries where the pursuit of growth and growth-
oriented social objectives proved not only unsuccessful but threatening to 
congenial ways of life. 
Goulet, writing in connection with development planning, asserts that 
"definitions of development in terms of industrialization, urbanization, 
modernization, growth, maximization, or even optimization are bad,,33 unless "it 
accords with, or promises to be useful for obtaining the values held by a given 
civilization. ,,34 He does not specify an alternative definition of development but 
offers a clue when he cites Libret who conceives development as "a coordinated 
series of change, whether abrupt or gradual, from a phase of life perceived by a 
population and all of its components as being inhuman to a phase perceived as 
more human. ,,35 
Some United Nations (UN) analysts expound the same theme. Stressing 
the importance of the viability and the authenticity of values in policy formation, 
they argue that only upon such values can an authentic societal self-image be 
fonned to guide and stimulate the lines of growth and change consistent with the 
conditions and aspirations of the given society.36 They go on to state that "the 
23. 
32Kahn, op. cit., p. 62. 
33 Denis Goulet, "That Third World", World Development: An Introductory Reader. etc., p. 
34Ibid.. p. 8. 
35Ibid.. p. 23. 
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ways in which peoples and governments can change social and economic realities 
depend not only upon the nature of these realities, but also upon the visions 
entertained ofthem.,,37 
The assumption that a key policy determinant is value commitment is 
shared by many writers. In connection with fiscal policy, Baster maintains that 
"optimum distribution of income, including both considerations of efficiency and 
equity ... will, in the final analysis, depend on the relative value which any socie70 
puts on these aims.,,38 With reference to agrarian policies, Myrdal,39 Foland 0 
and Ladejinsky41 join in the observation that in those countries where land reform 
was attempted its success or failure coincided with the presence or absence of an 
official commitment to that policy. Goulet expounds the theme in a more 
general context when he states: "the supreme factor is the decisive will of a 
society to assign itself new goals and condition itself to pay the price required to 
obtain them ... ,,42 
In short, authentic and viable values and the policy maker's commitment 
to them are crucial factors underlying policy formation and implementation. 
Institutional Non-Transitivity 
Many writers hold that values and institutions are essentially not 
transferable from one socio-cultural context to another. Hunter for one writes 
that the failure of both democracy and socialism, as well as of various 
modernization efforts including the experimentations with social insurance and 
agricultural cooperatives in Africa and Asia, attests to the truth of this proposition. 
He states: 
To abstract from the whole Western system just those elements 
designed to produce engineers or geophysicists (rather than the 
whole, which is designed to produce citizens and men) could be to 
36UN, Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America, Economic 
Commission for Latin America, New York, 1970, pp.7-8. 
37lbid, p.7. 
38Nancy Baster, Distribution of Income and Economic Growth: Concept and Issues, United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva, 1970, p. 35. 
39Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vols. I-III, Pantheon, New York, 1968. See sections on 
India. 
4°Francis M. Foland, Agrarian Reform in Latin America", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No.1 
(October 1969),pp. 97-112. 
4l WolfLadejinsky, Agrarian Reform in Asia", op.cit., Vol. 42, No.3 (April 1964), pp. 445-
460. 
42Goulet,op. cit., p.3. 
fall into a grave mistake. For what is at issue in Africa is the 
growth of the new nations, new societies of men, not merely the 
. if h . 43 constructIOn 0 t e new economies. 
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Again with reference to rural development, Flores discusses the close tie-
in of the agrarian economic structure with tribal customs and mores, which makes 
the adaptation of the European formula difficult.44 Dalton describes the tie-in in 
Africa thus: 
The economy is so organized that the distribution of tasks and 
land, the organization of labor in production processes and the 
use of goods and services - in short, production and distribution -
are a concrete expression of kinship obligations, tribal affiliations 
and religious and moral duties. There is no separate economic 
system capable of analysis independently of the social 
structure ... 45 
The implication of the above arguments for the present study is somewhat 
indirect. That is, although many social institutions have been transplanted from 
the developed to the underdeveloped context, it may be assumed that in many 
instances they have met resistance because of their fundamental or peripheral 
disharmony with existing institutional requirements. In the field of income 
maintenance, for instance, it is conceivable that where a social security system as 
it is generally understood in the Western context is either absent or under-
developed, it is due to counter-pressures from traditional institutions. 
Culture 
If institutions are basically not transferable and value premises of social 
policies must be authentic in order for the latter to succeed, then there is little 
doubt that culture exerts significant influence on policy. What is not so clear but 
potentially interesting is the question whether there are certain patterns of culture 
more conducive to the development of a particular policy than others. 
Livingstone, writing in regard to the health, education and welfare of the 
underdeveloped countries, indicates that kinship structure, tribal or ethnic 
celebrations, and negative attitudes toward change definitely hinder the 
development of rational policies.46 With regard to social security in Somali land, 
43Guy Hunter, ~he New Africa", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No.4 (JulyI970), p.713. 
44Xavier A. Flores, Institutional Problems in the Modernization of African Agriculture", A 
Review o/Rural Cooperation in Developing Areas, UNRISD, Geneva, 1969, pp. 201-209. 
45G. Dalton, Le Development des Economies de Subsistance et des Economies Paysannes en 
Afrique", Revue International des Sciences Sociales, Vol. VVI, No.3 (1963), p. 411. 
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Wildman cites the absence of interest in anything planned and a totally different 
basis of material security, i.e. livestock as the basic means of existence for the 
nomad, the nomadic mode of life itself, and inborn conservatism on the part of the 
urban independent workers toward collective security, etc., as obstacles to the 
social insurance approach.47 In Tingbergen's view, an interest in material well-
being, in techniques and innovation, an ability to collaborate with other people 
and to observe certain rules are some of the necessary traits for attaining socio-
economic progress through a rational policy. These traits are known to be 
lacking among the people of the underdeveloped areas.48 
How far these traits are cultural or may be due to low standards of living is 
open to question. But the point is clear: these tendencies render the purely 
efficiency-oriented or "rational" approach to development ineffective. The 
question now is whether the point is valid. The answer would depend on a 
number of as yet unclarified issues, such as whether social insurance and other 
social security measures in the Western tradition are really the best and most 
efficient approaches to income maintenance regardless of the socio-cultural 
context of their application, and whether economic growth and growth-oriented 
development objectives have intrinsic values of their own. This is because the 
concept of "rational policy" has meaning only in relation to policy objectives, and 
the cultural traits and practices suited for one type of rational policy may be quite 
unsuited for another. 
The complexity of the problem makes it impossible to incorporate it into 
the present inquiry in its basic form. But this study is concerned with clarifying 
whether socio-cultural traits in fact obstruct, modify and/or complement the 
adoption of one type or another of income maintenance measures in any setting 
and, if so, how. 
Ideology 
The significance of ideology as a policy determinant is refuted by those 
who place a high premium on cultural tradition. Tannerbaum, for one, argues 
that despite a widespread infiltration of foreign ideologies, e.g. Nazism, fascism, 
socialism and communism in Latin America, there are no ideologically-based 
party politics to speak of in the region.49 He contends that every important 
political event in the region has been attributable to shifting patterns in the 
"caudillo" structure, which has little to do with ideology. In his view, both 
46 Arthur Livingstone, Social Policy in Developing Countries, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1961. 
47Lee Wildman, Social Security in Somaliland", ISSAB, June/July, 1954, pp. 200-211. 
48Jan Tinbergen, op. cit., p. 27. 
49Frank Tannerbaum, The Future of Democracy in Latin America", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, 
No.3 (April 1955), and The Political Dilemma in Latin America", ibid., Vol. 38 (April 1960). 
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Trujillo and Castro are typical examples of the caudillo phenomenon, while 
revolutions and coup d'etats cause and foreshadow the leadership change.50 
Other writers disagree with the above view. Arciniegos,51 Alexander52 
and Pearson53 maintain in their respective articles that communism, nationalism 
and other party-based politics play an immediate and tan~ible part in the politics 
and policies of many Latin American countries. Arroba, 4 Mena55 and Carron56 
support their view in the context of agricultural policies of the area. Carroll, for 
instance, states that in Mexico, the history of the collective ejidas is intimately 
bound up with ideological and political struggles and that the rise and fall of the 
ejidas coincided with the presence or absence of ideological commitment on the 
part of the ruling government.57 Baster, too, regards ideology as a decisive 
factor in inducing one type of economic policy or another and refers to the 
differences between the socialist and market economies. 58 
Despite the above confrontation of views, there are reasons to assume that 
these views may be both valid, subject to such intervening variables as time, 
place, and again, commitment. In regard to the last, Castro may be a caudillo 
leader, but had he been committed to ideologies and values other than those of 
socialism, the policies of his regime might by quite different from what they are. 
The case oflran and Syria v. Libya and Tunisia in Africa and the two Chinas, two 
Koreas, and two Vietnams in Asia are further illustrations to the same effect. * 
50lbid., p.497. 
51German Arciniegos, Communism in Latin America: A Problem for the Immediate Future", 
Columbia Journal of International Aflairs, Vol. Ill, No. I, 1954. 
52 Robert Alexander, Nationalism: Latin America's Predominant Ideology", ibid., Vol. XV, 
No.2,1961. 
53 Neal 1. Pearson, Latin American Peasant Pressure Groups", ibid., Vol. XX, No.2, 1966. 
54Gonzalo Arroba, Social Security Schemes and the National Economy in the Developing 
Countries", ISSAB, No. 1,1969, pp. 46-47 and 81. 
55 Antonio Ortiz Mena, Recent Development in the Field of Social Security in Mexico', Ibid., 
Jan/Feb. 1956, pp. 42-66. 
56Thomas F. Carroll, Peasant Cooperation in Latin America", A Review of Rural Cooperation 
in Developing Areas, etc., pp. 39-40 and 42-47. 
58Nancy Baster, op. cit., pp.31-32. 
* Valid examples at the time of this study. 
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Requisites of Power 
The political-interest hypothesis of Downs and Riker finds support among 
various writers who see social policy serving the purpose of either creating and 
consolidating a political power base or weakening the forces of opposition. 
Pelzer, for one, reports that the earliest social insurance scheme in Germany came 
into being when Bismarck conceived it as a palliative to the radicals threatening 
the existing order. The UN experts similarly observe that "the (political) system, 
in order to survive, tries to satisfy demands ... according to the strength of the 
relevant groups within the system, and faces continual choice between the 
granting of some satisfaction to the groups striving to become incorporated or 
keeping them out by force". 59 
In Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, the social security and labor protection 
initiatives have been the means of strengthening a following among various labor-
based political movements and winning them over from revolutionary appeals.6o 
In other areas of Latin America, the land policy played a significant role in the 
struggle to gain the allegiance of the peasantry.61 
Conditions of Underdevelopment 
The very conditions of underdevelopment such as poor diet, low standards 
of health, inadequate housing, population expansion, as well as the scarcity of 
public funds inhibit meaningful social action. There are other corollaries of 
poverty and underdevelopment that serve the same function. They are low 
literacy rate, absence of trained personnel, absence of reliable data, inadequate 
registration practices and subsistence-oriented attitudes to work.62 
Colonial Tradition and Other External Factors 
The imprints of colonialism and protectionism, past and present, are 
unmistakable in most social security provisions and other social policies of the 
underdeveloped countries. In the social security field, France, for example, left 
her former colonies with the system of work-related family allowances. France 
and Great Britain introduced a variety of mutual benefit societies in their 
59UN, Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America. ibid., p. 30. 
60Ibid., pp. 2 and 242. 
6lCarrol1, ibid., p. 4. 
62Wildman, op.cit., pp.21 0-211; ISSA, Reports on the First and Second African Regional 
Conferences of Social Security. Bul1etins Jan/Peb. 1963, pp.14-17 & May/June 1966, pp.186-213; 
Vladimir Rys, Some Current Problems of Social Security in the World", ISSAB. No.3, 1968, pp. 
432-442. 
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respective colonies.63 They also bequeathed the tradition of dualism in social 
security that separates the urban from the rural subsistence sector.64 
While the British and the French influences are most visible in Africa and 
Asia, the Spanish had sway in Latin America. Cubas cites Paraguay in 
particular, where policies towards the Indian population were marked by 
protectionism of the early conquistadors. He states that it is from this very 
tradition that the particular social sensibility that made the entire continent 
susceptible to social security needs has evolved.65 
Two major instruments of external intervention during the post-colonial 
period have been foreign aid and technical assistance. In the words of some UN 
analysts, they have "assumed enormous importance .. jn shaping the conceptions 
and expectations of the low-income countries concerning the development 
process. ,,66 
For an outstanding example of intergovernmental intervention one might 
name the Alliance for Progress, the United States foreign policy vehicle in Latin 
America in the 1960s. Camargo writes in this connection that the social and 
economic policies of the region coincided with the rise and fall of this program 
and that land reform, for one, became acceptable to many of the countries in the 
area only after it had been endorsed at Punta Del Este in August 1961. 67 
President Truman's "Point-Four" program was another such example.68 
In the area of international assistance, the role of the United Nations has 
been singular. With respect to social security alone, the world-wide expansion 
of social insurance schemes and other provisions for labor is inconceivable 
without the ceaseless efforts of the International Labor Organization acting under 
63Yladmir Rys, Current Problems of Social Security in the World", ISSAB, No.3, 1968, 
pp.432-442; Otto Schimid, Development of Social Protection in Underdeveloped Regions By 
Means of Mutual Benefit Societies", ibid., November 1953, pp. 394-406. 
64Wildman, op.cit., suggests the dualist tradition stems in part from the practice of double 
social security standards, one for the European population and the other for the indigenous. 
65Emilo Cubas, "Recent Development in Social Security in the Americas", ISSAB, 
January/February, 1956, pp.18-19. 
66UN, ibid., p. 9. 
67 Alberto Lleros Camargo, The Alliance for Progress: Aims, Distortions, Obstacles", Foreign 
Affairs, Yol. 42, No.1 (October 1963). Also see, Foland, op. cit., p. 97. 
68Royal Institute of International Affairs, "U.S. Technical Assistance to Latin America", The 
World Today, (Chatham House Review), Yol. III, No.2, February 1951, pp.84-92, details the 
activities of Inter-departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, The Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs, and the U.S. Export and Import Bank, all of which were created to 
implement the policy guidelines of Point-Four". 
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UN mandates.69 Other development policies, in industry, commerce, agriculture, 
health education, housing, community development, crime control, human rights, 
and so forth, have also been under the aegis of various agencies of the same world 
body.7o 
A question arises at this point concerning technical assistance. In 
situations where there are marked differences in problem perception and 
perceptions of priorities between the aid advisors and the officials of the recipient 
countries, whose view prevails? Livingstone describes the problem in terms of 
the allegiance of the advisor - to the agency he represents, to the government he is 
advising, and to the country which nurtured his ideas and experience - and the 
preferences of the local official who demands the right to choose his own 
priorities and make his own mistakes.71 Livingstone offers no specific answer to 
the problem. 
Less obvious but perhaps more pervasive is the constraint that arises as the 
underdeveloped countries are incorporated into "a world order with its dynamic 
centers outside the region ... " This particular constraint is regarded as 
increasingly binding and inhibiting for policy at the nationallevel.72 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Empirical research in the social policy field is practically non-existent and 
what there is mostly concerns highly technical aspects of various branches of 
social insurance and assimilated schemes.73 The few exceptional instances of 
research that have some pertinence to the present study address themselves to the 
question of the level of social security development and its underlying factors. 
In the following, concise summaries of the findings of various authors are 
presented. 
Political Structure, Economic Development and Social Security Programs, 
by Philip Cutrighe4 
69Rys,op. cit., p. 433; ILO, technical assistance reports on numerous countries 
70 Ref. UN, Technical Assistance Reports. 
7lLivingstone, op.cit., p. 82. 
nUN,op. cit, p. 8. 
730aniel S. Gerig, A Survey of Research Carried on by Members of the International Social 
Security Association", ISSAB, No.2, 1968, pp.163-197. 
741n American Journal ojSociology. University of Chicago Press, March, 1965. 
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Cutright tested the relationship between social insurance program 
experience (SIPE), economic indices and political structures using data drawn 
from 76 developed and semi-developed countries. The major tenets of his 
findings are that, across the board, the level of economic development as 
measured in terms of energy consumption is the most powerful differentiator of 
SIPE, but political structure, in terms of the accessibility of the governing elite to 
the people, is also positively correlated with SIPE. He found that the second 
correlation is clearer among the wealthiest nations and that among poorer nations 
there may be a direct parallel between increments of economic growth and 
increments of SIPE. 
The economic correlation with SIPE in the overall context complements 
the per capita income-social indicator correlation reported by Tinbergen. As for 
the hypothesis of economic determinism at less developed levels of economy, it 
represents an interesting departure from the impression one gains from surveying 
the range of social indicators and certain social welfare expenditures among very 
low-income countries. This study will consider this hypothesis based on its 
own findings. 
Social Security: International Comparisons, by Henry Aaron75 
Based on cross-national data drawn from 22 industrialized countries, this 
study examines the relationship between the level of social security expenditure, 
economic indices, particularly national income and household savings, and the 
length of time since the enactment of the first social security legislation. In the 
study findings, the economic correlation was consistently positive. 
The interpretations offered for the historical correlation include such 
hypotheses as the promotion and perpetuation of social security programs through 
political bureaucracies, the momentum of historical precedent, and continued 
popular political demands. It is these interpretive hypotheses rather than the 
findings themselves that are pertinent to the present query. 
Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations, 
by Frederick Pryor76 
Examining 14 industrialized and semi-industrialized countries of differing 
economic systems, this study also finds the historical correlation to be highly 
significant. Pryor's interpretation of this correlation is again similar to Aaron's 
as he suggests that it can refer either to "the basic climate of opinion in nations for 
governmental intervention in the welfare field,,77 or the institutional momentum. 
7S Studies in the Economics of Income Maintenance, ed. Otto Eckstein, Brookings Institute, 
1967. 
76Pub1ished by George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1968. 
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Pryor finds that the level of economic development among the most 
developed countries is not a powerful explicator of the level of social welfare 
expenditure. He finds the economic variable to underlie social welfare expendi-
tures but not as a direct casual factor. 
Differences in Social Security Development in Selected Countries, 
by Koji Taira & Peter Kilby78 
U sing the studies of Cutright and Aaron as a starting point, the authors 
tested a series of variables in relation to a social security program index (SSPI) in 
19 Western nations. Their findings again support the historical correlation. 
However, their study isolated another variable: geographical proximity to a center 
of socio-political trends, i.e. the European continent. 
There are two somewhat inconsistent trends in the above findings. On 
the one hand is Cutright's economic determinism, although it carries the 
qualification that its power diminishes where wealthy countries are concerned. 
Political structure was another but less decisive variable. On the other hand, 
there are three studies that relegate economic variables to a secondary, if not an 
inconsequential, role while advancing the historical factor, with its political and 
institutional interpretations, as the more powerful explicator of social security 
development. 
Are these findings as inconsistent as they seem? They are not if it is 
noted that the Cutright study involved a large number of countries representing a 
wide economic spectrum whereas the others concentrated on industrialized 
countries and, to a lesser extent, on semi-industrialized ones. 
Since, in the Cutright study, the economic variable was weaker and the 
political variable stronger among highly developed countries, this makes the 
findings of all the studies reviewed more or less unanimous insofar as they pertain 
to the developed economic context. This is interesting because it makes 
Cutright's economic hypothesis regarding poorer countries something of a 
deviation from the pattern. 
As for the geographical factor offered by the last study, it depends on yet 
unidentified intervening variables. In other words, it is too diffuse to be taken 
into consideration at this point. 
77Pryor, op.cit., p. 133. 
7810 ISSAB, No.2, 1969. 
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OVERVIEWS 
There are a number of writings which provide sets of factors assumed to 
be associated with policy formation, social policy formation, and social security 
policy formation respectively. They represent the authors' overall perspectives 
on the subjects. First in the historical category are works of de Schweinitz79 and 
Schlesinger,80 the former on social policy development in England and the latter 
on the New Deal. In their works it was possible to identify the following as 
factors underlying social policy.81 
de Schweinitz: 
1. Change in economic order - Disintegration of the feudal economy 
and the resultant introduction of wage labor (pp.3-4). 
11. Contending interests - Such as the need on the part of governing 
group to counter social change (p.5 and elsewhere); rise of capital, 
followed by industrialization (pp.39-47, 179 and elsewhere) on the 
one hand and pressures from organized labor on the other (pp.170-
171, 199-202). 
iii. Sense of economy - Such as how to make social welfare pay. This 
underlay the workhouse system of the poor law era, as well as the 
universal measures of the mid-20th century. (pp. 48-68, 208) 
IV. External influences - From the Continent, particularly Germany and 
France (pp. 30-38, 206, 97-99 and elsewhere). 
v. Men of ideas - Charles Booth, Robert Owen, Arnold Toynbee, 
Elizabeth Fry, the Webbs and the Fabians, Richard Chamberlain, 
Winston Churchill, and numerous others. 
vi. Values - Christian values in particular, which both urged and 
hindered the evolution of effective social solutions (p. 21 and 
elsewhere). 
Schlesinger: 
79Karl de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security, A.S. Barnes & Co., New York, 
1943. 
80 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal, Houghton 
Mifflin & Co., Boston, Mass., 1958. 
81 The lists are of my own devising and may well be incomplete. 
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i. Economic cOhtext - The Great Depression, which compelled urgent 
policy actions. The crisis context, which can make almost any 
policy acceptable (p.13). 
11. Available expertise - The type of advice or expertise that happened 
to be available determined the type of banking system adopted (p.5). 
iii. Attributes of the leader and other policy-makers - Their ideas, 
philosophies, preferences, styles, abilities, etc., but particularly the 
leader's (numerous parts of the Age of Roosevelt .. ) 
IV. Contending interests represented by key actors - The agricultural 
policy of the period reflected personal interests of its makers who, in 
tum, spoke for interest groups (55-84). Industrial policies, i.e. 
minimum wages, price control, working hours, unemployment, anti-
trust measures, etc., bore the interests of the business, the labor 
unions, the administrative bureaucracies, and the congress (pp. 87-
102 and elsewhere). 
v. Political requirement - The need to fulfill a political pledge led to the 
creation of the Federal Relief Administration (p. 246). 
VI. Fear of radicalization of society - Fear of the loss of control of the 
angry mass, and fear of revolution was a major factor underlying the 
Social Security Act of 1935 (pp. 269,272-273,295-296). 
Despite the difference in time and place, the above two works point to 
remarkably similar and often identical factors as contributing to policy formation. 
In the more specific field of social security, Bums and Rys cite the 
following determinants of policy. 
Bums: 
1. Economic conditions 
2. Demographic factors 
3. Family system 
4. The state of technical knowledge and competence 
5. Social attitudes and values in general and attitudes toward income 
inequality and government in particular 
Rys: 
1. Predominantly Internal Factors: 
2. 
a. Demography 
b. Social structure 
c. Political factor 
d. Pressure group factor 
e. Institutional evolution factor 
f. Social psychology factor 
2. Predominantly External Factors: 
a. Cultural diffusion 
b. Technical development 
c. International standardization and technical assistance 
d. International cooperation 
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Among the factors cited by Rys, the political factor was singled out as "the 
most important 'environmental' element in the evolution of social security; 
demographic, economic, social structure or psychological factors "all have to be 
transposed to the political level at which legislative decisions are taken." He 
goes on to say that "under these circumstances it may not be unjustified to 
conceive the political factor as the sum total of all other social factors involved, 
and to consider social security as a political problem before anything else."s2 . 
SUMMARY 
The foregoing review lends itself to one basic generalization. That is, 
while objective or rational criteria of decision-making predominate in the 
normative context, they are over-shadowed by non-rational criteria in the 
descriptive context. In the latter, values and value commitment, socio-cultural 
and institutional factors, political factors, factors of leadership, ideology, and 
external factors were regarded the major determinants of social policy. Of the 
rational criteria, economic factors including the level of income, economic 
context, demographics and technical resources were given significance by some 
writers. The principle of utility optimization, a key concept in normative 
decision theories, had only minor applications in descriptive theories. 
The foregoing and other considerations to be clarified along the way 
became the basis for constructing the initial conceptual model of this study. This 
will be discussed in the next chapter as part of the exposition of the research 
problem. 
82Ibid., p. 19. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The problem that the present study sought to address can be represented in 
the following specific questions: 
1. What are the income maintenance programs of the selected study 
countries like and are there differences from one country program to 
another? If so, what are they? 
2. Are there specific factors that underlie the country program differences, 
if any? If so, what are they? 
3. Under what conditions, if any, do certain factors become active in 
association with one type or another of income maintenance programs? 
These questions address two basic dimensions of the study problem, i.e., 
the dimension of income maintenance policy itself, represented by income 
maintenance program in this instance, and that of underlying factors. 
The first research question relates exclusively to the policy/program 
dimension and is the only question for which alternatives may exist. For 
instance, instead of asking what type of income maintenance programs there are 
in the study countries, it may be asked what type of income maintenance policies 
there are in those countries. This study chose income maintenance programs to 
stand for income maintenance policies despite the fact that they are not identical 
because no better representation of the latter was available. The programs are 
concrete expressions of chosen policies and are easier to define, delimit, 
standardize and, thus, are more comparable cross-nationally than policies. In 
other words, in this particular study context, the surrogate serves our purpose 
better than the real one. 
What is an income maintenance program? As far as available literature 
is concerned, there is no fixed boundary to the concept. This study therefore 
defines its own as follows. 
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THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (IMP) 
In a broad sense, all measures that help secure income for individuals and 
families are components of IMP. Policies of full employment and minimum 
wages, policies and programs directed toward economic growth, educational 
provisions, measures for labor safety and mobility, housing subsidies, public 
utilities, health services, fiscal measures, as well as direct transfers such as social 
security and public assistance, are all components of one type of IMP or another. 
This view is present in varying degrees in the writings of Titmuss,1 Burns,2 
Merriam,3 and Laroque.4 
A more restricted view is embodied in Beveridge's "Social Insurance and 
Allied Services". 5 According to his definition, all types of contributory 
insurance schemes, various categories of public assistance, demo grants such as 
old age pensions and children's allowances and certain benefits in kind, e.g. 
school lunch and health services, can constitute an IMP. 
In the international context, the definition generally coincides with the 
social security perimeter represented in pertinent Conventions of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). Although theoretically quite broad, this definition is 
actually narrower than the preceding two, embracing only social insurance and 
assimilated schemes, public health services and public assistance. A listing of 
measures in "The Cost of Social Security" provides a fair sample of this definition 
in action.6 
For the present study, a fourth definition is employed. Taking the 
international common denominator as the starting point, it was extended to 
include public education, food subsidies, "profit-sharing" in the industrial sector 
where an entire category or categories of employees benefit from the scheme, and 
a subsidized commissary system, again if its application is broad enough and by 
legislation. Below is a listing of components encompassed by the present 
concept of IMP. 
I Richard Titmuss, "The Relationship Between Income Maintenance and Social Service 
Benefits - An Overview", ISSA Review (ISSAR), No. I, 1967, pp. 57-66). 
2Eveline Burns, Social Security and Public Policy, New York: McGraw-Hili, 1956, pp. 2-5. 
3 Ada C. Merriam, Social Welfare Expenditures in the United States of America, 1954-55" 
ISSAB, Mar/Apr 1957. pp. 145-146. 
4Pierre Laroque, "Social Security and Social Services", ibid., OctINov 1952, pp.317-323. 
SSir William Henry Beveridge, op.cit., Macmillan, New York, 1942. 
6ILO, op.cit. 
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THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS (IMPCS) 
1. Food subsidy 
2. Public health service 
3. Public education 
4. Demogrants 
5. One type or another of negative-tax 
6. Public assistance 
7. Social insurance 
a. work injury 
b. old age, invalidity, death 
c. sickness and maternity 
d. family allowance (work-related) 
e. unemployment 
8. Provident fund 
9. Profit-sharing 
10. Subsidized commissary 
None of the measures listed is hypothetical; they exist in different 
combinations in the countries selected for study. Considering the various 
definitions of income maintenance program that exist, why were just these 
included in the present one? One of the first considerations in this regard was 
that the scope of inquiry does not extend to areas where cross-national 
comparison is difficult. Housing, for instance, is frequently taken into 
consideration in analyses of income maintenance programs. These, however, 
were excluded from the present boundary because, among the countries selected, 
both the methods of their finance and delivery diverged so widely that 
establishing the expenditures involved and the number of people benefiting from 
them was virtually impossible. 
Another consideration was that the measures selected have effective 
functions of income redistribution and income maintenance through direct 
transfers of cash or benefit-in-kind. It was on this ground that not only work-
related "social security" schemes but such provisions as food subsidies, public 
education and public health services were also included. Their inclusion is in 
keeping with the reality of income maintenance situations of underdeveloped 
countries where basic income needs of a vast majority of the people are met 
through such broad-based services and benefits-in-kind rather than through 
employment-related and contributory social insurance and related schemes. 
The concept of IMP used in the current study may therefore be defined 
as a body of statutory measures designed to help assure a minimum income for 
selected or all sectors of a population through direct transfers of cash and/or 
benefits-in-kind. 
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An income maintenance program, in other words, refers to the totality 
of measures existing in a given country and the measures must be specifically 
designed to replace, supplement or otherwise help assure a minimum income. 
This definition effectively rules out those fiscal and economic development 
measures which may serve income maintenance functions but whose primary 
objectives are more to help generate income than merely to assure a minimum 
income. There is one type of measure which was excluded from consideration 
although it properly falls within the boundary of the present definition. That is, 
crop insurance such as that exists in Mauritius. This was left out because 
including it for the reason that it is an insurance would be inconsistent with the 
exclusion of all types of highly significant agrarian measures that exist in other 
countries, such as land redistribution, community development and other 
programs aimed at improving the economic conditions of rural families. 
THE INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MODEL (IMPM) 
In order to differentiate the types of IMP in effect in the study countries, 
the measures involved (the ten components listed earlier) were sorted according to 
their specific characteristics, and the result was as follows. 
I. Occupational 
1. contributory cash and/or service benefits 
(social insurance, provident fund and related schemes) 
2. non-contributory cash grant or grant-in-kind 
(profit-sharing, subsidized commissary) 
II. Non-Occupational (unrelated to work) 
1. universal transfers-in-kind 
(food subsidy, health service, education) 
2. universal transfers in cash 
(demo grants) 
3. semi-universal transfers in cash 
(modified negative tax or modified public assistance) 
4. selective transfers in cash 
(public assistance) 
Based on the above, an IMP type could now be conceived in terms of 
the balance between the occupational and non-occupational categories of 
measures and their relative income maintenance functions. And these 
classifications allowed the projection of four basic program models, as shown in 
Figure l. 
30 
Figure l. Four Basic IMP Models 
A. B. 
Undeveloped occupational measures Undeveloped occupational measures 
Undeveloped non-occupational measures Developed non-occupational measures 
C. D. 
Developed occupational measures Developed occupational measures 
Undeveloped non-occupational measures Developed non-occupational measures 
Needless to say, finer differentiations of program models are possible 
based on sub-categories of the classification shown and this possibility will, in 
fact, be explored in the delineation of specific country models. But the basic 
models are useful for cross-national comparison purposes with which the present 
study is also concerned. 
In classifying the various country IMPs vis-it-vis the above four 
models, the assessment of their levels of "development" was based on the number 
and type of measures constituting the program, the expenditures involved and 
the scope of population coverage. The administrative and delivery aspects of the 
measures involved were not taken into consideration because their contribution to 
income maintenance function was assumed secondary and difficult to gauge. 
At first glance, the models seem not to take into account certain 
important dimensions of an IMP, namely the population categories covered, 
benefit level and benefit -conditions. In the process of delineating the actual 
country models, however, the terms of evaluative classification, e.g., "developed" 
or "undeveloped" occupational measures, would be replaced by descriptive ones, 
such as work-related family allowances or non-contributory old age and blind 
pensions. This will automatically define the type and scope of population 
coverage as well as clarify major features of benefit conditions. Their more 
detailed features are significant in connection with the work-related measures and 
this study deals with them in part in the context of specific arguments. Benefit 
level was assumed to express itself generally in the expenditure-scope of 
population coverage equation. 
Before leaving the subject, it may be asked if the particular approach 
adopted in arriving at the basic models is appropriate. The answer is positive on 
two grounds. First, the classification of measures conforms to the general 
practice in the field and, second, the models encompass the three basic aspects of 
the programs which are of interest to the present inquiry, i.e., how, how well, and 
with what emphases the governments of the selected countries help provide 
minimum income for their people. 
With the above definition of IMP and IMPM, the meaning of the first 
research question may be clearer; it asks what type of income maintenance 
31 
programs, as distinguished from the type of income maintenance measures, there 
are in the selected countries. This study is concerned with the configuration of 
the measures in each country with emphasis, for instance, on either non-
occupational universal measures, such as food subsidies for all and demogrants 
for the aged, or occupational contributory measures, such as disability benefits 
and retirement pensions, or both, and with their levels of income maintenance 




Concerning the first research question, two prior assumptions were 
1. By and large, the income maintenance measures in the selected 
countries will have been patterned after those prevalent in the 
developed Western context, although there may be certain measures 
that are specific to certain countries of the study group and nowhere 
else. 
2. The income maintenance measures likely to receive high priority 
among the selected countries would be: (a) those designed to relieve 
immediate consequences of poverty, such as public health and public 
assistance, and (b) those coinciding with economic development goals 
such as public education and, again, public health. 
It was on these assumptions that the boundary of the present concept of 
IMP was in part drawn. 
The second research question is intended simply to identify various factors 
associated with the adoption of different types of policies/programs. If there is 
any particular pattern of relationship between policy-program types and 
underlying factors, this question will help bring it out. The second question, in 
other words, relates to both the policies as represented by programs and the 
factors that underlie their adoption. 
The obvious assumption underlying this question is that there are specific 
factors that have given rise to specific program models. As to the possible 
underlying factors, discussed in the preceding chapter, they were drawn from an 
extensive review of literature and included: economic factors (income level and 
economic context), administrative and/or technical resource factors, demography 
and issues of utility optimization in the rational domain; and values or 
preferences, socio-cultural and institutional factors, political factors, factors of 
leadership, ideology and external factors in the non-rational domain. 
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It may be clarified at this point that, in the present study, the term 
"economic context" signifies a wide variety of economic circumstances that go 
beyond what can be covered by "economic resources" or "national income". More 
specifically, it can refer to one or more of the following parameters: agrarian-
industrial balance in the economic structure; economy predominated by a single 
crop or product; heavy dependence on export markets; changing terms of trade in 
the world market; predominance of economy by plantation industries or private 
enterprises; state capitalism; or shifts in economic development emphases. 
Most, but not all, of the factors identified through the litertature survey 
were taken into consideration in investigating the second question in the selected 
national settings. Those rejected had to do with the principle of utility 
optimization. The concept was overly precise to be applicable in the exploratory 
context of this study. It was also meaningless without first knowing each 
country's utility parameters, defining which is beyond the scope of the present 
study. In its less precise sense, however, the parameter will be covered under 
one or more resource factors for the reason that a government might choose 
measure A rather than measure B because the first is more suited to its resource 
conditions, both financial and in terms of trained personnel. 
On the other hand, a number of additional factors were brought in, mostly 
from the area of social needs. The reason was simple: all social measures, 
including income maintenance programs, at least theoretically relate to prevailing 
social needs. 
In sum, this study starts out with the assumption that the following factors 
are most likely to be associated with the adoption of various IMPs in the countries 
selected. 
1. Factors of Need 
1. calorie intake 
2. health facilities and services 
3. adult literacy 
4. unemployment 
5. infant mortality 
6. size of the wage-earning sector 
7. population growth 
II. Factors of Resource and the Economic Context 
A. Economic Resources 
1. per capita income 
2. wage level 
B. Technical Resources 
1. availability of trained personnel 
2. access to technical assistance 
C. Economic Context 
III. Socio-Cultural and Institutional Factors 
A. Values and Customary Practices 
1. religious precepts and practices 
2. patterns of social relationship 
B. Social Structure 
1. family structure and its welfare function 
2. class structure and/or social stratification 
IV. Political Factors 
A. Political Structure 
1. monarchy or republic 
2. centralization or decentralization 
3. pressure groups 
B. Prevailing Ideology: "Democracy", "Socialism", Others 
C. Political Leadership 
1. ideological and/or value orientation of the leader or the 
leadership group 
2. requisites of power 
V. External Factors 
A. Colonial Tradition 
B. Foreign Aid and Technical Assistance 
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With the exception of the social indicators, the factors listed are 
substantially identical with those that have emerged from the literature, except for 
the third-level categories which derive from a preliminary exploration of the 
national settings. There is a good deal of overlapping among the variables, 
especially at the third level. But the first- and second-level variables are 
independent enough to serve as separate units of analysis. 
The above listing of factors makes no reference to the program types, 
indicating that this inquiry has no prior overall assumptions concerning their 
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relationship vis-a.-vis the factors. It does raise, however, a number of specific 
questions in that regard. The first specific question is, 
Is there a relationship between the social indicators and the 
program types? 
This question builds on a subsidiary question: is there a correlation 
between income needs and income maintenance programs? It is often assumed 
that there is. If so, the relationship between the social indicators (SI) and the 
income maintenance program models (IMPM) may well be a positive one. The 
present inquiry proposes to explore this question as far as possible. It needs to 
be kept in mind, however, that the SI-IMPM relationship may depend on certain 
intervening variables such as economic resources and one or more of the non-
objective factors listed. 
The second specific question to be asked is, 
What is the relationship, if any, between the economic indicators 
andIMPM? 
It was shown in the previous chapter that the social security program index 
or experience of.a given country is assumed by some scholars to be associated 
with the level of its economic resources. This assumption is based on two 
subsidiary assumptions which are not explicit in the literature. The first is that 
countries spend as much as they are actually able to spend on income 
maintenance provisions, and the second is that certain types of provisions are 
more expensive than others. 
With regards to the first subsidiary assumption, it was shown in the 
introductory chapter that there are grounds for questioning its validity. The 
validity of the second subsidiary assumption is fairly well established. 
Demogrants and other universal measures that do not discriminate between the 
rich and the poor in awarding benefits are certainly more expensive than means-
test based public assistance, as family allowances are demonstrably more costly 
than children's allowances. 
The overriding assumption that relates directly to the last specific question 
will be valid only if both of the subsidiary assumptions are also valid. By raising 
the question as it has, this study seeks to explore these assumptions of various 
levels, keeping in mind that it may be unrealistic to assume a direct relationship 
between the economic indicators and IMPM. 
The third and last research question asks what the conditions are under 
which certain factors become active in relation to the adoption of the program 
models. More specifically, the question concerns itselfwith: 
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(1) The conditions that a given factor must attain within itself in order to 
be effective in relation to an IMP. To illustrate, the enactment of a compulsory 
social insurance scheme may occur in a country only after the number of wage-
workers reaches a certain magnitude, not before. Then, the size of the wage-
earning population may be regarded significant for IMPM. 
What is implied here is a utility assumption in its broadest sense, but that 
is beside the point at the moment. What is more important is the assumption that 
all or some of the factors listed may need to reach certain "energy" levels before 
they can influence the evolution of an IMP one way or another. Based on this 
assumption, the present study proposes to gauge such levels or points in the case 
of some underlying factors for which quantitative data are available. 
(2) The conditions, if any, that a factor must attain in relation to other 
factors before it can influence IMP. 
This part of the question rests on the assumption that in some instances a 
single factor by itself is not capable of influencing a policy as represented by an 
IMP but capable of doing so if acting in concert with other factors. In 
illustration, one may cite the hypothetical situation in which the existence of a 
large number of disadvantaged children and the availability of certain funds were 
associated with the adoption of a children's allowance scheme, but the decision to 
enact the appropriate legislation did not occur until the time of X government, 
which came into power under the leadership of Y in a socio-political context 
characterized by Z. In this situation, the activation of need and resource as 
effective associative factors of the need for a children's allowance depended on 
the socio-political factors X, Y and Z. Conversely, the socio-political factors in 
themselves would have been meaningless without the need and resource factors as 
far as they relate to children's allowances. Thus, hypothetically, the three major 
variables are interdependent. 
In other words, the third research question is designed to explore the intra-
variable conditions as well as inter-variable relationships and their underlying 
factors in relation to IMPM. It is a question designed to elucidate how various 
factors enter into program outcomes whereas the second question is concerned 
with identifying what those factors are. 
For the second and third questions, there are no real alternatives, given the 
problem. These questions need to be asked as they are if the problem is to be 
solved. It is, of course, possible to rule out the third question and limit the scope 
of inquiry, but this option was not taken. 
By way of summarizing the foregoing discussion and carrying it forward 
to the formulation of an overall conceptual model, it is necessary to take note of a 
number of general trends that have been implicit in both the thrust of the literature 
and the foregoing exposition of the research problem. 
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The trends in question correspond to three alternative hypotheses that can 
arise concerning the factors presumed to underlie the choice of IMPs. It was 
seen that some tenets of the literature reviewed inclined toward a rational 
determinism, stressing the significance of the level of economy, utility 
maximization, expert knowledge, technical competence, demography and 
economic context. To these, the present study added several social indicators, 
i.e. the level of calorie intake, health facilities and services, adult literacy, 
unemployment and infant mortality. Others supported an institutional 
determinism favoring socio-cultural, political and other contextual factors. A few 
provided grounds for synthesizing the first two on the basis that policy decisions 
are products of an interaction of all components constituting the relevant social 
system. 
The question at this point is which of these alternative hypotheses would 
be most useful for the present study, not only in guiding the investigation but as a 
subject for exploration on its own right? The option was fairly clear for the 
systems hypothesis on two grounds. First, a good many aspects of the rational 
and institutional hypotheses have already been covered by the subsidiary 
questions raised under the second research question and the inter-variable 
relational aspect of the third research question. Therefore, to opt for either the 
rational or the institutional hypothesis as the basis for constructing the framework 
of investigation would be superfluous. Second, only the systems hypothesis 
would be broad enough to deal with all the variables that have surfaced from the 
preliminary investigation. Lastly, it in fact subsumes the other two hypotheses. 
THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Given the two dozen or so variables identified through the review of 
literature as underlying social policy decisions in general and income maintenance 
measures in particular, a conceptual model of analysis based on the systems 
hypothesis may be conceived as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. A Schematic Presentation of the Working Conceptual Model 
Socio-Cultural 
Needs and Political Factors 
P ~ ~ p Resources ,..,,1, 0 R Il PolitIcal L 0 ... ... ... G Economic ... Lea~~r~hip ... I ... 
Context C R 'I ,.,. A 
~ Y M (Rational ~ 
Domain) External Factors 
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In the above diagram, the central impulse toward social policies and 
programs, expressed in a central horizontal line, emanates from needs, resources 
and economic context (the rational domain) and filters through political 
leadership. The strategic impact points of this impulse are marked by the bold 
arrowheads. The central1ine in general represents the rationalist conception of a 
direct relationship between the rational parameters and the program, modified in 
this instance by the introduction of political leadership factors as intervening 
variables. 
The diagram as a whole, however, shows a host of other variables feeding 
into the basic impulse in two separate systems. In one, the socio-cultural and 
political factors and external factors, which are already interdependent among 
themselves, enter into the impulse (the straight line) through two-way interactions 
with the rational parameters. The major arrows indicate this particular system. 
In the other, the socio-cultural and political factors and the external factors 
intervene in the same impulse via two-way interactions with the political 
leadership factors. This system is shown by the minor arrows. 
The above description of the diagram may lead to the impression that the 
rational parameters have only one channel of impact upon the program, i.e., 
through the political leadership factors. This is not the case. They, too, have 
the secondary, perhaps more important channel of influence through the socio-
political and external factors, in other words, by way of the first system. 
In the overall system of two-channel interactions among all the variables 
associated with the program, political leadership factors alone are shown not to 
interact directly with needs, resources, and economic context, although they do so 
indirectly through the socio-cultural and political factors and the external factors. 
This exception is deliberate and is based on another assumption that this study 
makes, that political leadership factors do not define or influence needs, resources 
or economic context except through the people in the policy-making environment 
and their institutions and, in some areas having to do with resources and economic 
context, through external factors. 
If the central impulse in the model is that of needs, resources and 
economic context separately or jointly pressing toward the adoption of a program, 
the key factor bearing on that impulse is political leadership. The degree to 
which the leadership factors interact with other factors and the degree to which 
they further filter the input from the latter may vary widely, but it is the political 
leader and the ruling political groups around him or her that are actually 
responsible for the final decisions concerning the program. It is therefore 
towards them that all the pertinent factors converge. It must be made clear, 
however, that political leadership is not necessarily assumed supreme over other 
factors, although such an assumption might tum out to be valid. At this point, 
38 
the key actor status awarded political leadership is in terms of its strategic role 
position in the overall public policy-making system. 
Apart from the above specific features and the assumptions related to 
them, the model is notable for its elaboration of the variable interdependence, 
which is at the heart of the systems hypothesis used as the basis of its 
construction. 
All areas encompassed by the outline of the diagram, except the center 
square representing political leadership, represent the policy-making context. 
In its application, the model is not regarded as fixed. It is not expected 
that the potential of the model would always be fully utilized. In some study 
settings only part or some aspects of the model would be sufficient to deal with 
pertinent variables. As stated in an earlier chapter, it is conceivable that the 
model does not fit the reality in many respects. Therefore, it is open to take on 
new or additional dimensions and shed those that are without counterparts in 
reality. Also it is possible that certain secondary and tertiary characteristics of 
the variable relationship not anticipated and therefore not accounted for in the 
model might emerge. These would help reorder or refine the inner structure of the 
model. 
Finally, one may ask what the utility of a conceptual model such as the 
one described might be. Some of the answers to the question have already been 
made known in the foregoing discussion. It provides a framework for exploring 
the substantive problem, gathering data and analyzing them. But is the framework 
sound? It was made evident throughout this chapter that the basic research 
questions and related assumptions are grounded on existing theories, concepts and 
research findings in the field, and the model, in turn, was built on hypotheses 
stemming from the same theories, concepts and findings.. The model therefore 
accounts for all the major variables identified in the literature as underlying policy 
decisions; it also reflects the nature of variable relationships that the literature 
appears to advance explicitly or implicitly. The model, in short, is a broad 
summation of existing knowledge on the subject. The answer to the last 
question would therefore be in the affirmative. 
That said, the utility of the model goes one step further. Being a bridge 
between existing theories and concepts, the hypotheses stemming therefrom, and 
the findings yet to come, it could help generate new hypotheses and modify or 
strengthen existing ones. This working model will help construct an alternative 
or a revised model at the end of the present investigation as its applicability 
becomes clarified in the process. 
This working model was not designed specifically for the economically 




In exploring the stated problem along the line and within the general 
framework discussed in the previous chapter, this study employs a descriptive 
case study method for the following reasons: 
1. Research on the subject is in an early stage and little hard data lS 
available for a more controlled investigation. 
2. International statistical data lacks uniformity and tends to be 
superficial. A quantitative study based on such data will be equally superficial 
and unreliable. 
3. Changes in economic, socio-cultural and political trends occur over 
time and the time factor varies a good deal from one country to another. This 
suggests a vertical approach, at least until national circumstances have been 
adequately delineated and interpreted. I 
This is also a comparative country study in that findings of the country 
studies will be compared for generalization purposes, if applicable. Six 
countries were selected for this purpose and the following were taken into 
consideration in their selection. 
SELECTION OF STUDY SETTINGS 
PHASE I 
Since this is a study of income maintenance policy formation in 
economically underdeveloped countries, the foremost criterion for selecting the 
study settings was economic underdevelopment. In application, however, this 
criterion was far from being clear or specific enough for selecting a small sample 
manageable within the scope of the present inquiry. It was necessary to narrow 
IThese are essentially the grounds on which various experts argue for national case study" 
approaches to understanding social security development. They stress the discrepancy in the 
levels of comparability in international statistical data. See Vladimir Rys, Comparative Studies 
of Social Security," Ibid., pp. 235-241; UN, Social Policy and the Distribution of Income in the 
Nation, New York, 1969, p. 8. 
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down the criterion, and the first step toward doing so was to define economic 
underdevelopment. 
"Economic Underdevelopment" 
The term usually denotes more than just a low level of national 
income. It also connotes certain socio-economic characteristics that result from 
or are associated with low levels of economic development. According to certain 
relevant literature, the predominance of primary industries, inadequate 
assimilation of the subsistence sector into the market, inefficiency of the 
productive and distributive systems, enterprises geared to short-term gains, 
administrative and technical underdevelopment, inequity of income distribution, 
low standards of education, high mortality, social mores and practices 
incompatible with the demands of productive efficiency, and inadequate 
integration of the various sectors of society, are all major characteristics.2 
This comprehensive concept of economic underdevelopment is 
obviously unsuited for the present purpose and the option was taken in this study 
to define underdevelopment on the basis of per capita income alone. The reason 
is that this is a key indicator of the economy in any country is that it more or less 
sums up its productivity and reflects the level of the economy in general. 
National income serves the same function but it is not a comparable indicator and 
therefore is not appropriate as an alternative criterion. A real alternative would 
be a combined index of major economic indicators, such as the rates of national 
and per capita income growths, energy consumption, fixed capital formation, and 
so on 
In the absence of any established proof that such an index better 
represents the level of an economy and since per capita income is frequently used 
as a key indicator of the same, this study chose the simpler of the alternatives. 
Even so, the problem of drawing a line between different levels of 
economic underdevelopment as represented by per capita income remained. 
This study tackled the problem by distributing all the countries of less than 
US$I,OOO in per capita income in the late 1960s and taking the lowest per capita 
bracket applicable to the largest number of countries. As it happened, the per 
capita income distribution showed a vast majority of the countries clustering 
under the US$300 or less per capita level. 3 It also happened that in the field 
2 Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967, p. 71; Nancy Baster, 
op. cit., pp. 30-31 & 35; Joseph Spengler, Social Evolution and the Theory of Economic 
Development ", Social Change in Developing Areas, ed. H.R. Barringer, G.1. Blanksten and R.W. 
Mack, Schenkman Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1965, pp. 250-252; Arthur Livingstone, 
Social Policy in Developing Countries, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp.1-80. 
3 A breakdown of the countries with less than $1,000 per capita in the late 1960s based on the 
latest available data in UN Statistical Yearbook, 1970: 
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there is a generally accepted view that the socio-economic characteristics among 
this particular per capita income group are far more cohesive than among 
"develop-ing" countries4 as a whole. Based on these two reasons, this study 
defines "economic underdevelopment" as referring to those economic 
characteristics associated with US$300 or less per capita income. 
The second step in narrowing the economic criterion of country 
selection was pragmatic as well as statistical. It was pragmatic in that, of the 87 
or so countries falling under the US$300 or less per capita income category, those 
with less than US$100 were ruled out at the outset on an assumption of a socio-
economic vicious circle which is likely to leave them with little options as far as 
income maintenance provisions are concerned. The remaining thirty-nine 
countries were then distributed at US$lO intervals to obtain three frequency 
clusters of four (4) or five (5) countries each at US$130s, US$210 and US$240s 
per capita income levels. 
It is necessary at this point to make explicit the full significance of the 
economic criterion as it concerns the present study, in part to explicate the 
preceding step of sample selection and in part to prepare for the next. Its initial 
function was to define economic underdevelopment as stated. However, its 
broader use has to do with the hypothesis of economic determinism of income 
maintenance policy/program, which is fairly well accepted in the field as 
discussed earlier, and which this study has incorporated into its own framework of 
analysis. By controlling the sample by a narrow range of per capita incomes, it 
was hoped that a relationship between the level of the economy and IMP could be 
examined. Further, it was felt that it would also serve the exploration of a larger 
hypothesis with which this inquiry is concerned, i.e., the systems hypothesis. 
It was assumed above that as they are controlled by the economic 
indicator, other underlying factors and their relationships, if present, would 
emerge more clearly, either supporting or negating the hypothesis. The reasons 
for assuming this are: 1) any variable is better definable when controlled by 









4Conceptual1y, this assumption owes to the theory of economic stalemate in the pre-takeoff 
stage. See W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1960; Gunnar Myrday, A,sian Drama, Pantheon (Random House), New York, 1968, 
Appendix 2, pp.1 844-1 84 7, but practical1y the Nakamura Report at the Second Regional 
Conference for Asia and Oceana, New Delhi, 13-18 December 1965, which describes the 
tendency for social security efforts to be defeated by the very conditions that cal1 for them, i.e. 
poor health conditions, insufficient nutrition, high rate of unemployment, low wage level, amd so 
forth. See ISSAR May/June 1966, pp.159-180 for the report. Also see Gonzalo Arroba, Social 
Security Schemes and the National Economy in the Developing Countries", ibid., No.1, 1969, pp. 
37-38, which makes a similar case. 
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less dependent than other quantitative variables and is more readily measurable 
than non-quantitative variables under consideration; and 3) being a more 
independent variable, it would not directly interfere with other variables and their 
relationships even when it is present with them and in them.5 In short, the 
economic indicator - per capita income - is an appropriate criterion for selecting 
the countries for the purpose of answering the research questions posed. 
The problem in the third step of the selection procedure was what to do 
with the three per capita income frequency clusters obtained in the second step. 
There were three options: to take one, two or all three of them as study settings. 
Actually, the second option was chosen. For exploring the economic hypothesis 
mentioned, it was desirable to have two or more groups of countries belonging to 
different per capita income brackets. Including all three groups in the sample, 
however, would have overly broadened the scope of the study. The question is, 
which two groups should be chosen? 
In answering this question, a judgment was made based on what could be 
gleaned about the pace of economic growth in underdeveloped countries based on 
statistical data and other information pertaining to them. Specifically, among the 
US$300 or less per capita income countries, the difference of US$11 0 between 
the first (US$130s bracket) and the third (US$240s bracket) clusters represented a 
time span of approximately 20 years6 but available statistical materials rarely 
covered such a span. Because the time dimension may enter significantly into 
the cross-national comparisons, it was preferable to choose the time span with the 
best chance of being bridged by data. But since the second (US$210 bracket) 
and the third clusters were too close, the first and the second were finally decided 
upon. 
PHASE II 
The second criterion of country selection came into play at this stage. 
Because one of the central interests of the study has to do with the type of income 
maintenance programs that exist in underdeveloped countries, it was essential that 
the programs of the countries selected vary as widely as possible, within the 
ranges of per capita income indicated. 
An initial survey of the programs in the countries falling under the two per 
capita income brackets chosen indicated that in two instances of the US$130 or so 
SDemographic factors are equally independent but their functions with reference to income 
maintenance programs are not comparable to those of level of economy as represented by per 
capita income. 
6This was computed based on data in UN Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 184. The sum 
of cumulative per capita gains of all countries concerned over a 10 year period, 1957-67, divided 
by the number of countries included, was $56.80. 
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per capita income countries, the programs more or less repeated themselves. 
This situation required a choice between safeguarding the control per capita 
income level at a sacrifice of program variation and vice-versa. The choice was 
made in favor of program variation for the obvious reason that this is a study of 
program variation and its underlying factors in underdeveloped countries and not 
of programs prevalent among them. The two extraneous samples were replaced by 
those with differing program measures from adjacent per capita income brackets. 
With regards to the US$21O bracket countries, there was an additional 
problem of data unavailability, not in terms of program data per se, but those that 
are necessary to elucidate the underlying factors. In this case, the decision was 
made to drop the countries concerned and not replace them with samples far 
afield in terms of per capita range. 
The countries that finally came through the foregoing selection process 
were as follows. 
Table 1. Countries Selected for Study 




United Arab Republic 
Group B (US$209-21 I)* 
Ghana 
Mauritius 
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 184. 
* Per capita income range at factor cost; 1967 figures. 
The fact that there are only two countries in Group B is less than desirable. 
It happens, however, that their programs are widely divergent despite their almost 
identical per capita income, separated by only US$2, which represents a tightly 
controlled unit of comparison and compensates for the numerical limitation. 
It should by made clear at this point that program repetition was thought a 
problem within a cluster group but not between different cluster groups. If 
anything, it is an asset from the point of view of the study purpose. 
Although not by design, the selected countries represent all geographical 
regions of the underdeveloped world and it can be stated on common knowledge 
that their historical backgrounds are quite divergent also. 
SOURCES OF MATERIAL AND THEIR COLLECTION 
All materials used are from secondary sources. Much of the quantitative 
data came from the publications of the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
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such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO), and similar international organizations. Statistical data from the 
countries themselves were also extensively used, especially in determining their 
various expenditures and socio-economic conditions. 
Other sources of material included published works on the countries. 
Those works often provided highly useful factual information, but their primary 
contributions were in terms of illuminating the contextual aspects of the income 
maintenance policy/program decisions. 
Because the data is from secondary sources, every effort has been made to 
assess their reliability. Whenever possible, both the quantitative and qualitative 
data were checked against two or more sources. For instance, in the case of 
Bolivia's expenditure on public education in 1967, it was established based on the 
United Nations World Economic Survey, 1969-70, Boletin Estadistico, 1967, 
published by the Bolivian national directorate of statistics and census, and an 
independent source, "Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952". For another 
instance, the historical material concerning the position of organized labor in the 
United Arab Republic was drawn from half a dozen independent sources, 
historians, journalists, political scientists as well as the United States Army Area 
Handbook on the country. Where there were discrepancies in the available data, 
decisions had to be made as to which to rely on. The basis of such decisions will 
be stated in the context of country discussions. 
In many instances it was not possible to double-check a datum. Worse 
still, in a number of country situations, some essential statistical data was missing, 
which will be made explicit in due course. The volume of published works on 
each country varied a good deal. For example, in the case of the UAR, relevant 
materials were almost endless, while in the case of Mauritius, published works 
were few and not all of them were equally useful. In the last instance, however, 
the existence of a work directly addressing the development of income 
maintenance programs in that country went a long way in compensating for the 
shortage.7 
On the whole, an absence or abundance of available material on a given 
country did not seriously affect the study because determining what might be a 
more realistic approach to the research problem constitutes part of the study 
purpose. 
There was no predetermined data gathering procedure as such. No 
standardized instrument such as a reading schedule was used. The availability of 
pertinent data was the only guide. It must be stated, however, that in those 
7Refers to Richard Titmuss and Brian Abel-Smith, Social Policies and Population Growth in 
Mauritius, Methen & Co., Ltd, London, 1961. 
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country situations where the material was profuse, a limit was set at a point where 
the materials seemed to repeat themselves. 
TREATMENT OF MATERIAL 
Because this is a qualitative study, the main technique of data analysis was 
descriptive. This applied particularly to the treatment of individual country data. 
In the cross-national analysis, a limited use was made of cross-tabulation and 
correlation techniques. 
The plan of analysis for each country, which corresponds to the three 





Phase I: Model Delineation 
A. Description of each IMPC as it existed in or around 
1970, with emphasis on cost and population coverage. 
B. Delineation of the country IMP based on the above. 
Phase II: Examination of Underlying Factors 
A. Narrative discussion of the variables that have entered 
into the adoption of various IMPCs and the manner in 
which they have influenced the adoption of those 
IMPCs. This involved tracing the components and 
their underlying factors over a fairly long period of 
time as they have been adopted in a gradual process, or 
concentrating on a particular historical juncture when 
most significant decisions concerning an IMP as a 
whole have been made. 
B. Quantitative recapitulation of the above in terms of: 
1. The variables involved. 
2. The frequency of each variable involvement. 
Variable X may be associated with IMPC 'a' as 
well as with IMPC 'b', for instance. This is to 
see the quantitative strength of each variable. 
3. The individual variable "condition" as it relates to 
one or more IMPC. An intensification of labor 
unrest as measured by 'x' number of strikes and 
man hours lost may be a "condition" for the 
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variable association with IMPC 'a' or 'z', or both, 
for instance. 
4. Inter-variable relationships and the frequency of 
their occurrence. The pairing, for example, of 
variables X and Y may occur in relation to IMPC 
'a' as well as 'b' and 'c'. This part of the 
analysis is to isolate all such occurrences and 
order them in terms of frequency. 
Phase III. Summary 
Analysis of findings from the above, especially in 
terms of the predominant model characteristics and 
underlying variables, variable relationships and, 
when applicable, the individual variable conditions, 
against the overall conceptual model. . 
After each country's data have thus been treated, the findings will be 
subjected to a descriptive comparison as well as treated statistically if applicable. 
The results will again be analyzed against the conceptual model. 
Phases I and III above require no elaboration, but Phase II perhaps does. 
What is implicit in that part of the procedure is the decision to adopt a long-range 
historical approach on the one hand, and a meaningful historical juncture 
approach on the other, in gathering and analyzing data. Also implicit is the fact 
that this decision was guided by the circumstances connected with the 
development of IMPs in the selected countries. In five of the six countries 
selected, all the major components constituting the IMPs as they exist today were 
enacted over a relatively short span of time, usually coinciding with part or all of 
only one government's life time. 
The approach most strongly indicated under the circumstance was the 
historical juncture one. However, the one exceptional situation, Mauritius, that 
called for a long-range historical approach could not be disregarded. The 
question, therefore, was whether both approaches could be employed in the same 
study context without jeopardizing its integrity? In the context of this particular 
study, the answer was positive on the ground that the two approaches are 
reconcilable by regarding the historical juncture as a compression of the longer 
time range since very few events at any historical juncture would occur without 
gestation periods. 
In this case, it was even useful to have an exceptional setting that contrasts 
with the others in terms of the time dimension in IMP development. The gradual 
process found in Mauritius was comparable to an evolution and the more or less 
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sudden process in the others to a mutation. The full implication of utilizing the 
two approaches at the same time will be clear only after the data has been 
analyzed, but at the least, the case of Mauritius provided, in effect, a second 
control variable. For instance, it was possible to see if the factors associated 
with the country IMPs are similar or different in the slow and sudden contexts of 
social change. 
The particular historical juncture approach adopted in the study requires 
an explanation. It means that the study focuses on those socio-economic, 
political and external factors which were present at or around the time of the 
adoption of IMPCs and are thought to be associated with their adoptions. To 
some degree, this means comparing some identical variables on the basis of 
"before and after". Differences in leadership orientation are good examples of 
this. Not all variables could be compared in this manner, however. Economic 
and social indices, for instance, do not change suddenly. It was therefore more 
useful to examine their cumulative effects on IMPs. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The limitations of the present study stem largely from the nature of the 
research problem itself and relate to the methodology and resource availability. 
The major limitations are detailed below: 
1. The research problem is such that its solution really calls for an 
interdisciplinary approach. The degree to which a one-person study can 
integrate and incorporate pertinent bodies of knowledge in its analytical 
framework is limited. 
2. The use of secondary sources of data increases the chance of distorting 
facts. It must be recognized, however, that because the researcher is not a national 
of any of the study countries, it is doubtful that a field study would have reduced 
the margin of error to any significant degree. 
3. Income maintenance policies are part of larger social policies 
responding to a total societal or national demand at a given time or period. For 
this reason, what seems to be true about the underlying factors and their 
relationships when examined in relation to IMPs may not be entirely true in 
relation to other larger contextual realities. The validity of a study such as the 
present one, which examines a part of the whole, would therefore depend on the 
representative nature of that part. Yet, there is no way to gauge its representative 
nature as applied to this study. 
4. The use of secondary sources of data not only increases the chance of 
factual distortion but involves a serious bias stemming from the type of work that 
is available on any given country. Published works, or any work, reflect(s) areas 
of interest particular to the author(s) and do not necessarily provide a balanced 
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perspective. Therefore, what comes through the literature as dominant or strong 
variables may not, in reality, be such, some other yet unpublicized variables being 
stronger. This type of bias could be reduced if a large variety of materials on the 
countries were available and if they could all be examined. In the present study, 
in which the country materials were uneven and generally meager, there was no 
antidote to such biases. 
5. There are at least two problems stemming from the types of data that 
was available. First of all, there were government documents which related 
directly to the countries' social provisions. This type of material elucidates the 
"what" of the IMPs but almost never the "why" and "how" they came into being. 
This was true of most UN and other "outside" material on IMPs also. Of the 
other types of material used, only a small proportion directly addressed the issues 
of social policy in general, and income maintenance policy in particular, of any 
country. For this reason, in many instances, the association of certain factors 
with IMP was implicit rather than explicit in the materials. 
CHAPTER V 
COUNTRY DISCUSSION 
PLAN OF PRESENT A nON 
This chapter presents the findings on the six selected countries. In the 
first part of each country discussion, the country's income maintenance program 
(IMP) as it existed in or around 1970 will be delineated. The focus in this regard 
will be the relative status of IMP development as gauged in terms of related 
government expenditures, population coverage, the type and number of IMPCs 
involved and other characteristics, if any. A table showing a breakdown of the 
program in these terms will be included for each country. 
The IMP delineation will be followed by a discussion of its underlying 
factors in relation to each of the IMPCs. Public assistance, however, will not be 
discussed in any detail since its purpose and attributes are fairly common among 
the study countries. It will be discussed only if it has more than a routine 
significance in a particular country context. 
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BOLIVIA 
Delineation of the IMP 
The non-occupational category of Bolivia's IMPCs included education 
and public health services. Public assistance may be the third component of the 
same category, but information was unavailable on this subject. 
Table 1 shows' that in 1967, the total public expenditure on education was 
297.5 million pesos or approximately 3.5 percent of the country's GNP. This 
covered a school age population of 803,400 or roughly 17 percent of the total 
population. The cost per enrolled pupil was US$38 in 1966. 
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Source: ILO, The Cost of Social Security, 1967, pp.52-53; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 
203 & 204-5, p.64;- A.R. Jackson, The Bolivian National Revolution, p.104; UNESCO, 
World Survey of Education, 1971, Statistical Yearbook, 1971, p.79. 
Neither the level of expenditure nor the overall school enrollment ratio 
was very high even by standards of underdeveloped countries, much of the 
existing education program having been introduced since the promulgation of an 
educational reform decree in 1955. This decree, based on the recommendations of 
an educational commission established in 1953, provided for the first time, 
fundamental education for a broad segment of the population, particularly the 
. Indians. According to one source, I the government expenditure on education 
increased from 16 percent of the total budget in 1953 to 25 percent in 1964 and 
other statistics changed accordingly as shown in Table 3. 
'Cornelius, Henry Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-65; The Revolution and Its 
Aftermath, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp.166-168. 
Table 3. Selected Education Indices (Bolivia) 
Total enrollment 
Rural only 
Number of teachers 











Number of rural schools 2,690 5,699 
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Tables 203 & 204-5, p.64; UNESCO, 
World Survey of Education, 1971, Statistical Yearbook, 1971, p.79. 
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In addition to formal basic education, significant progress has also been 
made in adult education, specially geared to workers of school age. In 1962, 
there were 398 regular courses being conducted for nearly 8,000 adults and 415 
special courses in night schools for about 8,500 workers of school age.2 
In terms of facilities and personnel, Bolivia's public health services are 
well above average among the study countries. Budget allocation, however, was 
low. In 1963, it stood at 17.76 million pesos or 0.3 percent of the GNP. Efforts 
are under way to bring health provisions to various occupational groups, 
particularly among miners, petroleum workers and those in the private industrial 
sector. Extension of sources of potable water to all communities, including the 
rural areas, is also in progress. Construction of hospitals and health centers is 
part of the Ten-Year Economic Development Plan.3 
Although no recent data are available concerning occupational measures, 
the 1963 data indicate that the total social security receipt (covering sickness and 
maternity, work injuries, pensions and family allowances) was 228.8 million 
pesos or 4 percent of the GNP. This made the expenditures for workers the 
highest of all income maintenance expenditure categories in Bolivia. Also 
significant, the state's direct contribution to social insurance cost is high, and the 
benefit conditions are among the most liberal among the study group. Under the 
work-related family allowance system, for instance, workers are not required to 
contribute. Also, not only dependent children but married couples and single 
adults received cash benefits.4 
20p .cit., p.169. 
30p.cit., p.I72. 
4The U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 
1969, Government Printing Office, pp.16-17. 
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In addition to social insurance, mine workers of Bolivia enjoy subsidized 
commissary privileges, although at a much reduced scale since 1958 when the 
Siles government embarked on a price stabilization policy. During the years of 
the first MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) government, 1952-56, 
the prices of commodities available at the commissaries were as low as 1 percent 
or less of prevailing market prices.5 
The foregoing points up the Bolivian IMP emphasis on the non-
agricultural occupational sector that constitutes a small minority6 and the fact that 
it does so despite a high cost involved, which, in the view of some, acts as an 
obstacle to economic development.7 In this regard, it should be kept in mind that 
the main body of the occupational measures (pensions and family allowances) had 
been introduced during the first MNR government and the remainder (workmen's 
compensation, sickness and maternity, and the commissary provisions) had been 
significantly upgraded during the same period.8 
In brief, the Bolivian IMP is notable for the following characteristics: 
1. In terms of expenditure, occupational components. predominate. 
Because the population coverage of. the occupational measures is 
small, the IMP's disposition in favor of the working sector (non-
agricultural) is even greater than is apparent on the basis of cost 
companson. 
2. Most significant decisions relative to both the occupational and the 
non-occupational measures took place during the years of the first 
MNR government. 9 
3. The level of public expenditure on health service is quite low, and a 
significant part of the service has been for selected occupational 
groups only, i.e. the mining and petroleum workers. 
5Robert Jackson Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, Rutgers University Press, 
New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1958, p.1 04. 
6In 1950, over 62 percent of the total economically active population was in the agrarian 
sector. ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1971, Table 2, pp. 62-63. 
7 Alexander, op.cit., p.173; UN, Report of the Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia, 
1951, (The Keenleyside Report), pp. 98,100; Zondag, op. cit., pp.174-175. 
8Social Security Programs Throughout the World, 1969, op. cit. 
9Technically, the Social Insurance Code of 1956 did not get enacted until after the election of 
Siles who headed the second MNR government, but the decision and preparations for it were 
made by the first. 
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The questions to bear in mind in proceeding to examine the underlying 
factors. of the above IMP are, then, why there was an upsurge of efforts in the 
social field during the MNR period as indicated, and why special priorities were 
given to provisions for the workers and, to a lesser degree, to public education. 
Underlying Factors 
In the case of Bolivia, the factors associated with the development of most 
of the IMP characteristics cited above are more or less identical and are more 
closely inter-related than in other countries. It is only by degree that some 
factors are associated more with one characteristic rather than with another. For 
this reason, a good part of the present discussion will depict the overall 
relationship of various factors as they converged in a particular historical juncture 
to define the basic direction of Bolivia's income maintenance policy. When 
appropriate and possible, however, the relationship between certain specific 
factors and the development of specific components will be made clear. 
It can be said at the outset that during the several years in which major 
decisions were made on the IMP and necessary legislative actions were taken, 
Bolivia was experiencing a serious decline in national income due to a drop in the 
price of tin. The indices of total product in 1963 constant prices ranged in the 
low 80s during 1953-56 (excepting 1955 when the index was 89), whereas in the 
preceding two years they were in the low 90s. 10 The balance of payment deficits 
were 5.6 million pesos in 1952 and 20.3 million pesos in 1956. 11 What these 
point to is that resource factors had no immediate impact on the basic decisions 
concerning social provisions in this period and that their determinants must be 
sought in other areas of the national situation. 
1. Those associated with the IMP as a whole: Revolution and 
its implications for social policy 
What distinguished the period under consideration above all else was 
the National Revolution of 1952 and its effects on the country's economy and 
social situation. The revolution was brought about by a popular force represented 
by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) , the trade unions and 
their leftist affiliates, and temporarily, by the national military police. All the 
complex workings of the revolution do not concern the present study, but there 
are two specific aspects of it which do. They are the ideologies of the two major 
IOUN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Vol. II, International Tables, p.l66. 
I IJames M. Malloy & Richard S. Thorm, ed., Beyond the Revolution - Bolivia Since 1952, 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, Appendix Table 3, p. 374. 
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political forces involved and the power politics between them In the years 
following the revolution. 
a. Ideologies of the revolutionary parties 
The MNR existed unofficially since the late 1920s as a rallying 
point for students and young professionals discontented with the monopoly of 
economic and political powers by a foreign-dependent minority group, i.e. La 
Rosca. 12 
In its early period the MNR embraced two discernible ideological 
strains: a Marxist orientation projecting a mass-based revolution from below and 
a reformist nationalism inclined towards achieving structural renovations within 
the existing political framework. 13 The MNR launched itself officially in 1941, 
incorporating a segment of the young army officers disaffected by the Chaco 
debacle. 14 Shortly thereafter, the Marxist wing of the Movement split off, 
leaving the largely middle-class and reformist elements to constitute the enduring 
core of the MNR throughout its subsequent life. ls 
What was the reformist nationalism of the MNR? Initially it 
involved the objectives of freeing the Bolivian economy from foreign domination 
and the domination of La Rosca whose financial interests had long been foreign-
based,16 and economic development in a framework of state capitalism. More 
specifically, it called for regUlating the tin industry, sponsoring economic 
diversification and ·agricultural development, controlling public utilities, 
providing a decent standard of living to all, and freeing Bolivian jobs for 
Bolivians. 17 Subsequently, the MNR underwent a degree of radicalization, 
particularly since the Catavi incidence of 1942 (a massacre of mine workers at 
Catavi by the government troops) which had forced hitherto moderate political 
groups to take a stand in favor of labor and thus effectively destroying the middle 
ground between the traditional establishment and the radical left. 18 
12The upper-class of the mining corporations and big land-owners. 
13 James M. Malloy, The Revolutionary Politics", Beyond the Revolution, op.cit., pp.112-l13. 
14The Bolivian army was defeated in a protracted border war with Paraguay. 
15Malloy,op. cit., pp.113-137. 
16Cole Blasier, "The U.S. and the Revolution", Beyond the Revolution, op.cit., pp.56-57; The 
World Today, (The National Revolution in Bolivia"), Vol. VIII, No. 12 (Dec. 1952), p. 485. 
17Malloy,op. cit., pp. 115, 117. 
18Herbert S. Klein, "Prelude to the Revolution", Beyond the Revolution, op. cit., p. 37; 
Alexander, op. cit., p. 30. 
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Repeated betrayals by moderate groups of the MNR cause 
contributed to the MNR's shift to the left. In the late 1940s, the MNR attempted 
political revolts in conjunction with the army officer corps and the student- and 
church-dominated Falange Socialista Bolivian (FSB). However, the attempts 
were crushed, given away by one or another of the co-plotters. 19 As a result, the 
MNR turned to labor, particularly the mine workers. Since they were already 
under the control of the Trotskyite Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) by way 
of Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB), however, 
the MNR coalesced with the leaders of these groups and adopted their 
revolutionary program (the Pulacayo program) which, among others, envisaged a 
direct take-over of the mines by miners soviets.2o 
Thus, despite its middle-class background and basically reformist-
nationalist position, the MNR, around the time of the Revolution, had come to 
espouse some radical policy objectives. The last included, in part: 1) the 
incorporation of the Indian into the mainstream of national life through universal 
suffrage, 2) the nationalization of national resources, particularly the Big Three 
tin-mining companies,21 and 3) revision of the educational system in order to 
replace its elitist approach with a mass-oriented one.22 
Events during the first several years of the revolution attest to the 
fact that the above objectives were carried out and then some, i.e. provisions for 
the workers and land redistribution. The reasons underlying those actions had to 
do with the power politics of the post-revolutionary period. 
b. Politics of the MNR rule and the role oflabor 
Throughout its not so long reign, the MNR had never been a 
majority party. Its middle-class constituency was at no time strong enough and 
broad enough to attain independent political power. Having joined forces with 
organized labor for this reason, the MNR was not successful in assimilating labor 
into its party structure, in part because of its own basically moderate stance and 
middle-class background. In addition, labor's independent strength was too great. 
If anything, the MNR had become the "chosen political instrument" of labor.23 
In the 1952 uprising itself, the MNR, through its national political committee 
190p.cit., p.39. 
20C.A.M. Hennessy, "Shifting Forces in the Bolivian Revolution", The World Today, 
(Chatham House Review), May 1964, p. 201. 
21The Patino, Hochchild and Arrnayo Groups. 
22 Alexander, op.cit., pp. xv, 48. 
23M alloy, op.cit., p.117. 
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under the direction of Herman Siles, provided strategic leadership on the scene, 
but the muscle power had come from the armed mine workers and, later, the 
peasants, although the latter were spearheaded by the national police.24 Having 
played a key role in the revolt, labor was in a powerful position to bargain for 
social and economic rewards from the government that it has helped to usher in, 
and demand it did. It pushed for the control of the nationalized mines and called 
for liberal social welfare programs for the mine workers, including social security 
benefits, better housing, hospitals, educational facilities, and theaters. It also 
demanded land reform on behalf of the peasants. These demands were not new. 
They had been put to the Penaranda government in 1950.25 What was new was 
that, now, they could not be turned down, and so they were met. 
Does this mean that the role of labor in the uprising alone was 
sufficient to move the government of Victor Paz Esternssoro to acquiesce to the 
labor demands? The answer is no. Ever alert to the essentially moderate-
reformist stream of the MNR, the labor-left was not content merely to wait for the 
government to hand out the rewards promised. It made sure, on the 
administrative front, that its representatives took part in decision-making. Three 
leaders of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) were appointed as ministros 
obreros by Siles even before Paz returned from exile to assume the presidency. 
Not only that, the mine workers still had the arms supplied to them for the 
uprising and the COB declared itself in a state of permanent vigilance almost 
immediately following the insurrection. The workers were determined not only 
to hold the MNR to their pre-uprising pledges, but also to keep them on the path 
to a real revolution. Because the views of the MNR core group and labor were 
fundamentally different, there followed bitter and continuous debates on all 
aspects of the new national policies. 
Forces working toward an amelioration of the original pledges 
were quite strong within the MNR leadership. . In order to counter them, the 
workers took to the streets again. Also, the provision of Control Obrero Con 
Derecho al Veto (worker control with the right of veto) enabled the worker-
designated representatives to stand firm on any policy reversal inimical to the 
interests of the workers.26 
The labor-left, in short, was not merely a well-organized and well-
led interest group represented by highly vocal leaders. It was a group in 
possession of a palpable and tangible power derived from its vital role in the 
nation's key economy (tin-mining) and its direct access to and possession of anns. 
Thus, 
24Alexander,op. cit., p.44. 
25The Keenleyside Report. p. 96. 
26Malloy, op. cit., pp.119-122. 
during this first phase of the revolution, there developed an 
important divergence between authority and power. The COB, 
which included in its ranks not only the left-wing of the MNR, but 
also leftist parties such as the PIR, POR, and Communists, 
became a government within a government. The COB had all 
the characteristics of a sovereign like entity including executive, 
deliberative, and judicial organs ... and most importantly, armed 
forces. Allied with the MNR, the COB demanded and received 
corporate status within the state. As such, it let the MNR assume 
the formal responsibility of government while it constituted itself 
as an unrivaled center of initiative and veto - it had governing 
b ·b·l· 27 power, ut no responSI I lty. 
57 
It was under this political circumstance that the left pushed through 
decree after decree favoring labor and other "popular forces" during the first 
revolutionary years. 
The sheer political character of income maintenance policy 
decision in Bolivia emerged even more clearly in the subsequent period. The 
MNR, as a party, continued in power for eight more years until 1964 when 
Bolivia returned to a military rule following a coup d'etat. But the government 
leadership passed back and forth between the pragmatic nationalist faction 
represented by Paz and the elitist-reformist right wing represented by Siles. The 
political coalition shifted accordingly, from a center-right axis during Sile's 
presidency and a somewhat less radical center-left axis during Paz's second 
presidency. The power and influence of organized labor went through a series of 
ups and downs with the changing governments and, along with it, determined the 
fate of some of the benefits they had gained. None of the measures enacted were 
repealed, but their benefit levels suffered. One of the first cut-backs was 
effected by Siles when the subsidy for the miners' commissaries was drastically 
reduced. The Barrientos government lowered it further, along with salary cuts, 
following the coup d'etat.28 
c. External factors 
The influence of international agencies had been pervasive in all 
areas of Bolivian national affairs throughout the recent period. The particular 
MNR period under consideration was no exception. Of several outside 
influences, either connected with economic development or technical assistance, 
or both, the United States was particularly active in the education and health 
fields. This was partly because these were non-political, therefore non-
27Ibid., p. 123. 
28Hennessy, op.cit., pp.198-199, 205; Richard S. Thorn, "The Economic Transformation", 
Beyond the Revolution. op.cit., pp.186-187; Alexander, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
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controversial areas in which the U.S. felt able to cooperate despite her differences 
with the radical policies of the new revolutionary government.29 Much of the 
assistance in these areas was in the form of technical assistance. 
In the area of work-related social security legislation, it was the 
United Nations technical assistance team which was active in a consultative 
capacity and in providing technical expertise along the policies defined by the 
government. It had no significant impact on the policies themselves.3o 
In sum, the development of both education and the provisions for 
workers, particularly the latter, was strongly influenced by the ideologies of the 
political parties that led the revolution and by the ascendancy of the left in the 
ensuing power politics. 
2. Those associated with the occupational IMPCs 
There were a number of economic factors bearing on decisions 
concerning the occupational IMPCs. 
a. Economic factors 
(1) Strategic position of the mining industry in the Bolivian 
economy. 
In the preceding discussion, a number of factors were cited as 
having contributed to the ascendancy of Bolivian labor with definitive impact on 
the country's labor policy in general and income maintenance policies in 
particular. There was another factor that explains the strength of labor: the 
unique position of the mining industry and that of mine workers in Bolivia's 
economy. For a long time, even today, although to a lesser degree, mining has 
been the industry in Bolivia. Circa 1952, 60% of the national government's tax 
revenue came from exports and roughly 95% of the goods exported were 
minerals.3 ] Not only could the Bolivian economy be made or broken by what 
happened in the mining industry; the subsistence of the average Bolivian was 
directly affected by it also. Such basic food items as flour, sugar, meat and milk 
were imported with foreign exchange earnings from mineral exportation. In this 
circumstance, whoever controlled the mines controlled the economy and the mine 
workers, in the sense indicated, virtually controlled it. Without this specific 
economic context, it is doubtful that the mine workers could have commanded so 
much power during the period under consideration. 
29Zondag,op. cit., pp.190-193; Blasier, op. cit., pp.78-84. 
30Goodrich, op. cit. 
31 The Keenleyside Report, p.73. 
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The plausibility of this argument becomes stronger when it is 
recognized that the agricultural workers were nowhere near a position to bargain 
for anything on their own until after they had been brought into an alliance with 
the mine workers at the latter's initiative.32 During the latter half of the MNR rule 
when the strategy of economic development shifted from the exhausted mines to 
the interior where large scale agricultural colonization and petroleum production 
were carried out, the mine workers were dealt with harshly and their hard-won 
benefits were reduced. At this time the military and the peasants were 
assiduously courted with tangible rewards such as pay raises for the former and 
speedy granting of land titles to the latter. 
(2) Economic resources 
While economic resource factors had no impact on the basic 
decisions concerning work-related income provisions, there was evidence that 
economic difficulties delayed their enactment somewhat. Goodrich writes in 
this regard, 
Early in 1953, all these difficulties were intensified by the drop in 
the world price of tin, which fell from US$1. 215 per pound affine 
tin to about 80 cents ... this meant a sudden loss of almost a third 
of its dollar income. 
The economic crisis of course had its impact on the work of 
technical assistance. It meant that the consultants in social 
security and labor could not hope to give immediate efect to 
plans for the substantial extension of the social services ... 3 
The likelihood is that the enactment of social security schemes 
in two stages, 1953 and 1956, rather than all at once was connected with the 
above factor. 
Summary 
The Bolivian IMP as it exists today developed largely during the first 
several years of the Bolivian revolution of 1952. Education was popularized for 
the first time in this period and the country's most significant social security laws 
were enacted and implemented during the same period. 
32Royal Institute ofIntemational Affairs, "The Nationalist Revolution in Bolivia", The World 
Today, Vols. VIII, No. 12 (Dec. 1952), p.487; Malloy, op. cit., pp.125-127. 
33Goodrich, op. cit. 
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In terms of expenditures, particularly the cost-population coverage ratio, 
the occupational components of the IMP dominated the non-occupational, and 
this was exceptional among the study countries. Considering its limited resources, 
Bolivia has adopted an advanced and comprehensive system of income security 
that covered workmen's compensation, sickness and maternity, old age, invalidity 
(disability) and death (OAID), work-related family allowance and subsidized 
commissaries for the mine workers. 
The radicalization of the polity subsequent to the revolution, the power of 
labor and its affiliate parties of the left in the political coalition supporting the 
government in power, the reformist orientation of the leadership and its political 
requisites all underpinned the significant steps taken towards the evolution of this 
system. 
These same factors were also associated with the high priority given to the 
work-related social security measures and their unusually high benefit levels. In 
this latter connection, moreover, the position of the mine workers in an economy 
dominated by tin-mining was a key contributing factor. The country's economic 
context strengthened labor as a pressure group and obliged the political leadership 
group to respond to the former's social security demand. 
The enactment of social insurance schemes other than family allowance 
was delayed a few years because of financial difficulties. 
CEYLON 
Delineation o/the IMP 
Around 1970, Ceylon's income maintenance program (IMP) consisted of 
food subsidies, public education, public health services and public assistance in 
the non-occupational category and employees' provident fund and public 
employee pensions in the occupational category. The government expenditure 
for these provisions and their population coverage were as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. IMPCs, Cost and Population Coverage (Ceylon) 
Year of Public Exgenditure Population Coverage % of Total 




1. Food Subsidies 5.5 11,800,000 95 
(All Ceylonese over 1 
year of age) 
2. Education 1969170 472.4 3,362,000 27 
Expenditure per (Total enrollment in 
enrolled pupil 1966 US$29 1971) 
3. Public health 1969/70 235.7 2.0 Universal 
4. Public 1970171 27.4 0.2 (Total number of cases 
assistance (estimate) in receipt of charitable 
allowances in 1967: 
138,637) 
Occugational 
5. Pensions for 1970171 206 2.1 72,000 0.6 
Public (government (pensions in payment) 
Employees expenditures 
(sickness & and 
maternity, contributions) 
W.I.) 
6. Employees 1970 143 1.4 1,815,000 15 
Provident (contributions (1969) 
Fund and investment 
returns) 
Source: ILO, A Program of Action for Ceylon, 1971. See "Report", pp.9, 131 and "Technical 
Papers", pp.22, 74, 80-81, 233; Ceylon Yearbook, 1967, Table 233; UN, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1970, Table 193, p.663; UN, World Economic SUNey, 1969-70, Table 29, p.65; 
UN, Demographic Yearbook, 1970. 
In cost outlays, which stood at Rs.611.3 million or approximately 5.5 
percent of the GNP in 1970, as well as in population coverage, universal food 
subsidies were the most important income maintenance measure in Ceylon. 
There were two types of food subsidies: a free rice measure and a subsidized rice 
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measure. I In both instances, the government purchased rice and a few other 
essential food items from the cultivators within the country or imported them 
from other countries at market ~rices and distributed them either free or at prices 
lower than the purchase price. Each week every Ceylonese citizen over one 
year of age, regardless of financial status, received two pounds of free rice and 
another two pounds at a reduced price of 75 cents.3 This last price represented a 
subsidy of 25 to 33 percent of the retail price. The total amount of subsidy 
included the expenditures for the rice measures as well as for such other 
subsidized food items as red onions, lentils and cooking oi1.4 
Something of the efficacy of the subsidies as an income maintenance 
measure may be gleaned from the fact that, circa 1970, 43.6 percent of the 
households benefiting from the program belonged in an income bracket below the 
poverty lines and another 37.2 percent to one just above it. Table 5 shows the 
breakdown. It may be assumed from this that the measure was meaningful to 
about eighty percent of all households concerned. 
Table 5. Household Income Distribution in 1969-70 








Source: ILO, op.cit., Report, p.35-36. 









Food subsidies, along with a ration system, were introduced during World 
War II, probably at the same time as the establishment of the Food Control 
Department in 1937. Later renamed the Food Supply and Control Board, the 
body was responsible for importation, price control and distribution of rice and 
other food items, and for the internal rice purchase program concomitantly carried 
'ILO, A Program 0/ Action/or Ceylon, Report, Geneva, 1971, pp. 9-10. 
2B. H. Farmer, "Nine Years of Political and Economic Change in Ceylon", The World Today, 
May 1965, p. 192. 
3ILO, op. cit., Technical Papers, p. 234. 
SThe monthly income thought necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living in Ceylon 
in 1970 was Rs.200 for a household of two adults and two children. 
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out to place all food supply under government control. 6 The subsidized sale part 
of the rice program was launched as late as 1970.7 
The government expenditure on education was Rs.522.2 million or 
4.5-5.0% of the GNP in 1970. The total enrollment at all levels of schools was 
3,362,000 in 1971, representing approximately 27% of the total population. In 
1966, the cost outlay per enrolled pupil was US$29.00. 
Free education for all levels, from kindergarten to university, was declared 
in October 1945, and school attendance up to 14 years of age was made 
compulsory. 8 Progression to secondary and higher educational institutions 
depended on passing tests to qualify for scholarships. 
Both in expenditure and enrollment, Ceylon's level of education, thus 
measured quantitatively, is one of the highest, not only in the region but among all 
the underdeveloped countries. 
The standard of health service is also high in Ceylon. In or around 1966, 
there were only about 320 persons per hospital bed and 4,200 persons per 
physician.9 Government expenditure on the service was Rs.235.7 million or 
approximately 2% of the GNP during the financial year 1969-70. The outlay per 
head was roughly Rs.20. 
Health facilities are geographically widely dispersed and well balanced. 
Even rural areas are adequately covered by a decentralized but closely 
coordinated system of hospitals, clinics, mobile units and staff services. The 
utilization rate is very high. In 1962, for instance, the attendance at 134 out-
patient departments in government hospitals and 248 dispensaries throughout 
Ceylon totaled over 25 million (equivalent to 2.4 visits per inhabitant) and, during 
1961-61, the utilization rate of public maternity service was 98%.10 In view of 
this and the fact that health service is free to all those who choose to use it, the 
program, in effect, represents another universal income maintenance scheme. 
The pension schemes for public employees are the older and better 
developed components of the occupational measures as they involved RS.206 
million in public expenditures and user contributions during the fiscal year 1970-
71. The pensions include a non-contributory plan for retiring and pensionable 
6Ceylon Yearbook, 1948, pp. 48-55; lLO, op. cit., Report", p. 10. 
7ILO,op. cit., "Technical Papers", p. 234. 
800vemment Printer, Ceylon Yearbook, 1949, pp. 99-100. 
9UN, World Economic Survey, 1969-70, "Statistical Annex", Table A.7, p.196. 
IOOunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. Ill, p. 1596. 
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public servants, a contributory plan for the widows and orphans of pensionable 
public servants, a contributory scheme for government teachers, another 
contributory scheme for the widows and orphans of pensionable teachers, and the 
public service provident fund for non-pensionable public employees. The 
number of pensionerss in 1970-71 was 72,000. 11 
Compared with the above provision for public employees, the employees 
provident fund, the mainstay of the average worker in need, is still insubstantial 
since it has been in effect only since 1958. In 1970, the total contributions and 
investment returns amounted to RS.143 million or 1.4% of the GNP and the 
population coverage was 47.8% of the total economically active population in 
1969,12 and 15% of the total population. 
In addition to the above, there are three non-contributory provisions for 
which employers are held solely responsible. These include paid sick leaves, 
cash and medical benefits for maternity, and workmen's compensation. The 
original versions of these measures were introduced in the late colonial period in 
the forms of the Medical Wants Ordinance (1912), Maternity Benefit Ordinance 
(1939), and Workmen's Compensation Ordinance (1934). All three measures 
have been subjected to significant amendments at various stages, but most notably 
in the late 1950s. 13 Workmen's compensation is still on a voluntary basis and 
with private carriers. The expenditure and coverage data for these provisions are 
not available. 
In proceeding to examine the underlying factors of the above IMP, the 
following points may be borne in mind: 
1. Both in expenditure and population coverage, the non-occupational 
components, especially food subsidies and education, predominate. 
II. Despite Ceylon's limited economic resources, a highly universal 
measure·, i.e., food subsidies, represents the foremost instrument of 
income maintenance in the country. 
iii. Of the occupational provisions, those for public employees are far 
more substantial in terms of the cost-popUlation coverage ratio. 
IV. Provisions for the general sector exist in the form of a provident fund 
system. Sickness and maternity, as well as workmen's compensation, 
are on the basis of employer liability. 
lilLO, 0p. cit .. pp. 80-81. 
12ILO, op. cit .• Tables 3-4, pp. 22, 74. 
13Ibid. pp. 77-83; Ceylon Yearbook. 1951, p. 93. 
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There are other salient points concerning various components. Since 
they are too numerous and some of them cannot be discussed without reference to 
their underlying factors, however, they will be clarified in the following section. 
Underlying Factors 
1. Those associated with food subsidies 
It was indicated earlier that the subsidizing and rationing of rice and 
other essential food items began as part of an emergency device to adjust 
Ceylon's internal needs to the war time condition. The reason this device has 
been retained in the post-war period and has become a key instrument of income 
transfer to households is pertinent to this discussion. 
One notes on Table 6 that the levels of expenditure on food subsidies 
varied considerably from one government period to another but on the whole 
followed an upward trend. The period of the first MEP (Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna (People's United Party)) government (1956-59) was something of an 
exception, but it was canceled out by the second MEP government. In short, 
there has been a steady escalation in the subsidies throughout the post-
independence period, indicating that the income maintenance function of the 
measure has not been affected by changes in the reigning political parties. It was 
affected by other political factors though, as will be seen. 
a. Radicalization of the polity 
Role of trade unions 
Coalition of the left 
When Ceylon became the first colony to gain independence from 
Great Britain in 1948, the pressing circumstance that had necessitated the rice 
measure no longer existed and the government of D.S. Senanayake gradually 
moved toward ending it. In 1953, an attempt to reduce the ration was made by 
Dudley Senanayake who, upon succeeding his father, faced a serious budgetary 
problem. His proposal met with massive protests and he was forced to resign. 14 
In August 1962, the government of Mrs. Bandaranaike, whose Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP) is credited with a much wider support base than Senanayake's 
United National Party (UNP), similarly attempted to reduce the subsidies for the 
same budgetary reason. The public's reaction was the same and, this time, the 
finance minister was obliged to resign. IS 
14 ILO ,op. cit., "Report", p. 10. 
15Farmer, op. cit. 
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Table 6. Government Expenditures on Food Subsidies, Education and Health, 1950-68 (Ceylon)· 
(% of GNP) 
Parties in power Year Food Subsidies Education Public Health 
UNP 1950 0.9 2.6 1.6 
1951 2.8 2.5 1.5 
1952 5.3 3.0 1.9 
1953 3.4 2.6 1.9 
1954 --- 2.9 1.9 
1955 
MEP 1956 1.5 3.0 1.9 
1957 1.9 3.4 2.1 
1958 2.3 3.5 2.1 
1959 1.7 4.0 2.2 
MEP '1966'** 2.9 4.3 2.1 
_J r---I ~"jJ!61 3.7 4.1 2.2 
1962 3.4 4.1 2.1 
1963 3.1 4.1 2.0 
1964 3.5 4.6 2.0 
UNP 1965 5.5 4.5 2.1 
1966 5.8 4.2 2.1 
1967 5.1 4.1 2.1 
1968 5.3 4.0 1.2 
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1955, Public Finance, Ceylon; UN, Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1969, Part D, pp.819-864; Department of Census and Statistics, 
Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1966, p.298; Ceylon Yearbook, 1966, Chart No. 24 . 
• This table shows a trend rather than exact percentage representations since some computations 
were based on estimated expenditures. The percentages of educational expenditures during 1960-
68, for instance, are lower than the 5 percent average given by IlO, op.cit., Technical Papers, 
p.160, and the percentage of health expenditures in 1958 lower than the 2.8% given by Myrdal, 
op.cit., Vol. II, p.1578 . 
•• The UNP was in' office between April-July, 1960. 
It goes without saying that there was a real need on the part of the 
general public, which the rice measure met at least in part, and the mass reaction 
to the cut-back proposals was directly connected with that need. This will be 
given a closer look later. The factors underlying the militancy of the protest are 
of immediate interest. The first is the general radicalization of the political 
climate in the region in the post-war period. While Ceylon attained 
independence without a substantial liberation movement within which ideology 
could crystallize, she was nevertheless open to various radical thoughts then 
sweeping the emerging countries and so was more or less committed to a form of 
socialism from the beginning. In tangible terms, this commitment called for the 
realization of a welfare state in which raising the level of living for the masses 
was a top priority. This commitment was closely intertwined with the emerging 
notions of development and planning and contributed toward raising the mass 
expectation as to the government's responsibility for meeting these needs. 16 It 
was consistent with this expectation to have the government guarantee some part 
of the subsistence needs of the masses and the proposed cut-back of the rice 
measure was contrary to their expectation. 
16Myrdal,op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 742-832. 
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The second factor is not unrelated to the first, but it has more to do 
with interest groups and party politics than to the overall political climate. 
Specifically, in both of the "rice crises", the group spearheading the protest was 
composed of trade unions, particularly the dock workers of Colombo. The 
unions in Ceylon were under the influence, if not always under the direct control, 
of activist groups on the left, such as the Trotskyite Nawa Lanka Sarna Samaja 
Party (NLSSP) and the Communist Party. The unions were also affiliated with 
the Sinhalese nationalist movement. 17 When the dock workers and others 
demonstrated against the government plans in 1953 and 1962, they were more 
than just protesting the threat to their survival needs. They were in fact 
demanding that the governments adhere to their policy pledges which, 
theoretically, were socialist. The confrontations, therefore, have been between 
differing political interests as well as between the pragmatic need of the 
governments to cut expenditures and the equally pragmatic need of the public for 
assistance. The governments backed down in both of the confrontations for 
sheer political reasons l8 and against an overall economic development interest. 
Myrdal points out in this connection, 
The port workers of Colombo, especially, were used (by 
competing political parties) to hold the government up for 
ransom ... Unwilling or unable for political reasons to cut welfare 
expenditures, including those designed to hold down the price of 
food - any attempt to cut the subsidized rice ration would invite 
political disturbances and electoral defeat - the government 
continued, in effect, to pump money into the economy .... it also 
necessitated, because of built-in voting pressure, ever larger 
government expenditures of social welfare. /9 
For these reasons, even the moderate to conservative UNP 
government, replacing Mrs. Bandaranaike's in 1956, "made no move ... to curtail 
social welfare expenditures; in particular, the rice subsidies have been 
retained ... ,,20 
h. Existing need 
17The World Today, (A People's Government: Social and Political Trends in Ceylon), Vol. 
12, No.7 (JuI1956), pp.282-283; Op. cit., (Ceylon in Perspective), Vol. 14, N. 10 (Oct 1958), 
p.432; Farner, op. cit., p.196. 
18Farmer, op. cit., p. 193. 
19Myrdal,op. cit., Vol. I, p. 356. 
2o/bid., p. 359. 
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Even the most blatant political competition needs a real issue 
around which to join the battle. In Ceylon's rice crises the issue of need on the 
part of the masses was real enough. This was evident in an earlier breakdown of 
household income distribution (Table 4) which showed nearly half of all 
households in Ceylon subsisting under the poverty line. Add to this the chronic 
and ever worsening unemployment21 and underemployment problems, the fact 
that nearly half of the total population and 75% of the rural population were 
undernourished and that the majority of the school children who drop out, at the 
rate of 50% at the 6th level, do so because of malnutrition,22 then the urgency of 
the need is not difficult to establish. The perception of the need on the part of 
the populace may have been accentuated by the high expectation level 
characteristic of the post-independence period and during the Bandaranaike 
government with its radical constituency and policy commitments. Nevertheless 
they were authentic enough for the unions and the public at large to base their 
protests on them and succeed. 
c. Ideology 
Economic resources 
The discussion so far of Ceylon's IMP has been the implicit 
suggestion that ideology was a positive factor and economic resources a 
secondary factor underlying the continuation of the rice subsidies. This needs to 
be elaborated. 
To consider ideology first, it should be pointed out that socialism, 
in so far as it was associated with the food subsidies, became so only when it was 
translated into tangible political actions. When the UNP prime minister resigned 
and his cutback proposal was rescinded in the first rice crisis, his defeat was due 
to the political muscle demonstrated by the unions and other mass groups rather 
than because of any intrinsic force, validity or any other virtue of the ideology per 
se. The tenet of the ideology happened to represent the interest of the masses 
and the latter were able to rally around it as they no doubt would rally around any 
other ideology that serves the same purpose. This point becomes clearer when 
the second rice crisis is taken into account. It occurred during the first 
government of Mrs. Bandaranaike who came into power based on an even closer 
coalition with the NLSSP than had her husband before her. 23 Her cabinet 
21 During 1960-70, the average rate of unemployment was 10% or more of the total labor force. 
See ILO, op. cit., "Report", pp. 3-4. 
22ILO,op. cit., "Technical Papers", p. 217. 
23ILO, op. cit., "Report", p. 40. 
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included a number of prominent Trotskyite leaders and the overall policies of her 
government were definitely aimed at creating a "socialist democracy".24 
Theoretically, therefore, no ideological conflict was possible 
between the government leaders and the organized labor and other groups on the 
left. More purely pragmatic differences of interest came into play in the crisis. 
To be sure, the Bandaranaike government must have found itself in a self-
contradictory position because of its professed allegiance to the "people's needs 
first" principle. In the final analysis, however, it was again the voting power of 
the protesters rather than any ideological qualm on the part of the government that 
forced the latter to back down. In other words, the role of ideology in the 
continuation of the food subsidies was in terms of creating a climate in which the 
hitherto dormant sector of the public was able to identify its self-interest and 
mobilize around it. 
As for the significance of economic resources, it was clearly over-
ruled by the political and public need factors when it became the basis of the 
proposed subsidy cut-back. In the earlier period when the decision to carry over 
the war-time measure into the post-independence years was made, however, the 
availability of funds was a positive underlying factor. Ceylon had come out of 
the war with a high level of cash reserves25 and this had enabled her to fund 
programs for social advancement. Myrdal writes in this regard, 
"(the revenues derived) from taxing the efficient, profitable, and 
largely foreign-owned plantations in the country, have permitted 
it to institute numerous measures to promote greater economic 
equality [and] the large subsidies paid to both producers and 
if . . I ,,26 consumers 0 rlce ... are prime examp es. 
The balance of payment declined steadily in the post-war years, 
however, until the governments were faced with budgetary problems as 
mentioned.27 
2. Those associated with education 
24Myrdal develops the thesis that all ideologies in Ceylon serve the purpose of rationalizing 
political and ethnic self interests. See Asian Drama, Vol. I, p. 357 and Vol. 11, pp. 741-847. 
25 It was Rs.II3 million in 1946. See Ceylon Yearbook, 1948, p.42. 
26Myrdal,op. cit., Vol. II, p. 770. 
271n 1956-57, the deficit in the operating budget was Rs.196.4 million. Ceylon Yearbook, 
1958, p.ll\. 
70 
Enrollment at all levels of schools rose steeply since the introduction 
of a new educational system providing free education. The comparative 
statistics are as follows. 
Table 7. School Enrollment (Ceylon) 
JPersons 
Levels 1946 1971 
Primary 1,000,000 3,000,000 
Secondary 86,000 350,000 
Tertiary 1,000 12,000 
Source: ILO, A Program of Action for Ceylon, 1971, p. 9. 
The progression from the 1946 level to that of 1971 was on the whole 
a continuum and on a high level of public expenditure. This means that all 
governments during the post-independence period utilized education more or less 
consistently as an instrument of indirect income transfers. 
Within this general framework, it is nevertheless possible to discern 
separate phases of educational development according to cost outlays. The phases 
correspond to the periods of alternating political regimes. (See Table 6) During 
1948-1956 when the UNP was in power, public expenditures on education as a 
percentage of the total GNP ranged between approximately 2.5 and 3.0, while 
during 1956-65 when the SLFP reigned in coalition with the leftist parties (except 
between April and July of 1960), it rose steadily from about 3.0 to about 4.5 or 
more. In the next three years which form part of another UNP period, the 
educational expenditure tended slfghtly to decline, by about half a percentage 
. 28 pomt. 
The question at this point is what were the factors associated with the 
basic education policy to which all the governments more of less equally adhered 
may have been, as well as what the factors connected with the variance in the 
educational expen~itures of the successive governments may have been. 
Part of the first category of factors may be traced back to the situation 
that had obtained under the British rule. 
a. Colonial influence 
As in many other former colonial countries, modem education was 
first introduced in Ceylon by various Christian missions in the early period of the 
British rule. The colonial administrators then took an active interest in its 
development partly out of their own need to train minor civil servants, whose 
28The percentages are based on data from Ceylon Yearbook, 1955, p.152 and 1966, Chart No. 
24; Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1966-68, section of 
Expenditures incurred by the Department of Education. 
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posts the colonists themselves were not interested in filling, and partly from a 
long-range design which included preparing the colony for eventual self-
government.29 In any event, a system of compulsory education for children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 went into effect as early as 1906.30 As it was not 
cost-free, however, the efficacy of the system was limited. 
The cost-free and compulsory system now in existence was first 
recommended by the Special Committee on Education in 1943 following a three 
year study. Due to the war, the recommendations had gone unimplemented and 
the task of implementing them, along with the high cash reserve mentioned 
earlier, was handed down to the government of independent Ceylon. To the 
extent that the colonial administration bequeathed two vital ingredients necessary 
for the task, i. e. a plan and the initial investment fund, however, substantial credit 
for Ceylon's post-war advancement in the education field can rightfully go to the 
former. 
The colonial government helped to establish other traditions in the 
country's education policies, not all of them necessarily laudable. These, 
however, are not directly relevant to the income maintenance function of 
education and, therefore, will forego discussion. 
Factors associated with the degrees of emphases that the various 
governments placed on education, as measured by expenditures, included the 
orientation of the political parties and, again, politics. 
b. Leadership orientation 
Party politics 
The two major political contenders in Ceylon, the UNP and the 
SLFP, differ in the origins of their respective leaders and the companies that they 
keep. Briefly, the first is the party of the old establishment of Western-educated 
elites and was founded by D.S. Senanayake who held office since 1931 under pre-
independence constitutions and he was the first prime minister after 
independence. Led by men "who dressed, drank, and made merry in ways now 
frowned upon officially in Ceylon" and otherwise well identified with the 
traditions of their former colonists, the UNP policies tended to depart from the 
past as little as the overall political context would allow. 3 1 
S. W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the founder of the SLFP, was not very 
different from the leaders of the UNP in that he, too, was Western-educated and 
29Myrdal, op. cit., Vol. III, pp.l637-1639. 
30ILO,op. cit., "Technical Papers", p. 159. 
31The World Today, Vol. 12, No.7 (July 1956), pp.218-287 and May 1965, pp.189-198. 
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even served as a member of the first UNP Cabinet. When he decided to run for 
the prime minister's office and founded the party, however, he did so by 
identification with Sinhalese nationalism. 32 In order to obtain the electoral 
majority, however, he had to coalesce with the left as well and form the Mahajana 
Eksath Peramuna (MEP) - People's United Party - which managed to stand for 
Sinhalese nationalism and socialism simultaneously.33 Specifically, nationalizing 
the economy and making Sinhalese the official language were the main election 
pledges, and it was particularly the latter pledge that later bore on the education 
policy of the Bandaranaike government. 
Introduction of Sinhalese as the medium of instruction in all 
primary classes of government-supported schools had been made a condition of 
the cost-free education system proclaimed in 1945. Implementation of this 
provision, as well as that of the free education system itself, was held u~ by the 
UNP-dominated parliament during the first period of the UNP rule. 4 This 
changed during the Bandaranaike reign because fulfilling their political pledges 
necessitated turning out trained personnel proficient in Sinhalese and the task of 
doing so fell squarely on the doorsteps of the educational institutions. In order 
to facilitate their task, the government increased its financial responsibility for 
them and many hitherto private schools were converted to "assisted" ones. 
Under this arrangement, the assisted schools were obliged to change the medium 
of instruction from English to Sinhalese or Tamil, depending on the student 
population.35 
c. "Hunger for education" 
Development needs 
Population growth 
With the awakening of the masses caught up in the nationalist 
movement, there developed a "real hunger for education". Over the two periods 
of the Bandaranaike regime genuine attempts were made to respond to that hunger 
by increasing the number of schools and opening new schools even in the 
remotest villages. Night schools also mushroomed to meet the need of the adult 
population.36 
32 Among the ingredients of Sinhalese nationalism are Buddhists revivalism, linguistic 
nationalism and sentiments directed against the Tamils (mostly the Indian workers on estates) and 
English-educated elites who occupied privileged positions in the past. See Farmer, op. cit., 
pp.190-191. 
33Ibid., pp.189-198; The World Today, Vol. 12, No.7 (July 1956) pp.282-287. 
34Ceylon Yearbook, 1949, p. 100 and 195/, p. 70. 
35lbid. 
36The World Today, October 1958, p. 435. 
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The significance of education in the overall framework of 
economic development was clearly recognized in connection with the Ten-Year 
Plan introduced in 1959.37 It placed particular emphasis on the development of 
educational policies appropriate to the social and economic conditions of Ceylon. 
The National Education Commission of 1961 similarly recommended broadening 
the basis of education on egalitarian princi~les and breaking away from the old 
approach geared to training civil servants. 8 Although it is not clear to what 
degree these plans and recommendations have been implemented, it seems 
reasonable to assume that they have influenced the decisions concerning 
education during this period. 
The expansion of school facilities and the corresponding rise in 
education expenditure have been to accommodate a growing number of school 
age children. This requires no elaboration beyond pointing out that Ceylon's 
average annual rate of population growth during 1951-66 was approximately 3 
percent. 
2. Those associated with health services 
Both in terms of public expenditures and service resources, the overall 
development of public health programs in the post independence period has been 
one of slow but steady growth without marked changes coincidental to the 
changes of government. Table 7 shows that during 1950-52, the midpoint of the 
first UNP rule, the number of physicians and hospital beds per 100,000 persons 
were 17 and 270 respectively. The cost outlay was approximately 1.5 percent of 
the GNP. This represented a gain over 1938, ten years prior to independence, by 
only one physician and 70 hospital beds per 10,000 persons. The per capita 
outlay, however, rose from Rs.2.19 in 1938 to Rs.8.98 in 1952. Even allowing 
for the increase in the cost of living, which doubled from 38 points to 98 points 
during the period (1953=100),39 the per capita gain was substantial, perhaps 
indicating qualitative improvements in the service. 
During 1957-59, a few years after the coming into power of the MEP, 
the number of physicians and hospital beds per 100,000 of the population were 21 
and 310 respectively. The cost outlay was 2.2 percent of the GNP in 1959. 
The cost per head was Rs.17 in the same year. 
37National Planning Council, The Ten Year Plan, Government Press, 1959, p. 46. 
38 Final Report of the National Education Commission, 1961, Session Paper No. XVII, 
Government Press, 1962. 
39UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1958, pp. 419-427. 
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In 1966, a year after the return of the UNP, the figures were 24 
physicians and 312 hospital beds per 100,000 persons and the total public 
expenditure involved represented 2.1 percent of the GNP. The outlay per head 
was close to Rs.20 in 1969-70. 
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Source: Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. III, Tables 30-1 and 30-2, pp.1564, 1585; UN, World Economic 
Survey, 1969-70, Statistical Annex, Table A.7, p.196; ILO, A Program of Action for 
Ceylon, 1971, Technical Papers, Tables 3 and 5, pp. 22, 233. 
In view of the above, which indicates a moderately upward continuum 
throughout the post-independence period, various political factors which were 
associated with other social measures can be safely ruled out as far as public 
health services are concerned. What seems to have predominated in the latter's 
development is simply the reality of massive health needs. A 1948 study 
showed that, of about 71,000 children examined, 80 percent had health defects of 
one kind or another.4o There are many other health statistics from different 
sources which all substantiate the same needs. 41 What is remarkable about 
Ceylon's health service development, therefore, is not only that it was basically 
determined by existing needs but also that, as a result of sustained efforts on the 
part of the various governments, some inroads were made in meeting those 
needs.42 
In the post-independence period two factors contributed to the positive 
trend. One was the participation of the World Health Organization and other 
international agencies in the country's health efforts. The other was the 
recognition on the part of the national government that a high level of health 
among the populace is a precondition for economic development. 43 The 
international agencies have been active in the area of preventive medicine which 
resulted in the eradication of certain communicable diseases, manufacture of 
drugs and medical equipment, training of health personnel, and the expansion of 
4oSarker, The Demography of Ceylon, pp.I64-165. 
41World Health Organization (WHO), Reports on the World Health Situation. See 
particularly the Second Report, 1957-1960 and the Supplement to the Second Report, 1061-1962, 
Pat 1: Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Ceylon, 1966, Incidence of 
Disease: Ceylon Yearbook, 1950-66. 
42Myrdal, op.cit., Vol. III, pp.1563, 1614. 
43I bid., p.1517. 
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health centers.44 In the fiscal year of 1958, foreign grants for health programs 
amounted to about two percent of the total public expenditure for the same 
category.45 
3. Those associated with occupational components 
Of the points raised concerning the occupational measures, the fact 
that an Employees Provident Fund was adopted during the first Bandaranaike 
government and that significant amendments were made (in Workmen's 
Compensation, Sickness and Maternity Ordinances) during the same period is of 
interest in this part of the discussion. This development represents a marked 
departure from what prevailed during the preceding UNP period when the only 
legislative action in social security was an amendment of the School Teacher's 
Pension Ordinance in 1951. The obvious question is what underlay the new 
development? 
a. Radical politics 
Role of the unions 
Without reiterating it in detail, the overall radicalization of the 
political climate around and subsequent to the election of 1956 and the 
Bandaranaike government's radical stance in response to it can be credited at least 
in part. Another more specific factor was also involved, the growing strength of 
organized labor and its demand for better working conditions. 
Table 9. Number of Trade Unions, Membership, and Strikes, 1948-1961 (Ceylon) 
Year Number of Unions Membership of 
Workers' Unions 






1953 259 307,369 87 
1954 282 311,449 114 
1955 310 359,431 
1956 352 261,681 214 
1957 526 521,654 304 
1958 631 730,178 219 
1959 826 821,996 248 
1960 900 738,569 
1961 916 787,575 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Yearbook, 1950-66 issues. 
4sSrain Abel-Smith, Payingfor Health Services, pp. 55, 71. 
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Table 9 shows that, whereas during 1953-56 (the UNP period) the 
number of functioning unions increased by only 93 in three years, it jumped by 
174 during 1956-57, one year after the government change. It continued to 
increase by the hundreds during the next few years, to taper off somewhat 
subsequent to 1958 when the provident fund was enacted. The increase in the 
membership strength followed a similar pattern. 
The incidence of labor disputes rose along with the growing 
numerical strength of the unions. In 1954, a year in which the number of strikes 
hit an all time high of the UNP period, it was 114. In 1956, the year of the 
government change, it nearly doubled to 214 and involved 353,854 man days. 
The next year, a year before the enactment of the provident fund, there were 304 
strikes and 808,493 man days were lost. The most frequent causes of strikes 
were wage disputes, working conditions, and dismissals. 46 
The above rise in union strength and labor disputes occurred in a 
period when the increase in the rate of new entrants into the labor market was 
very slight.47 This seems to point to the significance of organized power of the 
unions rather than the demographic aspect of the labor force itself as a factor 
underlying the union's strength. 
As to why a provident fund, rather than an insurance system, was 
adopted, no explicit explanations are available. There are two possibilities 
which are worth considering. One is the influence of the ILO technical team 
which was active in Ceylon during this period. In view of the very limited 
resources of the government and the country as a whole, a provident fund would 
have been the preferred model. The other possibility is that with estate laborers 
representing the most stable and somewhat larger sector of the wage-earning 
group, they were the main beneficiaries of any scheme to be adopted. But, as 
indicated earlier, they were composed largely of Indian Tamils who had yet to be 
successfully assimilated into the country. It is quite possible, given the 
Sinhalese nationalism that was sweeping the period under consideration, the 
policy makers were averse to choosing a model which would result in a transfer of 
public funds to outsiders largely under the employ of former colonists. 
b. Status of the civil service and public employee pensions 
As in other countries of Asia, civil service in Ceylon has been the 
most privileged of occupational categories. Under the British, it developed into 
a well organized and highly competent system into which only the elite of the 
46Cey/on Yearbook, 1966, p.193. Also see earlier issues. 
47ILO, op. cit., Report, p. 44. 
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Western-educated Ceylonese were recruited. This particular group became an 
essential partner of the colonial administration and its members were rewarded for 
their services with fairly adequate pensions. 
This tradition continued into the post-independence period, not 
only because the precedence was set but also because the civil service was no less 
essential a partner of the Ceylonese governments. Their superior administrative 
experience and technical know-how have been valued and relied upon by 
politicians who were usually amateurs in such matters. For this reason the civil 
service came to represent an independent political force. They provided ample 
reasons for their priority pension rights. 
Summary 
In terms of expenditures (12 percent of the GNP) and population coverage, 
the income maintenance function of the non-occupational components of the IMP 
is very high in Ceylon by the standards of underdeveloped countries. The food 
subsidies, demo grants in kind, are particularly important because they cover 
practically the entire population. 
Education is not far behind food subsidies in expenditure. It expanded 
markedly since 1956 and, at present, school enrollment is one of the highest 
among the underdeveloped countries. Health services progressed steadily 
throughout the post-independence period and these, too, reached a large 
proportion of the population. 
Of occupational components, the pensions for public employees are such 
that "there is little room for improvement.,,48 They were first introduced under 
the colonial administration and were consolidated and expanded further since. 
The same cannot be said of the provisions for the general population. 
Workmen's compensation and sickness and maternity are non-contributory 
schemes relying on the employers' voluntary responsibility. The only 
contributory component, the Employees Provident Fund, was enacted in 1958 by 
the first MEP government. The ratio between the cost outlay and the population 
coverage of the general sector schemes is inferior to that of public employee 
pensions. 
The retention of, and escalation of, expenditures for food subsidies was 
due to the pressure of a radicalized polity in which labor and the Sinhalese 
majority constituted a strong power bloc in opposition to government plans to 
reduce the level of the measure. Radical ideologies such as Marxism and 
Sinhalese nationalism provided both the ferment and rallying points for the 
pressure groups. 
481LO, op. cit., Technical Papers, p. 87. 
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Underlying Ceylon's educational reform and expansion were a perceived 
need for more and better educational opportunities on the part of the public which 
was expressed as political pressure and the leadership response to that pressure 
was out of political and development necessity. The colonial factor was 
significant in the development of education in the pre-independence period. 
In the health field, massive health needs, the leadership interest in meeting 
those needs, and the availability of foreign aid came together to further the 
develt>pment of health services. The dualistic health service system (estate and 
non-estate) corresponds to the dualistic economic structure ofthe country. 
The introduction of the Employees Provident Fund appears to have been 
in response to labor's demand for social security. The choice of the measure 
itself was based on considerations of limited resources which the ILO experts 
presumably took into account in helping to formulate the plan. The relatively 
high level of public employee pensions is attributable to the status of the civil 
service. Pressure group and political requisite factors, as well as traditional 
factors, affected the position of the civil service as a pressure group of its own in 
Ceylon. 
GHANA 
Delineation of the IMP 
Ghana's IMP components as they stood in the late 1960s are as shown in 
Table 10. There are six components in all: education, health and other social 
services for the non-occupational sector and a compulsory provident fund system 
(covering old age, invalidity, and health), public employee pension, and 
workmen's compensation for the occupational sector. In cost and population 
coverage, the former dominates the latter. 
Table 10. IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (Ghana) 
Year of Public Exgenditure Population % of Total 
Data New Cedis % of Covered Population 
(million) GNP 
Non-Occugational 
1. Public Education 1968 75.4 3.8 1,520,214(1965) 18 
Expenditure per 1966 (19680) 
enrollepupil (US$60) 
2. Public Health 1968 21.5 1.1 
3. Other Social Services 1968 32.7 1.6 
Total 129.6 6.5 
Occugational 
4. Provident Fund, 13.98 0.2 365,000 4.5 
covering sickness & (56% of all wage 
maternity, earners and 
invalidity, old age and salaried 
death (Total receipt in employees.) 
1965/66) 
5. Pensions for Public 1965-66 3.12 
Employees 
6. Workmen's 1965/66 0.84 
Compensation 
Total 17.94 1.0 
Source: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Part D, pp.819-864; UN, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1971, Public Finance, p.634; UN, World Economic Survey, 1969170, Table 25, 
p.64; UN, World Economic Survey, op.cit., Statistical Annex, Table A-11, p.206; ILO, The 
Cost of Social Security, 1964-66, Geneva, 1972, p.120 & Appendix, Table V, p.391; UN, 
Demographic Yearbook, 1970 (for computation of population coverage). 
Note: All expenditures as percentages of GNP were computed based on market prices. "Cedis" is 
a monetary unit of Ghana, equal to 100 pesewas. 
In Ghana's IMP, education is the most prominent component. In 1968, 
its expenditure was 75.4 million new Cedis or approximately 3.8% of the GNP, 
and total school enrollment was over 1.5 million or about 18% of the total 
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population in 1965. The outlay per enrolled pupil was US$60 in 1966. 
Although the data years differ, it is safe to assume that the ratios of approximately 
2: 1-3: 1 between the education expenditure and expenditures for other non-
occupational components have prevailed during the years under consideration. 
Public health is said to be one of Ghana's priority programs, perhaps 
rightly so since it addresses an urgent need of the country and as it is potentially 
as important an instrument of income maintenance as education. In terms of 
public investment actually made, however, it lags far behind the latter, taking up 
only 1.1% of the GNP in 1968. 
The third and last non-occupational component listed is "Other Social 
Services". In Ghana, this is more than just public assistance in the conventional 
sense. I It covers such service categories as assistance to voluntary welfare and 
youth organizations, a welfare fund for "derelict" labor, maintenance and 
operation of delinquency institutions, as well as institutional and outdoor relief.2 
The diffuse nature of this particular component and the proportionately large 
expenditure it takes up constitute distinguishing characteristics of the Ghanaian 
IMP. 
The relative modesty of occupational components is still another 
noteworthy characteristic. Pensions for public employees are well entrenched, 
having been introduced in the colonial era, but these apply only to a very small 
sector of the population. The provident fund system which applies to the general 
wage-earning and salaried sector came into being only since 1965 and it covers 
those in establishments with five or more employees. Workmen's compensation 
was first enacted in 1940 and amended a number of times since, most recently in 
1963, but its voluntary basis remains unchanged. Thus, compared to the IMPs of 
other countries under study, Ghana's occupational measures are on the 
conservative side and the component covering the non-public sector has been late 
in coming. This is noteworthy because the level of Ghana's economic resources, 
as represented by per capita income, has been higher than those of most other 
countries in the study group. 
The main questions arising out of the above review therefore are: 
1. Why is education singled out as the area of public investment? 
ll. Why is the development of occupational provisions relatively slow? 
I Meaning "indoor" and "outdoor" relief and related services. 
2These are the budget items of the Department of Social Welfare and Delinquency Services 
as shown in Estimates of Annually Recurrent Expenditures, 1957-58, Government Printer, Accra, 
Ghana. 
iii. Why is there a provident fund system rather than an insurance 
scheme in protecting the general sector? 
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The following discussion of underlying factors of the Ghanaian IMP will 
focus on these particular questions. 
Underlying Factors 
1. Those Associated with Education Policy 




Changing world context 
Modern education in Ghana began during the colonial period at the 
initiative of various Christian missions. Since the 1920s, however, the British 
colonial administration became more directly involved, assuming the financial 
and teacher training responsibilities to a degree hitherto unprecedented. The 
Education Ordinance of 1925 was a tangible embodiment of this new direction. 
The interest of the colonial government in education persisted until the end of its 
rule.3 
One of the first factors entering into the above development was 
the governorship of Sir Gordon Guggisberg who took office in 1919. He was 
keenly interested in education as the foundation for progress and endeavored to 
raise its standard through provisions for better trained teachers, inclusion of 
agricultural and technical subjects in the curriculum, and equal opportunities for 
male and female students. He help established half a dozen or more teacher 
training institutions and one of them, Achimota College, became well-known in 
the region. It was the seedbed of Guggisberg's dream of African development 
through black and white cooperation.4 
A highly profitable cocoa trade during the 1920s and 1930s that 
resulted in a sizable accumulation of reserve funds supported Guggisberg's policy 
thrust. 5 The availability of funds was a tangible invitation for the colonial 
3F.M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, Stanford Univ. Press, Stanford California, 
1960, pp. 99-136. 
4Bourret,op. cit., pp.134-135. 
S/bid., pp. 99-101. 
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government to respond to the territorial people's felt need for education and other 
social services and to make it the government's on-going concern. 
Essentially similar factors gave rise to the developments in the next 
phase. Sir Alan Bums, who succeeded Guggisberg, was also oriented toward 
African development through education and set down his ideas in a five-year 
plan. Its implementation was delayed by World War II, but the decisions 
emphasizing education were made and acted upon in the post-war years while 
Great Britain was still in full control of the territory. Economic conditions 
continued favorable during the war and the first post-war decade and have made 
pursuing the established policy objectives financially feasible. 6 
Another factor encouraged education during this period and 
separated it from the previous one, i.e. the dramatic change in the world socio-
political climate best expressed in the declaration of the United Nations Charter 
on Human Rights. More to the point, as far as the colonial territories were 
concerned, was the establishment of the Trusteeship Council, with its mission to 
promote "the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the Trust Territories, and their progressive development towards 
self-government or independence". According to Bourret, this international 
mandate had the effect of accelerating efforts on the part of both the colonial 
government and indigenous leaders in the education and development fields as 
these were necessary steps toward fulfilling the mandate. 7 
The efforts bore significant fruits. Between 1946 and 1951, the 
number of teachers in training doubled and the primary enrollment nearly tripled 
from 80,000 to 235,000.8 Also, the first university college of the Gold Coast 
was established at Lagos.9 
b. Self government and post-independence period: 
Popular demand 
Political requisite 
Despite the substantial progress made during the colonial rule, the 
physical and human resources for education was still far too inadequate to meet 
the country's acute needs when the reign of government was in good measure 
6Ibid., pp.157-179. 
7Ibid., p.ll!. 
8Ibid., pp. 214-215. Cf. Ministry ofinfonnation & Broadcasting, Ghana: An Official 
Handbook, 1961, Government Printer, Accra, p. 53. 
9Bourret, op. cit. 
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handed over to an indigenous national leader, Kwame Nkrumah, in 1951. What 
confronted the new leader was, first of all, a long built-up need for education. 
There was also the need of a newly self-governing people with their heightened 
expectations. The demand for education at this period was indeed "explosive". 10 
Nevertheless, what faced Nkrumah and his government was more 
than just pressing needs for education translated into demand. The needs were 
first faced as an important political issue in two successive general elections that 
determined which the country's majority party would be. Nkrumah's 
Convention People's Party (CPP) succeeded in attaining the dominant position 
partly on the merit of its pledge to meet those needs. II It was therefore both the 
very real need of the people for expanded education opportunities and the CPP's 
need to keep its pledge regarding that need that figured prominently in the first 
decisions of the Nkrumah government. By keeping the pledge, Nkrumah and his 
party hoped not only to maintain but widen their political support. 12 
The policy formula incorporating the above requirements of both 
the people and the government in power was the Accelerated Education Plan. It 
was introduced after Nkrumah was installed as the leader of "Government 
Business" under the new colonial constitution. Above all, the Plan called for 
opening the primary schools to all children without fees by 1951 and making 
education compulsory by 1964. 13 It also called for the necessary expansion of 
teacher training and school facilities. Table 11 shows some interim results of the 
implementation of the Plan. 
Enrollments in the primary and middle level schools approximately 
doubled between 1951 and 1959, as did the annual output of teachers in half that 
time, 1951-1955. The number of schools for various levels grew at different 
rates between 1951 and 1959 ranging from 317% for the primary to 63% for the 
secondary levels. The middle level schools increased by 20% during the same 
period. 
IORobert E. Dowse, Modernization in Ghana and the USSR: A Comparative Study. Rutledge 
& Kegan Paul, London, 1969, p.35. 
II See Convention People's Party General Election Manifesto. 1951, p.706. It pledges, 
among others, to effect "a unified system of education with free and compulsory elementary, 
secondary and technical education up to the age of 16 years", to "bring the University College to a 
full university status at once", and to liquidate illiteracy from this country in the shortest possible 
time ... " in a.E. Metcalfe: Great Britain and Ghana; Documents of Ghana History. 1807-1957. 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1964, pp.704-707. 
12Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, Gold Coast to Ghana: Some Problems of Transition. Bourret, 
op.cit., p.215; Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), Ghana: A Brief Political & 
Economic Survey. (Chatham House Memoranda). May 1957, Oxford University Press, pp.35-36. 
13Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, op.cit. 
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Table 11. Schools Enrollment, Number of Schools, Teacher Training, 1951-1959 (Ghana) 
1951 1955 1959 
Enrollment: primary 235,000 465,290 
middle 66,175 139,984 
No. of Schools: primary 1,081 3,428 
middle 539 1,118 
secondary 37 59 
Annual output of teachers: 791 1,680 
.. Source: Ghana: An OffICIal Handbook, 1961, p.53; Development Progress Report, 
1955, Accra, Ghana, para.165. 
The Accelerated Plan as a whole took into consideration at least 
three other important factors, although one overlaps with the political factor 
mentioned. They were the Africanization of the government and other 
institutions, economic development, and complete political control of the country. 
The first two factors were made explicit in both the CPP General 
Election Manifesto, 1951, and subsequent documents. 14 According to Bourret, 
these factors underlay the decision to devote three quarters of capital expenditures 
amounting to some £ 8 million to secondary and technical schools and teacher 
training institutions under the Plan. 15 The development of educated and trained 
manpower was seen as the key to both the Africanization and development 
objectives. 
The political control factor is understandably not as explicit in 
official documents as the others, and the discussion therefore depends even more 
on the views of other writers. However, there are some salient facts. First of 
all, true to the election pledge, the Nkrumah government and the CPP launched a 
massive program of adult education. This was carried out in conjunction with 
community and rural development and youth training programs and it was this all 
embracing mass education that served the political control needs of the governing 
party. Cadres of the CPP were sent out to strategic areas of the country to 
conduct literacy campaigns that simultaneously functioned as political 
indoctrination activities. Many youth centers were established under both the 
Ministry of Education and the Department of Social Welfare and Community 
Development and functioned as leadership and political training institutions. 16 
Dowse, who sees Nkrumah's regime as having been essentially a revolutionary 
one, holds that, under that regime, education represented the groundwork for 
14Deve!opment Progress Report, 1955; The CPP Manifesto, 1951, op. cit., Bretton, op. cit., 
pp.15, 16,95. 
ISBourret,op. cit., p. 216. 
16/bid., p. 217. 
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revolutionary mobilization and development and that it was "intimately associated 
with desired attitudinal changes ... to produce ... the African Personality, imbued 
with love of country and ... work.,,17 
Even without Nkurumah's far-reaching notions about education, it 
is not difficult to see why he would have needed to convert the mass education 
apparatus into a political control mechanism. Having spent many years in the 
United States and Great Britain, Nkrumah was a latecomer on the Gold Coast 
political scene and his support consisted, at least initially, of the grass-roots 
members of the United Gold Coast Convention Party (UGCCP), which he took 
with him when he left the party after serving it for a few years as the organizing 
secretary. This support enabled him to prevail over his competitors in the pre-
self-government elections but it was hardly enough or significant enough to be the 
basis of the independent government yet to come. Having been actually 
expelled from the UGCCP, a party of intellectuals and professionals, for his 
personal ambitions, and not enjoying the support of the still powerful tribal chiefs, 
he was left with the alternative of cultivating his constituency on the fringes of 
tribal control and among the small-traders and menial workers of the city. IS The 
mass education and community development programs were practically tailor-
made as the means for reaching those sectors. 
In short, education during this period was seen as the one stone 
capable of killing all the right birds, i.e. satisfaction of public demands for 
education, fulfillment of the political pledge, development of political support and 
control, and preparation of the ground for Ghana's Africanization and 
development. 
c. Resources 
It goes without saying that even an auspicious program such as the 
above could not have been launched on thin air. Fortunately for the policy-
makers, the Gold Coast of this period enjoyed one of the highest per capita rates 
of capital reserve in its historyl9 and its per capita income, at around £ 50, was 
one of the highest in Africa.2o In other words, the availability of funds enabled 
the Nkrumah government to implement the educational program. 
17Dowse, op. cit., p. 34. 
18Henry L. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in 
Africa, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp.42-43; W. Arthur Lewis, Politics in West Africa, Allen & 
Uniwin, London, 1965, p. 27. 
19Bourret,op. cit., p. 179. The Total Amount of reserve was estimated at about L200 million. 
See Economic Survey, 1964, p. 30 and West Africa, Oct. 9, 1965, p.1123. 
20 Bretton, op. cit., p. 15. 
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d. Ideology 
A theme which was hinted at but not developed in Dowse's 
characterization of Nkrumah's regime as a revolutionary one and his educational 
policy as one geared to attitudinal conditioning of the populace for revolution is 
ideology and its relation to the last policy. It needs to be asked what the nature 
of Nkrumah's revolution was, if indeed he undertook one, and upon what 
ideology it was based and how that ideology contributed to the choice of 
education as a high priority program in its particular form. 
Regarding Nkrumah's revolution and its ideological underpinning, 
there are two interpretations. One argues that Nkrumah was a Marxist or a 
communist and that what he attempted in Ghana and Africa as a whole was a 
socialist revolution on a grand scale. Circumstantial evidence in support of this 
view is massive. To refer to only a few, he was believed, while in England, to 
have had "Communist affiliation and to have become imbued with a Communist 
ideology ... and was identified particularly with the West African National 
SecretariaL.the precursor of a Union of West African Soviet Socialist Republics" 
around the time when Nkrumah was appointed Leader of Government Business. 
There was no indication that he had "abandoned his aims for a Union of West 
African Soviet Socialist Republics and ... his foreign affiliations connected with 
these aims.,,21 During the period of his leadership, especially subsequent to his 
assumption of the presidency of independent Ghana, he had surrounded himself 
with advisors and other personnel representing or affiliated with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the 
internationallefi.22 His public addresses both inside and outside Ghana have been 
characterized by Marxist revolutionary views and visions,23 and at least one of 
his development plans, in which education occupied an important position, was 
actually called the Socialist Plan.24 
The other interpretation, perhaps best represented by Bretton, 
portrays Nkrumah as a despot, a ruler who had subordinated all national and even 
21Colonial Office (Britain), Report of the Commission ofEnquby into Disturbances in the 
Gold Coast, 1948, His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948, pp. 17, 19. 
22Bretton,op. cit., pp. 23-26, 79. Among Nkrumah's foreign advisors and associates were 
(within Ghana) Geoffrey Bing, Patrick Sloan, Erica Powell, D.N. Pritt, Alan Nunn May, Thomas 
& Dorothy Hodgkin, Ron Bellamy, (outside Ghana) Bertrand Russell, Fenner Brockway, Barbara 
Ward, and many others. 
23Nkrumah, Kwame, 1909-, Government Printer, Accra, Ghana, 1957; President, 1957-
(Addresses), Government Printer, etc. 
24Parliamentary Debates, Session 1963-64, Official Report, 1st Series - Vo1.35, pp. 22-195, 
Presidential address and debates of the parliament on Seven-Year Plan. 
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pan-African interests to the requisites of his personal power.25 In this view, 
ideologies, whether Marxism, Communism or "Nkrumahism", are mere trappings 
provided by the "professional revolutionaries" and other types of international 
intelligentsia "to cover up the intellectual nakedness of his rule" or "to cloak the 
old-fashioned, garden-variety political machine in ideologically respectable 
garments.,,26 
Insofar as the above arguments relate to whether Nkrumah's 
policies were ultimately determined by his commitment to one ideology or 
another or by requisites of personal rule, they present difficult problems and no 
one argument should be given precedence without a thorough analysis of what 
actually happened during his regime. Such an analysis, however, is outside the 
scope of the present study. Nevertheless, relating the arguments to certain facts 
about the income maintenance program development during his regime is another 
matter and this shall be undertaken after all pertinent facts are in. As far as they 
concern the educational policy itself, however, it can be stated even at this stage 
that there is no ground to rule out one or the other argument. Free and 
compulsory education with a good dose of indoctrination is consistent with 
widely practiced Marxist or Communist educational policies, but is by no means 
their monopoly. The evidence is that, in Nkrumah's Ghana, both ideology and 
political requisite factors entered into education policy but the latter was more 
decisive. 
e. External factors 
The British had given Ghana's education a start by their efforts in 
the pre-self-government period, but the efforts seem to have had no impact on 
subsequent development. This was so even while the colonial government still 
held some. constitutional authority over Gold Coast affairs. One case in point is 
the Accelerated Education Plan which represented a clear departure from the one 
recommended by the colonial administration. The latter called for "a steady 
increase in primary schools with a proportional increase of middle schools, 
teacher training institutions, and so up to the university level",27 but without the 
fee-free compulsory feature. The CPP ministers went for the Accelerated Plan 
because they were "governed by the estimated popularity and vote-catching 
capacity of any plan" and because "[education] was regarded the most popular 
measure that could be enacted. ,,28 The strength of political requisites over 
external influence was unmistakable in this instance. 
25Bretton, op. cit. 
26Bretton,op. cit., pp. 25, 85. 
27Bretton, op. cit., p. 125. 
28Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, op. cit. 
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Subsequent to full independence in 1957, external influences on 
Ghana were numerous and varied. Aside from foreign advisors and associates 
from the left, whose influence seems to have been primarily in international 
relations, there were the United Nations technical assistance teams that worked 
closely with government departments. There is evidence that the teams had a 
good deal to do with the financial and administrative aspects of many 
governmental affairs29 but no indication that they had significant influence on its 
basic policy decisions vis-a.-vis education. 
2. Those associated with public health service: political requisites 
It was seen that Ghana's public expenditure on health is less than one 
third of that for education. Considering that Ghanaian health service has been 
among the poorest even among underdeveloped countries,30 relegating public 
health to a secondary place of importance was certainly not need-based. If 
anything, this merely seems to emphasize the strength of the factors associated 
with the choice of education as a high priority program. 
The limited health program carried out by the Nkrumah government 
was strongly influenced by political considerations. One indication of this was 
that, despite repeated expert recommendations - i.e. the report of the 1951 
commission to study health needs and the 1955 Development Progress Report -
which stressed the urgency of preventive medicine and its cost-benefit advantage 
in the long run, actual emphases were placed on building a large scale modem 
hospital for its demonstration value and on expanding curative services in 
response to popular demand.31 
3. Those associated with the development of occupational provisions: 
Labor's need 
Place of labor in the economy 




29Henry Simon Bloch, A Program for Technical Assistance in the Fiscal and Financial Field, 
(Prepared of the Government of Ghana) UN Technical Assistance Program, 1958. 
30 Around 1966, Ghana's physician-population ratio, at 13,300 persons per physician was the 
lowest among the study group and her hospital bed-population ratio, at 770 persons per bed, the 
second lowest. See UN World Economic Survey, 1969-70, Statistical Annex, Table A-7, p.195. 
3 I Bourret, op. cit., p. 218. 
89 
Material on Ghanaian policies for occupational social security is 
practically non-existent. What is being presented in the following is therefore 
fragmentary and, at times, only suggestive. 
One of the questions raised about the Ghanaian IMP had to do with the 
slow development of occupational provisions. The government's plan to establish 
the National Pension and Insurance Fund was first made public by Nkrumah in 
his speech at the Trade Union Hall on 9 July 1960.32 This means there was a 
nine year lapse between Nkrumah's assumption of government leadership and his 
public decision to enact a general social security scheme. It was to go into effect 
in July 1961 but was delayed by four years. The Minister of Labor and Social 
Welfare explained that the delay was due to slow process of consultations amon§ 
various organizations concerned and the equally slow pace of committee work.3 
Although these explanations, given to the parliament, may not be complete, they 
could be assumed to be valid. Yet what were the reasons for the initial time lapse 
of nine years? 
There are only probable answers to the above question. In other 
countries the factors often associated with work-related social security are the 
position of labor in the overall economic context, the strength of labor as an 
organized pressure group, and its place in the political coalition supporting the 
government. These are in addition to labor's actual needs. The circumstances 
of Ghana in the first decade of self-government indicates that these same factors 
may qualify as explicators in the Ghanaian context as well. 
To consider needs first, during most of the 1950s, there were two 
factors which may have kept the labor demand at a low level and made an 
immediate action on its behalf seem less urgent. They were a favorable 
employment situation and the very small size of the non-agricultural working 
sector. (See Table 12) 
Table 12. Number of Persons on Wages & Salaries and Unemployed Persons, 1954-61 (Ghana) 
Year Total No. of Persons on % of Total No. of Unemployed % of Total 
Wa~es & Salaries Population Persons Emj>l~ees 
1954 240,000 Practically none 
1957 277,414 4.3 6,447* 2.4 
1961 14,700 
Source: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Ghana: A Brief Political & Economic Survey, May 
1957, Oxford Univ. Press, p.35 (for 1954 data); Annual Report on the Labor Division of the 
Ministry of Trade and Labor, 1956-57, pp.10, 37 (for 1957 data); ILO, YearbOOk of 
Labor Statistics, 1971, Table 10, p.418 (for 1961 unemployment figure). 
* Persons on the "live" register of those seeking employment at the end of the year. 
32Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Vol. 34, p. 1198. 
33/bid., p.1199. 
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Within the non-agricultural working sector, the level of unemployment 
was fairly high in or around 1960. But because the number of wage-earners and 
salaried employees represented only a fraction of the total population, the problem 
did not generate sufficient pressure to draw national attention. The relationship 
between the size of non-agricultural workers and the development of occupational 
income security provisions will be considered as part of a cross-national analysis 
later. But it is useful to note at this point that, in 1960, Ghana's non-agricultural 
workers accounted for only 14% of the total economically active population, 
while those in the other study countries ranged from a low of 9.3% to a high of 
51.6%. Ghana was ahead of only one country, Thailand.34 
As for the other factors, i.e. the relative position of labor in the overall 
economy, its strength as an organized pressure group and its place in the political 
coalition, the Ghanaian situation ranked low on all counts. During the period 
under consideration, Ghana's most important product was cocoa and its economy 
depended largely on the export of this product. While many of the wage-earners 
were employed in the service aspect of the cocoa trade, those more directly 
connected with it belonged in the agricultural sector. In other words, the 
workers in question were not members ofa key sector of the Ghanaian economy. 
Further, the numerical strength of organized labor was unimpressive 
during the period. Its total membership at the end of 1957 was 86,923 or about 
31.3% of the total number of employees in the non-agricultural sector.35 The 
unions, in other words, constituted a minority organization and the extent to 
which such an organization could wield influence as a pressure group or a 
political force was limited. 
The unions were actually co-opted into Nkrumah's political machine 
early in the post-independence years. Nkrumah and the CPP came into power 
largely with the support of rural grassroots elements but lost no time in bringing 
organized labor under the CPP wing. Bretton writes, 
As in a number of other countries, adopting totalitarian measures 
after independence, the trade unions were quickly brought to heel 
and directed to address themselves to the new tasks of national 
construction... Accordingly, an Industrial Relations Act was 
passed in 1958 to consolidate the unions and to integrate them 
with the CPP. After that, the unions were expected to 
concentrate on political tasks set by the new supreme employer, 
the state. 36 
34ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1971, Tables 1 & 2 were used as sources of data. 
Computations are the author's. 
35 Annual Report on the Labor Division of the Minister of Labor, Cooperatives and Social 
Welfare, 1957-58, Table IX, p. 97. The percentage computation is mine. 
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Bretton goes on to discuss how the original trade union leaders were 
gradually replaced by personal appointees ofNkrumah and how the "Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) was 'securely tied', not to the Party - which did not really exist -
but to the personal political machine.,,37 
In face of the cooperation and support that labor must have given the 
Nkrumah regime, the absence of any meaningful social security legislation for so 
long seems inexplicable. But, the puzzle more or less solves itself when it is 
realized that being a powerless minority organization, the TUC had no choice but 
to submit and was not even in a position to bargain the terms of its submission. 
As will be discussed in a cross-national context later, in those countries where 
labor legislation was enacted rapidly following government change, the trade 
unions invariably enjoyed effective bargaining power of one kind or another. 
What is of some interest in this connection is that in the few years preceding the 
Ghanaian government's initiative toward the Pension and Provident Fund, there 
was a sharp rise in the number of strikes and workdays lost. During 1955-56, 
the strikes numbered 23. In the next one year period, the number suddenly 
jumped to 43.38 This level was maintained till 1961 when the number of strikes 
stood at 43 and workdays lost at 29,340.39 
Bretton indicates that the workers' demands were justifiable on 
economic grounds but "Nkrumah was adequately equipped to resist such 
pressures", and that the workers, no matter how justified their grievances, "could 
not hope to succeed in pressing their demands without assistance from the army 
or police.,,40 Both the numbers of strikes and workdays lost dropped to a 
fraction of the 1957-61 level for the next three years, perhaps because the 1961 
strikers were suppressed, and do not begin to rise again till 1965,41 the year of the 
adoption of the Pension and Provident Fund and the year before the overthrow of 
Nkrumah by a military coup d'etat. 
In other words, despite Bretton's evaluation as to the strength of the 
Nkrumah regime to resist labor pressure, that pressure, when built-up to a 
sufficient level through direct action, appears to have had some impact on 
decisions regarding the one major labor legislation enacted during its reign. 
36Sretton, op. cit., p. 76. 
37Sretton,op. cit., p. 77. Also see Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Vol. 35 (March 1964), 
p.282. 
38Annual Report, op. cit., p. 17. 
39ILO, op. cit., Table 27, p. 738. 
40Sretton, op. cit., p. 78. 
41 ILO,op. cit. 
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So far, the discussion concerned the factors associated with the initial 
absence of any major income maintenance provision for labor as well as those 
that were associated with the decision to finally enact such a measure. None of 
these, however, are factors explicit in any official document or publication. What 
explicit official reason given points to gaps in private schemes that do not cover 
all the grades of labor and the need to remedy this shortcoming.42 
As to why a provident fund rather than an insurance scheme was 
adopted, once again there is no ready-made explanation. It is known, however, 
that representatives of the Social Security Division of the International Labor 
Office were closely involved in the program formulation from the beginning43 
and it may be assumed that they gave consideration to certain objective factors in 
the program setting such as resources. It is worth noting in this regard that since 
the 1955-57 period when the price of cocoa dropped and Ghana had her first 
experience of an unfavorable balance in trade,44 her economic condition had been 
steadily deteriorating. By around 1965, her once considerable reserve (£ 200 
million in 1957) was replaced with a national debt of £ 349.2 million.45 In this 
circumstance, the government would have been averse to a measure requiring 
substantial contributions from its budget. The provident fund, relying on 
employer and employee contributions, with the government shouldering only the 
administrative costs, was therefore a preferable measure. 
In view of the less than satisfactory economic condition that prevailed 
throughout the post-independence Nkrumah period, it is possible to argue that it 
was that very factor that underlay the late introduction of the general occupational 
scheme. This argument may be valid. That is, had Ghana been unconstrained 
in available resources, the scheme might have been introduced sooner. The 
point, however, is that given the limited resources, she chose education, rather 
than a program for labor, as the top priority social program. 
4. Ideology versus Political Requisite 
Having considered thus far the entire range of social measures for 
which important decisions were taken during the Nkrumah period, and the 
possible reasons why they were taken, it is appropriate now to return to an earlier 
argument concerning the prevailing ideology of the period and its influence on 
social policy. This argument is worth further consideration because of the 
unequivocally socialist label that was usually attached to Nkrumah and his regime 
42Parliamentary Debates, op. cit., Vol. 34 (Oct. 1963 - Feb. 1964), p.1199. 
43 Ibid., Ghana Today, June 6, 1968, p. 2. 
44Bourret,op. cit., p. 219. 
45 West A/rica, Oct. 9, 1965, p.1123; Economic Survey, 1964, p. 30. 
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and the apparently negligible or very secondary nature of its impact on the 
development of Ghanaian IMP, as reviewed. 
It was indicated in connection with education that it received high 
priority attention during the Nkrumah regime because it was thought the best 
means of conditioning the people for a projected socialist revolution. This 
means that socialist ideology was a factor underlying Ghana's education policy. 
On another level, however, there is ground for arguing that it is not socialism in 
particular but ideology in general that should be regarded significant in 
association with policy decisions because, under different circumstances, even 
Nkrumah's Ghana could have used education for quite different purposes, such as 
advancing capitalism or any other ideology. What was primary in Ghana's 
policy decision on education was that the latter was shown to be an effective 
instrument for preparing the populace for the chosen national task. In this sense, 
ideology itself might have been an instrument rather than an end . 
. As far as Ghana's public health and occupational measures were 
concerned, there was no evidence that ideology played a part in decisions 
regarding them. 
The question that still remains is whether socialism and/or Nkrumaism 
actually served as a framework for social action, although neither seems to have 
had any impact on Ghana's IMP, or whether they were mere rhetoric in 
Nkrumah's schemes of Pan African Unity and international confrontation. The 
indications are that it was the latter. To begin with, the Convention People's 
Party General Election Manifesto, 1951, while laced with anti-colonial 
sentiments, was devoid of doctrinal ideology, whether of the right or the left, and 
consisted mainly of concrete program pledges. In part, the pledges included: 
1) Immediate realization of the Volta Hydro-Electric Scheme and 
electrification of the whole country, 
2) Immediate development of modern communication and transport 
systems and facilities, 
3) Modernization and extension of the railway, 
4) Progressive mechanization of agriculture and raising the standard 
of living among the peasants by bringing piped water, electricity, 
good housing, education and other social and cultural amenities to 
towns and villages, 
5) Industrialization of the country as a whole, 
6) A unified system of free and compulsory education, and 
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7) Eradication of "the scandalous (un)sanitary conditions in towns 
and villages [that represent] some of the gravest indictments of the 
imperialistic regime ... " by establishing hospitals, clinics and 
sanatoriums all over the country and inaugurating a free medical 
service.46 
Dowse, who made a comparative study of Ghana and the USSR, 
makes a point of paralleling their modernization processes but not necessarily on 
ideological grounds. He points out, with reference to Nkrumah's Five Year Plan 
introduced in 1952, that, of the £ 120 million allocated for the plan, 
approximately 89% was for projects geared to modernizing the economic 
infrastructure and states that "this allocation had nothing to do with socialist 
theory, it was a recognition of necessity", and that "insofar as there was an 
ideology, then it was one of social and psychological reconstruction and it was to 
these that Nkrumah devoted (a) considerable amount of attention.,,47 
Along with the above modernization model for analyzing Ghana's 
development is Bretton's personal rule model which equally discounts the 
influence of ideology in the Nkrumah period of Ghana. Bretton argues that 
Nkrumah, to be sure, was tutored in Communist strategies while in the United 
States and England and, during his presidency, associated with a large number of 
Marxists and sympathizers, but the ideology itself had no tangible imprint on his 
domestic policy. In this sphere, where he was subject to no meaningful social 
control, 
Nkrumah turned into a man controlled by the demands of "self'. His 
personal motivations, as distinct from the aggregate interests ~r the 
society became paramount in his decision-making... To secure his 
position of power, to control key points of power and influence in the 
countlY, and to watch over the movements of actual and potential rivals 
had to be first order of business for the dictator ... 48 
Bretton argues the critical importance of the political leader, the man, 
and his personal rule as the most realistic and valid explicator of political 
development in all underdeveloped countries, Ghana providing a prime example. 
Ideology, political parties, political systems and government structure - the 
"Political Machine" - have been only instrumental or secondary to the political 
orientation and personal style of the leader and that it is these latter that 
determined Nkrumah's policies. In this scheme of things, income maintenance 
460p. cit., in G.E. Metcalf, pp. 704-707. 
47Dowse, op. cit., p. 38. 
48Bretton, op. cit., pp. 33-35. Also see pp.82-89; Col. A.A. Africa, The Ghana Group, 
Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., London, 1966. 
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needs of the populace in general and those of the wage-earning sector in particular 
were matters of no great urgency. 
Summary 
Involving an expenditure equivalent to 3.5 percent of the GNP in 1968 and 
covering 18 percent of the total population, public education was the single most 
important component in Ghana. 
Health service, the second highest priority program of the country, 
expended only 1.1 percent of the GNP in 1968 and the physician-population and 
hospital bed-population ratios were low. 
In the occupational sector of the IMP, workmen's compensation and 
pensions for public employees have been in effect since the colonial period, but 
these measures covered only a fraction of the working population. 
The provident fund was introduced as late as 1965 and the total receipt for 
this scheme in contributions and investment returns was 0.8 percent of the GNP in 
or around 1966. The coverage was 11 percent of the total economically active 
population in the same period. 
An identification of interests between the political leadership and the 
populace at large underpinned the development of education. The two shared 
the values and objectives of development and Africanization. 
Considerations of needs and resources were not reflected in the curative 
emphasis in Ghana's health policy despite expert recommendations to better 
respond to them through preventive health measures. 
The choice of the provident fund, rather than an insurance scheme, as an 
occupational income maintenance measure appears to have been due to limited 
resources, which was taken into consideration by the ILO technical assistance 
team involved in the formulation of the measure. 
The development of all the above IMP components was influenced by 
another factor, or a pattern of inter-factor relationships, viz. translation of needs 
into public or pressure group demands and the leadership response to those 
demands out of political necessity. 
MAURITIUS 
Delineation of the IMP 
The Mauritian income maintenance program is prominently in the non-
occupational sector and relatively modest in the occupational one. In the former, 
there are the usual free education and health services and the not so usual rice 
subsidy, a system of demogrants for the aged and the blind and a flat-rate family 
allowance to all non-taxpaying families with three children. Public assistance 
completes the same category. 
In the occupational sector, there are well developed pension schemes for 
public employees and voluntary workmen's compensation. (See Table l3) 
Table 13. IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (Mauritius) 
Year Public Exgenditure Population % ofTotal 
of 
data Rupees (million) % of GNP covered pg~~ulation 
Non-Occugational 
1. Education 1968 30.987 3.2 196,153 25 
expenditure per enrolled 
pupil 1966 (US$37) 
2. Health Service 
3. Rice Subsidy 1964 3.0 0.3 Universal 
4. Pensions for the aged and 1963 8.0 0.8 33,152 4.5 
the blind 
5. Family allowance (to non- 1963 9.7 1.0 59,162 8.0 
tax-paying families) 
6. Public assistance 10.3 1.4 42,890 6.0 
Occugational 
7. Pensions & 1958- 6.828 1.0 2,489 0.4 
"compassionate 59 
allowances" for public 
employees 
8. Workmen's compensation 
(voluntary) 
Source: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Part D, pp.819-864; op.cit., 1965, 
p.248; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 204, pp.778-782; UN, World Economic 
Survey, 1969-70, Table 25, p.65; R. Titmuss and B. Abel-Smith, Social Policies and 
Population Growth in Mauritius, p.22; Annual Report of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (Government of Mauritius), 1963, VoLlII, pp.15-17. 
In 1968, public expenditure on education was close to Rs.31 million or 3.2 
percent of the GNP and the cost per enrolled pupil was US$37 in 1966. The 
total school enrollment in 1968 was 196,153 or 25 percent of the total population. 
The enrollment ratio was very high in the study group. 
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As measured by physician-population and hospital bed-population ratios, 
the level of health service in Mauritius is comparatively high. (See Appendix II) 
As in Ceylon, the Mauritian health service system evolved from the estate sector 
and even today estate medical service is the more important division of a dualistic 
public health service system. 
The rice subsidy was introduced during the Second World War, as was the 
case in Ceylon. Unlike in Ceylon, however, this measure plays only a very 
minor part in the overall income maintenance program of Mauritius. In 1964, 
the measure absorbed Rs.3 million or approximately 0.3 percent of the GNP. 
The cost of the old age and blind pensions (demogrants) was much higher. 
In 1968, the total expenditure for the measure was Rs.8 million or 0.8 percent of 
the GNP. This particular measure covered 33,152 persons or about 4.5 percent 
of the total population in 1963. 
The income maintenance function of the family allowance for non-
taxpaying families was somewhat greater than the old age and blind pensions. 
The expenditure for the measure in 1963 amounted to Rs.9.7 million or 1.0 
percent of the GNP. It covered a population of 59,162 or 8 percent of the total 
population in 1963. 
The role of public assistance was even greater than the preceding two. In 
or around 1964, approximately Rs.l 0.3 million or 1.4 percent of the GNP were 
expended for this provision and the persons on outdoor relief or in institutions as 
public wards numbered 42,890 or 6 percent of the total population in 1963. 
Public assistance as an income maintenance component was thus more significant 
than in other countries. 
In the occupational sector of the IMP, the expenditure for pensions and 
"compassionate allowances" for retired public employees was Rs.6.8 million or 
1.0 percent of the GNP in the fiscal year of 1958-59. The number of persons in 
receipt of these pensions and allowances totaled 2,489 or 0.4 percent of the total 
population in the same year. Considering the small number of beneficiaries 
involved, the level of expenditure as a percentage of the GNP was high, more or 
less on a par with that of family allowances which cover twenty times as large a 
population. Regarding the voluntary workmen's compensation, neither 
expenditure nor population coverage data were available. 
Other than a private pension fund and sickness and maternity provisions 
for a small number of monthly-paid employees and resident estate workers of the 
sugar industry, there is no statutory social security measure for the general 
occupational sector. 
In short, the Mauritian IMP is striking for the following characteristics and 
it is these that will be the focus of the ensuing discussion. 
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1. There is a strong emphasis on non-occupation measures. 
11. The non-occupational components include a demogrant and a modified 
negative tax system, which are models usually found among highly 
developed countries. 
iii. The occupational sector of the IMP is modest, particularly in terms of 
population coverage. The measures cover primarily public 
employees. 
Underlying Factors 
One of the first things to note in the Mauritian income maintenance 
program is that, unlike other countries in this study, Mauritius did not attain 
independence from Great Britain until recently and, therefore, the outline of the 
program as it exists today evolved under the colonial administration. This is not 
to say that all the decisions involved were that administration's alone. 
Throughout the colonial rule, there has always been some form of consultative 
body composed of the island's indigenous leaders that took an active role in 
policy decisions. The final authority over policy, however, rested with the 
colonial government. 
It must also be noted that in Mauritius, the IMP developed component by 
component over a relatively long period of time rather than at any particular 
historical juncture. The discussion to follow deals with factors associated with 
the various components as they were introduced at different points in time. 
Since the present concern is with the underlying factors of the IMP rather than 
with its developmental process, however, the order of discussion will not be 
chronological. 
1. Colonial context and education policy 
Aside from the usual need to educate the people in an under-developed 
country, there was a factor specific to the Mauritian context and this factor was 
responsible for at least two aspects of its education policy. One is that basic 
education was not compulsory. The reasons for this are not clear. Funding and 
personnel may have been at issue. However, the fact remains that, in all the 
formerly colonial countries in the study group, education was made compulsory 
since or around the time of independence but, in Mauritius, still under 
colonization, it was not made so. As pointed out earlier, the enrollment ratio at 
the primary level was 65% in 1966, which is high by the standards of 
underdeveloped countries. The non-compulsory policy did not keep the school 
utilization rate from being high through most of the 1950s and 1960s, but the fact 
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of Mauritius being one of only two countries 10 the study group without 
compulsory basic education is noteworthy in itself. 
The other has to do with the objective of education. Despite the trend 
toward popular education of recent decades and the overwhelmingly agrarian 
economy and life style of the island, Mauritian education has largely been geared 
to qualifying students for government scholarships which, in tum, opened 
opportunities for entering the minuscule civil service or for going abroad, mostly 
to England, for professional training. For the vast majority of the school 
graduates who must return to the mid- or lower-stream of the island life, the 
substance of education was largely irrelevant. I 
2. The economic context of health service 
There are two overlapping systems of health service in Mauritius. 
The older and better developed system covers the sugar estates and the other the 
general sector. Under the existing Labor Ordinance, the estate employers are 
required to provide medical care for their employees, particularly the salaried and 
resident employees, with hospital accommodation, equipment, medical attendance 
and treatment. For more serious problems, however, they are referred or 
transferred to government hospitals and clinics. The wage-earners, because of 
their seasonal affiliation with the estates, must avail themselves of services for the 
general sector. 
The estate health service is supervised by governmental medical 
officers and, thus, is under the overall control of the public health authority.2 
The development of the estate health service as a more or less separate 
system had to do with the productivity as well as health needs of the workers in 
the sugar industry, the key sector in Mauritian economy. Because the estate 
workers serve important economic functions, their need commanded priority 
attention. Along with this, the stability and financial capacity of the estate 
owners seems to have encouraged the policy-makers to require them to invest in 
the health of their own employees. 
3. Geographical isolation and rice subsidy 
The practice of subsidizing rice began, as in the case of Ceylon, during 
the Second World War. Separated from the nearest land mass by some 500 
(Sir Richard M. Titmuss & Brian Abel-Smith, Social Policies and Population Growth in 
Mauritius, Metheun & Co., Ltd., London, 1961, p. 5. 
2Titmuss &. Abel-Smith, op. cit., pp. 34-36. 
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miles, the Mauritians were threatened by serious shortages of rice and other basic 
food items when the nonnal flow from outside was disrupted by the war. In 
order to ensure the islanders' minimum subsistence needs, the authorities 
undertook direct responsibility for importing and distributing rice. This also 
enabled the colonial administration to prevent undue fluctuations in the price of 
rice which, uncontrolled, would have contributed to overall economic instability. 
This measure was retained after the war to maintain the level of grain stocks and 
to keep down the price of rice.3 Thus, while the measure is to serve a definite 
welfare function as well as an economic one, the reason for choosing this 
particular measure for that purpose stems directly from Mauritius' geography. 




Although no explicit statement to that effect is available, it is safe to 
assume that the Titmuss and Abel-Smith recommendations of 1960 was the 
immediate underlying factor for Mauritius to introduce the family allowance 
scheme in its particular fonn. There were also such prior and long-standing 
factors as a rising relief roll and the need to overhaul existing provisions to meet 
expanding needs. 4 These will be considered together in the following 
discussion. 
Faced with a rapid increase in the number of relief cases, which was 
seriously straining both the financial and personnel resources of the colonial 
government, its Governor asked Sir Richard Titmuss to "advise the Government 
of Mauritius as to the provisions to be made for social security, bearing in mind 
the resources of the territory and the needs of its people." Titmuss and his team 
went to Mauritius during 1959 and 1960 to make the necessary field inquiry. The 
team submitted wide-ranging recommendations on the island's social needs and 
issues and on existing provisions to address them. The recommendations were not 
implemented in their entirety, but the Family Allowance Ordinance was enacted 
in 1961 in partial fulfillment of them and went into force in 1962.5 
One of the first reasons for recommending a family allowance for 
"non-taxpaying families" had to do with the unprecedented population growth 
that the island was experiencing at the time and with the related problem of 
unemployment. After nearly a century of an average annual rate of population 
3J.E. Meade & Others, The Economic and Social Stnlcture of Mauritius: Report to the 
Governor of Mauritius, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1968, pp. 173-174. 
4Titmuss & Abel-Smith, op. cit., pp. 2-14. 
5 Annual Report of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, 1963, CoUll, pp. 10-11. 
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growth of less than 0.5% up until 1942, the rate jumped to 2.2% annually between 
1944 and 1952, and then to 3% annually since.6 The static and small labor 
market of the island was unable to absorb the new labor input. In the sugar 
industry, for instance, the average number of persons employed during 1946/1947 
was 56,000 and the average number of persons employed in the same industry 
during 1957/58 - 11 years later - was the same, 56,000. Yet the labor force in 
the intervening years had increased by 20%.7 
A very low level of health among the working population was another 
significant factor that underlay the high level of unemployment. Many of them 
were physically unable to carry out the type and amount of work required of them 
and were simply unable to support themselves.8 
The resulting large number of unemployed and underemployed 
persons came increasingly under the financial and administrative responsibility of 
the Social Welfare Department, causing a phenomenal rise in both the number of 
"outdoor relief cases" and the cost of their support.9 This situation strained the 
personnel resources of the Department to the limit and placed an inordinate 
burden on the time of medical officers called upon to certify partial or temporary 
disabilities on the part of those seeking "outdoor relief' on medical grounds. 
Administrative jurisdiction was also becoming an issue in this connection because 
the Social Welfare Department was not intended to deal with the type of problem 
it now faced. 
Though not explicit in the Titmuss and Abel-Smith Report, various 
materials to which it makes reference reveal that underneath the concern over the 
rising relief roll was also an apprehension that the presence of an increasing 
number of relief recipients in the community would somehow undermine not only 
the moral fiber of the recipients themselves but the moral fabric of the community 
as a whole. This concern was expressed time and again in the reports of various 
commissions deliberating social welfare and social security policies of the island 
and recommending modifications. 10 
In other words, there was a felt need on the part of the community 
leaders and participants in policy-making to reduce the number of relief cases. 
However, their actions in response to the need were to administratively structure 
6See Titmuss & Abel-Smith, op. cit., Tables 1II and IV, pp. 45-46. 
7 Op. cit., p.l O. 
Sap. cit., pp.lO-12. 
9The number of cases multiplied by nearly 35 times and the costs by about 3.5 times between 
1953 and 1958-9. See op. cit., Tables I and II, pp.ll, 14. 
IOThe Mauritius Royal Commission of 1909; the Poor Relief Inquiry Commission of 1929; 
the Commission on the Financial Situation of Mauritius of 1932. See op. cit., pp. 69-72. 
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them out of the Welfare Department rather than actually reduce the number of 
persons on aid. Having them taken care under some label other than "outdoor 
relief' or "indoor relief' was perhaps less disturbing to sensibilities grounded in 
their work ethic and the principle of "self-help". 
In this circumstance, the overriding need was to find a way to: 
(1) Meet the needs at issue with means appropriate to their nature and 
scope, 
(2) Help reduce the population growth by providing effective 
incentives toward small families, and 
(3) Contribute to the general health condition ofthe popUlation at a 
strategic stage of growth and development. 
Titmuss and Abel-Smith recommended a family allowance as the best 
means to satisfy the above requirements in the Mauritian context. On the 
conclusion that a good many Mauritians' health was irrevocably damaged in 
childhood due to malnutrition and otherwise poor living conditions, they selected 
children less than 14 years of age as the target population. But by specifying 
that the allowances be limited to families with only three children, they built into 
the scheme an incentive for family planning. It was reasoned that by setting the 
number of children at three, the scheme would provide no encouragement for 
either starting a family or having too large a family. Also, by providing that the 
allowances be granted to only those families with incomes too low to pay taxes, 
the benefit was designed to go to those who really needed it. At the same time, 
it kept the cost of the provision within the bounds of available resources. II 
As implemented in 1962, family allowances were paid out through the 
general administrative structure of the central and local governments and via a 
standardized procedure so that the burden of its administration fell entirely 
outside the newly named Public Assistance Department. 12 
In short, the introduction of the family allowance in Mauritius has 
been a response to an expert recommendation which was entirely based on a 
needs and resources assessment of the policy-making context, i.e. population 
growth, a high rate of unemployment, poor health conditions of the populace, and 
limited financial and personnel resources. Within the context of the present 
study, this represents a rare instance in which decisions to adopt an income 
maintenance provision, in its particular form, were based entirely on needs and 
resource parameters, viz. on rational grounds, as far as it could be gauged from 
available information. 
IIOp . cit., pp.l30-136. 
12 Annual Report of the Minister of Labor and Social Security, op. cit., p.ll. 
5. Those associated with Old Age and Blind Pensions: 
Changing structure and function of family 
Social values 




Titmuss and Abel-Smith trace the beginning of official consideration 
for the non-contributory and "no means test" pensions to the Commission on 
Unrest on Sugar Estates in Mauritius which was appointed in 1937. The 
Commission filed a report recommending the establishment of old age pensions 
along with sickness insurance, which "must obviously apply to all sections of the 
population and not merely to persons employed in the sugar industry." 13 
Although the Titmuss and Abel-Smith study makes no specific reference to it, the 
title of the Commission seems to indicate that its recommendations had been in 
response to labor unrest. Benedict states in this regard, "the Creoles of 
Mauritius had a long and active tradition of opposition, sometimes to the British 
and sometimes to the Franco-Mauritians, and that old age pensions and some 
other social welfare measures eventually introduced were due to their agitation 
through the unions which they organized and led." 14 In fact, there is a 
chronological correspondence between the introduction of the Old Age and Blind 
Pensions and related legislative actions and the said political activism. 
The Commission inquiry was followed by the appointment of a 
committee whose task was to assess the need and feasibility of adopting measures 
such as those recommended by the Commission. Regarding the old age pension, 
the majority of the committee favored a contributory compulsory scheme on the 
recognition that a new provision must be made for the aged in view of the 
breakdown of the traditional family system, but that the social value represented 
in the principle of "self-help" must be adhered to. 15 A minority report of the 
same committee indicated, however, that the workers of Mauritius were too poor 
to pay the insurance premium, no matter how small, and that the contributory 
approach would, in effect, shift the cost of supporting the aged from the taxpayer 
onto the working people. It therefore proposed a scheme which should place a 
larger responsibility on the employers, while charging only certain "license fees" 
from the employees. The Governor then went so far as to have an actuarial 
13Titmuss & Abel-Smith, op. cit., p. 85. 
14Burton Benedict, Mauritius: The Problems of a Plural Society, Pall Mall Press, London, 
I 965, pp. 6\-62. 
15The same social and religious values referred to on p.1 09 were in operation in this 
connection. 
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analysis made on the majority recommendation and getting the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State of the Colonies on the old age pension scheme. However, he 
took no further action. As a result, the whole process involving the 1937 
Commission inquiry and recommendation to the actuarial study of 1943 was in 
vam. 
While the contributory pension scheme was thus stymied, an old age 
and blind person's assistance program was introduced in 1950. Under this 
provision, all persons aged 65 and over and blind persons aged 40 and over 
received a maximum of Rs.15 per month as non-contributory allowances. In 
1957, this provision was converted into a system of demogrants for the same 
category of persons. All those above the age of 65 or those who are blind and 
over 40 years of age received flat-rate allowances regardless of the status of their 
personal resources. The reason underlying the change was the administrative 
and technical difficulties of applying means tests and assuring fairness to all 
concerned. 
In 1957, a Committee of Ministers was appointed by the Governor to 
make another feasibility study of the contributory pension scheme as part of a 
comprehensive social insurance system including sickness and maternity, old age, 
invalidity (disability) and death (OAID), workmen's compensation and 
unemployment. The Committee found the promulgation of such a system both 
feasible and desirable and made recommendations to that effect. 16 There is 
again no indication, however, that the recommendations were acted upon even in 
part. 
Demogrants for the aged and the blind, in other words, have evolved 
(1) as a partial response to an increasingly felt need on the part of the estate 
workers and the populace at large for adequate social security provisions; (2) in 
place of a contributory scheme which, for a variety of reasons, most notably the 
problem of finance and cost delegation, could not be implemented; and (3) 
because of administrative and technical difficulties of applying the means test 
equitably. 
7. Status of civil service and the Public Employees Pension and 
"Compassionate Allowances" 
The Public Employees Pension Fund, a non-contributory government 
grant to retiring pensionable government employees, was established as early as 
1859. Non-pensionable employees have been provided with "compassionate 
allowances" at the discretion of the Governor. In practice, however, the 
allowances are routinely granted unless particular employees happen to be 
relieved of duties under unsatisfactory circumstances. This was the first income 
160p. cit., pp. 85-90. 
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maintenance provlSlon of any kind in Mauritius and was indicative of the 
predisposition of the Mauritian policy makers to give priority to the needs of the 
public sector. This of course was not unusual and the underlying reasons are the 
same as in most other countries. The civil servants are normally a group of well-
educated and highly trained members of the government bureaucracy and their 
functions are essential to any political leader or administrator. It was therefore 
to be expected that the government leaders would wish to keep the members of 
the bureaucracy satisfied and loyal. This applies regardless of whether the 
government leader is a native or a representative of a foreign power, except that in 
the latter case, the tendency to accord special privileges to government employees 
is stronger for such reasons as mutual dependency between colonial 
administrators and native civil servants in controlling a native society. 
8. Factors associated with the absence of social security measures for the 
general sector 
It was seen that, in Mauritius, there is neither social insurance nor any 
alternative income maintenance measure for the general occupational sector. 
What provisions there are, other than those for public employees, i.e. the sugar 
industry pension fund and sickness and maternity benefits, cover salaried or 
monthly paid employees only and, in the case of maternity benefits, female 
resident workers meeting the continuous employment requirement of six months 
or longer. The one occupational provision that applies to all workers is voluntary 
workmen's compensation. 
What are the factors associated with this state of affairs? Whatever 
they are, lack of need for one or more of such measures and a shortage of expert 
information and recommendations were not among them. In addition to the 
1937 Commission on Unrest on Sugar Estates in Mauritius, which recommended 
the establishment of an old age pension scheme along with a sickness insurance 
plan that "must obviously apply to all sections of the popUlation and not merely to 
persons employed in the sugar industry", 17 there were at least two committees 
appointed by the Governor which put forward even more comprehensive 
recommendations based on studies of need and feasibility. IS The first response 
to these recommendations was the 1945 bill for a private retirement scheme for 
the senior staff of the sugar estates (Retiring Fund Ordinance). This was 
introduced by the sugar interests over the objection of the Technical Workers' 
Union which felt that its members could not afford the deductions and that the 
fund was being established for the "sole purpose of depriving the artisan of his 
17 Report of Commission on Unrest on Sugar Estates in Mauritius, 1938, p.168 as cited in 
Titmuss and Abel-Smith, loco cit., p. 85. 
180p. cit., pp. 69-90. 
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ability to pay union dues.,,)9 The 1950 old age and blind pensions already 
discussed was the second response to the same recommendations. 
Then came the Titmuss and Abel-Smith study which led to their 
recommending, among others, a comprehensive and contributory social insurance 
system for wage-earners?O Again, the official response was not responsive to 
that recommendation but to the one relating to the family allowance. 
Thus, in Mauritius, there has been a consistent trend away from social 
security provisions geared to wage-earners despite the fact that such provisions 
are fairly common even among underdeveloped countries. The argument against 
any official action on the matter seems to have been an economic one, either in 
terms of economic context or limited resources. For instance, the 1940 
Committee to study the need for a social insurance system and the prospects of 
successfully and economically implementing such a system reported, with 
particular reference to unemployment insurance, that, 
in Mauritius, where the majority of the laboring classes are 
engaged in agricultural pursuits, and many do work of a casual 
nature, the unemployment insurance is ... impracticable except 
perhaps in the case of certain industries of a non-a~ricultural 
nature in which casual labor is not normally employed. ) 
The Governor of Mauritius also stated in 1945 in an address at the 
inaugural meeting of the Central Development and Welfare Committee that 
measures of social security must be appropriate to the stage of economic 
development of Mauritius and that, 
policy must be limited by the funds which can be made available 
from the aggregate members of the community and by the extent 
to which the wealthier members of the community can be 
expected to contribute towards the maintenance of those who fall 
below an ascertained minimum standard, after provision has 
been made for the maintenance of law and order, defense and 
other administrative and developmental services ... 22 
19 Annual Report of the Labor Department, 1945, p. 8. 
20See Titmuss & Abel-Smith, op. cit., chapters 4-11. 
210p. cit., p. 85. 
22Inaugural Meeting of the Central Development and Welfare Committee, 1945, pp. 9-10 as 
cited in Titmuss & Abel-Smith, op. cit., p.88. 
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The official line of thinking in the subsequent period, especially in 
response to the Titmuss and Abel-Smith recommendations, is not known. The 
economic arguments could well be rationalizations, particularly in the Mauritian 
context of the most recent decade. For one thing, in per capita income terms, 
Mauritius has been better off than all other countries reviewed in the present study 
throughout the period for which information is available, that is, the 1950s-1960s. 
This does not mean that average Mauritians have been better off than their 
counterparts in other countries but that the overall national resources have been 
greater. 
Given the fact that many underdeveloped countries with less national 
resources have managed to introduce one type or another of income maintenance 
measures for the general working sector, the Mauritian argument of resources 
does not stand up well. As for the agricultural and seasonal nature of work 
performed by the majority of Mauritians, the counter-argument would be that, 
unlike most other predominantly agricultural economies, Mauritian agrarian 
workers belong in a market-oriented industry rather than in a subsistence sector. 
They are paid cash for their labor and they pay cash for their needs. Their work is 
seasonal; but stable in its seasonality. In this sense, they are not different from 
other categories of industrial workers and, obviously, this was why the various 
recommendations for an insurance program for them must have been made in the 
first place. 
In brief, there are grounds for assuming that the more important factor 
connected with the absence of a general social insurance system in Mauritius is 
something other than need, expert infonnation and knowledge, economic 
resources or economic context. And as to what the other factor(s) might be, 
there are only hints. Two were contained in the Governor's address cited. The 
first was a reservation on the part of the colonial government to effect the type of 
redistribution that must accompany a general social insurance scheme. The 
second was other communal needs requiring prior attention, e.g. those of the 
elderly, the blind and the very poor. These two factors may explain an absence 
of official commitment to the needs of labor. 
Another strong hint is to be found in the economic structure of the 
island and relative weakness of labor in it. Without going into details, it can be 
said that, in Mauritius, the sugar industry is everything and it is largely in the 
hands of a small number of estate owners who, with few exceptions, happen to be 
Franco-Mauritians. It is the estate owners, who, through either direct production 
of canes, the highly biased tenancy regulation, an equally biased system of cane 
processing, or other laws favoring the sugar industry as a whole and the big 
owners in particular, dominate every facet of Mauritian life. Labor has been 
powerless except in minor ways.23 The following excerpt provides a good 
glimpse of this state of affairs. 
23Jay Narain Roy, Mauritius in Transition, Ram Pratap Tripathi at the Samelan Mudranalaya, 
Allahabad, India, 1960, pp. 266-328. 
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There is a general feeling that the entire administration is overawed by 
the industry. You can arrest anyone you like, get into trouble with 
anyone you wish, but think twice before you do anything against the 
estates. If you go to the estates any time of the year you can take 
dozens of sanitary, labor, medical or other contraventions, but officers 
have learnt from experience that they are likely to get into hot water or 
even risk their jobs if they are not in the good books of the estates. 24 
The little that workers have achieved has been obtained through the 
efforts of the trade unions. But the trade unions themselves have had 
to go through insuperable difficulties that even after more than twenty 
years of existence, they are in a precarious position. It is because the 
industry has today developed into such an almighty organization that 
nothing can resist its power. It has crushed the bargaining power of 
trade unions. It can choose the trade unions with which it can 
negotiate and contract. It can slow down work and throw thousands 
of people on the brink of starvation. It can pay less rates of wages 
h . . . 25 W en sugar prices go on Increasmg ... 
The election of 1959 and 1963 saw non-traditional political groups, 
notably the Indo-Mauritian dominated Labor Party, supersede traditional forces in 
the Legislative Council, at least numerically.26 However, this development has 
been largely formal. Substantively, it did not diminish the relative 
powerlessness of labor and other non-traditional groups to any significant extent 
because the distribution of real power generating from economic ownership 
remained the same. 
Summary 
The Mauritian IMP is characterized by a well developed non-occupational 
sector, including fairly sophisticated components, and a poorly developed 
occupational sector in which measures for public employees predominate. The 
development of the IMP as a whole took place under the British rule and this fact 
was significant in association with the development of all components. Other 
factors also associated with various components were as follows. 
1. A dualistic economic structure consisting of the estate and non-estate 
sectors gave rise to the development of a dualistic health service system wherein 
the needs of the two sectors were covered separately. 
240p. cit., p.284. 
250p. cit., p. 299-300. 
26Senedict, op. cit., pp. 60-65. 
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2. The rice subsidy was introduced during World War II and was 
retained after the war because of Mauritius' geographic isolation which made it 
desirable, even imperative during the war, for the government to take direct 
responsibility for and control of rice imports and distribution and, so, ensure to 
meet the subsistence needs of the populace and maintain economic stability. 
3. The factors underlying the introduction and revision of the old age and 
blind pensions included labor unrest seeking higher wages and better working 
conditions; a widening base of political participation that gave the masses a voice; 
loss of the traditional family function for the care of the aged; low wages; and the 
technical problem of applying a means-test equitably. 
4. A family allowance was adopted in response to an expert 
recommendation which was based on existing social needs stemming from high 
population growth and unemployment rates, poor health conditions of the 
populace at large, and the problem of an over-burdened bureaucracy. 
5. The prominence of public sector income maintenance measures 
appears to be associated with the position of the civil service that plays a vital role 
in the colonial administration of the country. 
6. The absence of any substantial income maintenance measure for the 
general working sector was attributable to an absence of official commitment to 
introduce such a measure on the face of the predominance of the sugar interests 
that oppose it and the weakness of labor as a pressure group in favor of it. 
THAILAND 
Delineation of the IMP 
Thailand's income maintenance program consists of fairly rudimentary 
components in both the non-occupational and occupational sectors. In the 
former, there are education, health and social services. Around 1968, total 
public expenditures on education was 3,306 million Baht or approximately 3.4 
percent of the GNP. The expenditure per enrolled pupil was US$25 in 1966. A 
total of 2.7 million pupils representing some eight (8) percent of the total 
population were involved in 1968. In terms of both expenditure outlay and 
population coverage, education is the most prominent component of Thailand's 
IMP as a whole. (See Table 14.) 
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5,560,779 16 
Source: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1971, Table 205, pp.776-799, UN, World Economic 
Survey, 1969-70, Table 25, p.65; National Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, Thailand, 
1970-71 (No.29), Table 201, p.409; The U.S. Social Security Administration, Social 
Security Programs Throughoutthe World, 1969, pp.210-211. 
Expenditures on public health was 565 million Baht or 0.5 percent of the 
GNP in 1968. This makes the country's health investment among the most 
meager in the study group. On the other hand, the cost outlay in "Other Social 
Services" which include public assistance, financial assistance to various 
charitable institutions and social welfare organizations is on a much higher level 
than in most other countries under study, at 1,527 Baht or approximately 1.6 
percent of the GNP in 1968. 
111 
In the occupational category, there are only two provisions: workmen's 
compensation and pensions for public employees. A workmen's compensation 
law was first passed in 1956 but the law was subsequently rescinded. The 
existing provision is effected by a ministerial decree and is on a voluntary basis 
and with private carriers. The pension system for public employees has long 
existed and is considered well-developed, although specific data is unavailable. 
In addition, there are sickness and maternity benefits, which, too, are 
implemented by ministerial decrees. Under these, the employer is liable for 50 
percent of the employee's wages during the latter's sickness and 100 percent of 
wages during the female employee's maternity leave of 30-90 days. Aside from 
these, there is no social insurance scheme as such or its equivalent for the general 
sector. None of the existing provisions, except for the public employee pension, 
are statutory or on a contractual basis. 
For the record, it should be pointed out that in 1954, a comprehensive 
social security law covering old age, invalidity (disability) and death (OAID), 
sickness and maternity, and family allowance was enacted by the government of 
Pibul Songkram but was never implemented. A new social security code was to 
be introduced in 1974. 
As it existed in 1973, Thai IMP is notable for the following. 
i. The program as a whole has yet to develop. Even public education, 
which is one component usually fairly well funded and pursued with 
considerable energy in other countries, is on a low key. 
ii. Within this generally limited framework, pensions for public 
employees appear fairly adequate. 
iii. Expenditures on "other social services" as a percentage of the GNP 
have been comparatively high. 
IV. Provisions for the general wage-earning sector are negligible to nil. 
Given these facts about the Thai IMP, it would not be unjustified to depart 
from the hitherto pattern of asking why certain IMPs have developed and ask, 
instead, why the Thai IMP has not developed, and secondarily ask why pensions 
for public employees and the charity-oriented "other social services" are fairly 
prominent nevertheless. 
The discussion of underlying factors in Thailand, in other words, will not 
basically be in terms of why measures were introduced, but why they were not. 
It will be seen in the following discussion that the factors associated with the 
overall underdevelopment of the IMP are also the factors associated with the 
112 
relative prominence of the public employee pension system and "other social 
services". 
Underlying Factors 
The factors associated with the Thai IMP are manifold. Some are 
general in nature, pertaining to the fundamental and all pervasive traits of the Thai 
society. Others are specifically related to the IMP characteristics outlined. 
Together, they weave a complex but highly recognizable pattern of relationships 
among themselves and make the case of Thai social policy formation rather 
unique in the study group, as the following discussion attempts to show. 
1. Economic Factors 
a. Abundant land resources 
Low unemployment 
Income maintenance programs are not always direct responses to 
poverty although they are invariably aimed at preventing it from occurring. 
Theoretically, therefore, the existence or absence of dire poverty, whatever its 
cause, needs not bear on whether or not a country adopts income maintenance 
measures. In Thailand, however, it influenced both the official and public 
attitudes toward doing so. Regarding Thai social welfare programs in general, 
Blanchard points out that solutions to social problems have been hampered by 
indifference of the Thai people and the government, which at least in part, is 
based on the knowledge that almost anyone can earn a living if he or she wishes, 
by working on the freely accessible land. I Wilson concurs when he states that 
such Thai attitudes are attributable to "the very substantial luxury of resources in 
which Thai society has developed" and which she enjoys even today. It 
encouraged an attitude of economic self-reliance among the Thais.2 
The same availability of cultivable land has kept unemployment 
down to a minimum. In or around 1968, the number of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the total population was less than 0.1.3 This represents a tiny 
fraction of the population and the lowest unemployment rate among the countries 
under study. 
'Wendell Blanchard, Thailand, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, Human Relations Area 
Files, Inc. (HRAF) Press, New Haven, 1958, p.367. 
20avid A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, 
p.367. 
3See Table 14, p.119 of text. 
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These factors could not but take any sense of urgency out of the 
Thai social situation as whole. However, as far as provisions for wage-earners 
were concerned, there were other factors more to the point. 
b. Ethnic basis of economic and occupational structures: 
Ethnic bias and the minority wage-earning sector 
Family orientated production-units 
Thai economic and occupational structures are generally built 
along ethnic lines and these separate the ethnic Thai in the agricultural sector 
from the ethnic Chinese in the private sector of business and industry. The 
urban wage-earners in both the public and private sectors are almost entirely 
Chinese. The reasons underlying this division of labor are partly cultural and 
partly to protect the ethnic Thai's position of privilege. 
Thais have historically been reluctant to enter into occupations 
purely on cash basis. This attitude is distinctly cultural, but has also to do with 
the practical fact that, in Thailand, agriculture as a source of livelihood has always 
been securer than other economic sectors so that it held a comparative advantage, 
psychologically and financially, over wage labor or business.4 Because trade 
thus lacked traditional support, and because exchanges in the market place could 
strain traditional social bonds, the average Thai found the business and industrial 
field unattractive and left it to aliens.s 
From the ethnic Chinese and other minorities' point of view, there 
has never been any choice in the matter. By law, they have been excluded from 
land ownership, farming, and with the exception of a few special instances, from 
public or government service. The religious or clerical service has also been 
barred to them.6 Thus prevented from participating in the primary occupational 
fields, the minority groups have been "obliged to fall back on those secondary 
occupational talents which they have and are allowed to exploit" and accept the 
fact that they are "pariahs and ... cannot hope to maximize their occupational 
advantage in the patrimonial division of labor by becoming bureaucrats ... ".7 
Jacobs argues that the reason why labor welfare remains minuscule in the overall 
social provisions, which include fairly extensive child and family aid, low-cost 
4Wilson, op.cit., pp.42-43; Nonnan Jacobs, Modernization Without Development: Thailand 
As An Asian Case Study, Praeger, New York, 1971, p.1 02; James C. Igram, Economic Changes in 
ThaiiandSince 1850, Stanford, 1955, pp.210-211. 
SIn 1959, the ethnic Chinese, the largest minority group in Thailand, numbered 2.6 million or 
about 10 percent of the total population. See G.William Skinner, Overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXXI, Jan. 1959, p.137. 
6Jacobs, op. cit., p. 170. 
70p. cit., p. 183; Myrdal, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 840-841. 
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housing projects, self-help land settlements, etc., is in part because the labor 
population is predominantly Chinese.8 
The trend in the private sector of business and industry to organize 
production activities around the family has compounded the official tendency to 
neglect the needs of labor. Typical businesses or industries are small, a "home 
workshop" or the "home store", employing more often than not family labor or a 
few wage-workers integrated into the family structure.9 According to the World 
Bank estimate of 1958, only two percent of the total Thai industrial 
establishments employed more than fifty workers and the bulk of urban workers 
were employed in shops with less than ten workers. 1o Industrial organization, 
patterned after and around the family, tended to foster a personal relationship 
between the employer and the employee and, since the boss and the workers are 
approximate social equals in a small shop, it stimulated neither working-class 
solidarity nor political activity and was not conducive to the formalization of 
employer-employee relationships such as is necessary for the evolvement of 
social security contracts. 
Another factor that did not receive adequate consideration may have 
further undermined the development of work-related social security provisions. 
The factor in question is the overall socio-cultural and religious values of Thai 
society that permeate and mold its entire fabric including its structure, pattern of 
individual and group relationships, behavior of its people and their outlook on 
life. There are reasons to believe that it is these values that profoundly affected 
Thai attitudes toward social provisions, particularly toward collective security. 
The discussion immediately following attempts to support this view, based on a 
number of works, but primarily on that of Norman Jacobs who made a 
comprehensive study of Thailand as a patrimonial society. 
2. Religious and Socio-Cultural Values 
All major institutions of Thailand, including its socio-political 
structure, stratification, pattern and objective of formal and informal relationships, 
in fact its entire reason for being, closely reflect the tenets of Thai religion and 
related socio-cultural values. As they bear on social policy, the institutional and 
value dimensions do not separate themselves easily. To facilitate discussion, 
however, they will be considered separately. 
SOp. cit., p. 102. 
9Wilson, op. cit., p. 43. 
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Strictly speaking, Thai religion is an amalgam of Buddhist, Hindu and 
Muslim traditions. It is generally believed that Thais are eclectic in their 
religious practices, their pragmatic service needs over-riding much of the 
doctrinaire concerns. The designation commonly given to modem Thai religion, 
however, is Hinanaya Buddhism because much of the cosmological and 
customary traditions now prevailing in Thailand stem from this sect. 
In the cosmology of Thai Buddhism, the universe is ordered in a 
system of concentric zones with Mount Meru at the center and a series of 
mountain ranges and intervening seas surrounding it. The zones, "whether 
drawn horizontally or vertically from the origin point, represents zones of 
ascending or descending morality from that origin point .... ".11 The significance 
of this order is that Thai society regards itself as a potential microcosm of this 
order. It must be pattered in accordance with it so that the society may be moral. 
The Thai ruler's prime responsibility is to assure this morality by ever closely 
approximating Thai society to that cosmic order. 
Since Thai society is more or less a replica of the cosmic order in 
which virtue radiates from above and the center in descending and diminishing 
intensity, the ruler, as its center and highest authority, and the ruling elites, are, or 
presumed to be, moral by virtue of their being where they are. Within the 
political order, morality flows down to the bureaucracy, grade by grade, from the 
top-most ruling elite. It then extends to the social structure outside the political 
order where merit follows social stratification, from the most to the least powerful 
and prestigious as determined on the basis of concentric lines of intimacy with 
members of the bureaucracy. 12 
As morality is of prime importance to the Thai, it is in its quest that 
the Thai people most frequently tum their attention even amidst their daily routine 
and it is to those invested in morality that they defer. 
Thus put, the Thai attitude seems reasonable enough. What is 
striking and must be made explicit here, however, is the Thai concept of morality. 
It is as defined in the Thai cosmology or religious precept and is closely tied in 
with rituals and customary practices. The Thai concept of morality is not 
necessarily substantive. What renders a person moral is the close attention that 
he pays to prescribed religious norms which insure his proper alignment with the 
cosmic order, regardless of what he actually is. A bureaucrat, for instance, may 
conform to the ritual prescriptions of his office and maintain or even enhance the 
merit of his office and, thereby be regarded moral, although personally quite 
corrupt. From the bureaucratic and class standpoint, his corruption may be 
meaningless because he has fulfilled his ritual moral obligation to help maintain 
the political order of the Thai society. 
II Jacobs, op. cit., p. 246. 
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The implications of the prescnpttve and presumptive virtue 
attributable to status are far-reaching. To cite only those with immediate 
relevance to the present purpose, it not only sets the ruling elite and the 
bureau'cracy qualitatively apart from the populace but also leaves the former 
unaccountable to the latter. Being morally inferior, the average Thai is 
presumed unqualified to pass judgment on the performance of the bureaucrats 
who are their moral superiors. Further, because of its prescriptive definition, it 
tends to encourage gestures rather than meaningful action corresponding to real 
needs. In order to promote agriculture, for instance, the ruler may engage in a 
ceremonial rice-planting instead of developing a better irrigation system or 
providing more fertilizers. 
" ... each man, for better or worse, has his own responsibility to 
act or not to act in his own advantage and to accept the moral 
and material consequences of his actions in accord with the law 
of righteousness. In this line of thinking, society is but the 
passive milieu from whose delusive attraction man must liberate 
himself if he is ever to achieve religious perfection and mental 
security. Hence, if the social situation is not to an individual's 
liking, presumably on moral grounds, that individual should not 
actively seek to change the social situation, but rather change his 
commitments in that situation.,,\3 
It is evident that Thai religious precepts do little to stimulate direct and 
long-term commitments to social causes and social responsibility. This is not to 
say the Thai religion discourages beneficial acts toward others. On the contrary, 
the whole system of merit-making, which is an essential prescription for 
perfecting one's religious virtue or morality, is based on the notion of "doing 
good". To that extent, the concept and the significance of merit-making is akin 
to charity and its function to the concept of Christian salvation. Where merit-
making radically departs from charity is in the emphasis it places on individual 
autonomy and initiative and the absence of a communal sense of solidarity. It is 
not that communities should not benefit from acts of individual merit-making. 
In fact, a higher value is attached to acts dedicated to impersonal-others. All that 
is required is that all the others be individuals and not an abstraction such as 
society. 
Theoretically, Thai religion offers a basis of hope and social change on 
a level as profound as any other religion, such as through reconstructioQ and 
perfection of the inner man. Its relegation of the reality of the immediate 
physical world and the significance of dealing with its needs and problems for 
what they are and for their own sake to a place of inconsequence, however, 
130p. cit., pp. 290-291. 
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hampered the emergence of collective and contractual social provisions m 
Thailand. 
3. Socio-Political Structure and Its Implications for Social Policy 
In the social science field, Thailand is variously described as a 
"loosely structured" society,14 an 0ligarchy,15 or a patrimonial society.16 The 
first designation is descriptive, underscoring the degree of autonomy and 
independence with which the Thais seem to pursue their lives. The stress is on 
the importance of the individual will. The second is a political characterization 
that denotes the existence of a ruling class with its ''unchallenged hold on the 
spoils of power". 17 The last is an analytical designation that not only describes 
an entire social system but also explains it to an extent that the first and the 
second do not. Further, as far as Thailand is concerned, it may be justified to 
regard the last to subsume the first two since it has a wider and deeper power of 
analysis than the other two. It is also a concept that pays close attention to the 
linkage between the Thai religious precepts and its socio-political structures. 
The following discussion therefore relies primarily on this last notion of Thailand 
(patrimonial society) as expounded by Jacobs. 
a. Patrimonial leadership 
The patrimonial leader derives his authority from two sources: the 
moral superiority that resides a priori in positions of leadership or high status 
which, in tum, is rooted in the moral order stipulated in the Thai religious 
cosmolo~y; and the pragmatic ability to exercise political coordination and 
control. I In regard to the first, it is assumed that the prime function of the state 
is to uphold moral laws and, therefore, ideally, the man holding state authority 
and power should be moral. Since morality is defined in terms of the acts 
performed in accordance with religious prescriptions, such as merit-making, a 
patrimonial leader and his staff devote their efforts to this-worldly public service 
that may include promoting material resources of the populace through technical 
advice, maintaining political peace and order, constructing roads and irrigation 
14John Embree, "Thailand, A Loosely Structured System", American Anthropologist, LII 
(1950); Hans-Dieter Evers, ed., Loosely Structured Systems: Thailand in Comparative 
Perspective, Southeast Asia Studies (Cultural Report Series, No. 17), Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1969. 
ISMyrdal, Asian Drama, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 390-391. 
16Jacobs,op. cit. 
17Myrdal, op. cit. 
18Jacobs,op. cit., pp. 31, 246. 
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systems, and providing drinking water, health care and other prebendary services. 
In return, the populace is expected to offer political and economic support 
(revenue) to the ruling elites. 19 
As for the ability to exercise political coordination and control, a 
moral leader is assumed to attract sufficient clients and followers to build a power 
base upon which to legitimize a political order. Therefore, there is no conflict 
between the requirements of morality and those of power for the patrimonial 
leader. In him, might has the potential for being employed in the service of right 
and right will hopefully help develop might to support further right. Whether 
political might implies right in reality depends on the individual leader's will 
rather than on any specific systemic requirements.2o 
Based on the authority thus derived, the patrimonial leader relates 
to the polity, the bureaucracy and the populace, as a patron to clients. In fact, 
this is the basis of all relationships at every level of the Thai political structure. 
b. Patrimonial political organization 
Although a constitutional government was instituted in 1932 by a 
coup d'etat, the constitutional system has since been co-opted by the patrimonial 
requisites. The coup therefore had accomplished little more than to replace the 
king with a ruling elite in a position of substantive power. The elite who heads 
the Cabinet has supremacy over other branches of government, including the 
judiciary and the legislature, a majority of whose members are appointed by the 
Cabinet.21 
As a group, the leaders of the ruling class consider themselves 
above pragmatic politics because their occupation of offices depends not on any 
electorate, but their own ability to be there. According to the Thai premise, 
those who are there deserve to be there. They are moral guardians of Thai 
society as they are monopolists of pragmatic power. As such, they and the 
members of the bureaucracy as a whole are not accountable to the public. In 
fact, the public in its proper sense does not exist in Thailand. The officials are 
free to pursue their own interests as they see fit and they are indifferent as well as 
inaccessible to the populace.22 
19Ibid. 
200p. cit., p. 32. 
21 The World Today, "Musical Chairs in Siam", Vo1.5, No.9 (September 1949), p.379. 
22Jacobs,op. cit., pp. 44, 47, 77. 
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What has compounded this relationship between the ruling class 
and the populace is the requirement of a high level of education on the part of the 
members of the bureaucracy and its ability to absorb the educated into its system. 
Regarding the first, Wilson indicates that the official Thais' domination of the 
populace depends in part upon their "superior know-how in the forms and 
methods of government and upon a monopoly of this kind of know-how.,,23 
Concerning the second, Wilson further states that, unlike in other Asian countries, 
there is no frustrated, unemployed educated class in Thailand and that, although 
there has been a drastic broadening of educational opportunities in recent years, 
this only reflected new and broadening demands of the increasingly complex 
government and an enlargement of the ruling class?4 So long as the elites are 
able to keep the bureaucracy and the educated aspirants reasonably satisfied 
through the distribution of prebends (offices), and so long as the masses are not 
sufficiently moved to reject traditional claims of right by the bureaucrats, the 
relationship between the ruling and the ruled will remain unchanged. A mass 
movement requires leaders drawn from the educated class and, unless a sizable 
segment of the establishment completely loses its stake in the existing order, it is 
unlikely that leaders will be available for such a movement.25 
c. Social stratification and organization 
To the extent that Thai society is permeated with the values and 
beliefs stemming from the Buddhist cosmology, much of the relational and 
organizational characteristics found among the ruling class may be assumed to 
hold among the populace at large also. For this reason, the immediate subject 
matter does not require a great deal of elaboration. However, there are a 
number of features that are specific to the latter that have particular significance 
in the context of the present study. 
First of all, for all practical purposes, there are only two 
meaningful population groupings in Thailand: "the leader and the follower 
classes,,26 or "those who are involved in politics and those who are not".27 The 
basis of this distinction is the Thai view of the world and society as a system of 
statuses of differing rights and powers that gave rise to a "we and they" situation 
23Wilson, op. cit., p. 61. 
240p. cit., pp. 61-63. 
2SMyrdal, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 295; Wilson, op. cit., p. 66. 
26Jacobs, op. cit., p. 203. 
27W ilson,op. cit., p. 57. 
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and to the assumption that politics is properly the affair of politicians or the ruling 
class.28 
What is significant about this particular stratification of Thai 
society is that one grouping has direct access to what security the society offers 
and the other does not. Jacobs writes, 
"All members of the follower class, regardless of individual or 
group contributions to the division of labor, are divorced from 
automatic, collective access to the kind and quantity of class 
security which members of the leadership class enjoy 
automatically and as a class ... Followers a priori are considered 
as potential individual clients of individual members of the 
leadership class. ,,29 
The follower class, thus, has no a priori or even a legal right as 
such; it only has the privilege of depending on the largess of the moral, 
patrimonial leadership class. 
The characterization of Thailand as a "loosely structured society" 
is most apt in describing the general social organization and the individual basis 
of relationships among the populace. Village allegiance or solidarity is weak. 
Village institutions, such as the temple and the school, may define a village by 
their clientele, not necessarily by its corporate entity. In fact, the village as a 
corporate entity does not exist?O 
Cooperative efforts such as are evident in villages at harvest times 
are organized on the basis of personal reciprocity between individual members of 
fairly stable groupings rather than on a community basis. Nor is there such a 
thing as communal property, be it land, buildings or equipment. This leaves the 
villagers without any tangible ground for common interests and cooperative 
activity. Thus, the emerging picture of a Thai village or community is not one 
geared to collective action for common interests. Rather, it is geared to 
supporting and serving as a receptacle of patrimonial prebends from the center 
and above. 31 
Implications of the above socio-political characteristics of the Thai 
society for social policy are wide-ranging. Listed below are the more salient 
among them. 
28Jbid. 
29Jacobs, op. cit., p. 193. 
30Wilson,op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
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1). Public services, including social provlSlons, are awarded in 
demonstration of the patrimonial leader's superior morality, not as a matter of 
right on the part ofthe beneficiaries. 
2). On the pragmatic level, social provisions are measures to keep 
the populace satisfied in terms of their expectations from their patrons, and thus to 
help maintain the status quo. 
3). Being prebendary awards for merit, the recipients of the 
provisions are select individuals rather than groups of citizens in need of common 
services. In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition of certain 
universal needs, such as rural development requirements, but the connotation of 
social and economic services as patrimonial rewards dispensed out of 
benevolence has not diminished.32 
4). The initiative for social provlSlons lies in the hands of the 
patrimonial leader. He decides who, where, when, what and how much, 
according to his subjective sense of the needs among his clients and according to 
his own requirements, which may be religious, political, or financial. This 
leaves the beneficiaries almost totally outside the possibility of reconciling 
benefits to their needs. 
5). Because of the fundamental alienation of the ruling class from 
the general populace, the former is incapable of accurately assessing existing 
social needs. 
6. In the absence of an effective electoral system, the populace is 
without any formal means to represent their own interests and to oblige the 
leadership to respond to their needs. Even if there were, they are ill-prepared to 
make use of it since, as matters now stand, there are neither functioning interest 
groups nor effective public opinion mechanisms in support of meaningful 
participation in the political process. They are merely a collection of 
individuals. 
7. The Thai attitude of individual responsibility and the tendency 
to regard the problems of "this world" as something to try to avoid at best are ill-
suited to the requirements of any social action directed toward insuring material 
and physical security within a formal framework. 
8. The nature of Thai patrimonial authority and political 
leadership is such that no contractual social provisions involving public 
responsibility are likely to materialize and coincide with the interest of the 
32Jacobs,op. cit., pp. 64-101. 
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patrimonial polity. By the same token, social measures based on contractual 
obligations are "foreign" even among the populace, including the urban workers, 
and not in keeping with the Thai's natural proclivity. 
3. Foreign Ideology, International Politics and External Influences 
Since the Western penetration of Asia in the 19th century, Siam 
adopted many of the Western political institutions and technologies and 
underwent many stages of adaptation and modernization until, now, the 
governmental and political structures of Thailand are nominally a combination of 
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. It was seen in the 
foregoing section, however, that the Western institutions have been substantially 
co-opted into the traditional socio-political system of patrimonialism. Jacobs 
contends in this regard that Thai rulers, from the earliest stage of Westernization, 
accepted Western values and ideas to ward off direct confrontation with the 
Western powers and to streamline their own system. By conceding to the 
Western cultural, political and economic influences and pressures up to a degree, 
Thailand was able to avoid the situation of China, for instance, where resistance 
had brought on forceful infringements on territorial and political sovereignty. It 
was also expedient to adapt its administrative structure to that of the West because 
dealings between more or less equal counterparts contributed to greater 
efficiency. 
Even today, Thailand is all for modernization through up-to-date 
technology and know-how. However, this interest stems from the desire to 
improve the functioning of the patrimonial establishment and its service role to 
the populace, not to bring about a change in the fundamental basis of the 
patrimonial system itself. Jacobs argues that even the revolution of 1932, which 
had removed the monarch from effective political power and attempted to 
introduce national programs founded on Marxist ideology, including land 
redistribution and nationalization of all natural and industrial resources (the Pridi 
Plan), was not really concerned with reconstructing the society based on new 
ideological premises, but with transferring the reigns of power into the hands of 
highly educated non-royal elites already in the bureaucracy and the military. 
In short, in Thailand, even a Marxist revolution was not necessarily 
undertaken to effect radical social change. When individual leaders, most 
notably the Nai Pridi Social Action party, showed signs of being serious about 
translating ideology into social action, they were overruled and removed from 
leadership.33 
33Jacobs,op. cit., pp. 42-44, 71-72, 261; Wilson, op.cit., pp. 17-19; Louis E. Lomax, The War 
That Is, The War That Will Be, Random House, New York, 1967, pp.56-60; The World Today, op. 
cit., pp. 378-384. 
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The foregoing, however, need not be an argument against ideology as 
an effective factor on social policy in Thailand. Rather, it may be taken as a case 
of one ideology (the traditional) prevailing over another (the radical). It is 
therefore possible to conclude that ideology has been a potent factor underlying 
social policy even in Thailand, as elsewhere among the study countries. 
Indochina has been one of the harshest battlegrounds for the two major ideologies 
of the post-World War II era, i.e. Western democracy and Communism. 
Because of its geo-political position, Thailand has long been on the periphery of 
that conflict. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly involved, 
partly because of its basic anti-Communist stance and partly because it has been 
persuaded into involvement by foreign powers, most notably the United States of 
America (U.S.A.) seeking a base for its Indochina strategy. Communist 
infiltration from the adjoining areas also has led to mounting insurgent activities 
within Thailand and has consolidated its involvement in the region's ideological 
conflict. 
To counter growing Communist pressure, the Thai government has 
introduced many social and economic programs with financial and technical aid 
from the United States. Lomax, who regards the insurgent movement in 
Thailand as significant, reports on the U.S. determination to fight Communism in 
Asia at all cost, including through intervention in the Thai socio-economic and 
political affairs. He quotes the U.S. Ambassador in Thailand, Graham Martin, as 
saymg, 
"We must stop the Communist aggression in Southeast Asia; we 
must have stable and viable governments; we must meet the needs 
of the masses in such areas as politics, health and economics. 
That is what we are here to do ... ,,34 
In Lomax's writing, the above statement implied, among other things, 
that if meeting the needs of the masses will help stop the advance of Communism 
the U.S. will steer the Thai government toward doing so. This U.S. position has 
been borne out in the presence of a large number of its agencies in Thailand 
working closely with every department ofthe government bureaucracy. 
The Thai government, whose patrimonial interest in the status quo 
coincides with the ideological and political interests of the United States, 
willingly cooperated with the latter. Examples of their joint efforts to fight 
Communism include extensive rural development, land reclamation and basic 
education programs undertaken during the past decade. Jacobs states that these 
were "frankly aimed at winning friends for the existing political order" and 
motivated by "the need to counter Communist influence among the rural 
population ... ,,35 The social security legislation to be introduced in 1974 may very 
34Lomax, op. cit., p. 91. 
35Jacobs,op. cit., pp. 105-106. Also see Myrdal, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 394. 
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well be part of this overall program direction under the influence of foreign 
ideologies and political pressures. 
As for non-political external factors, such as the United Nations 
technical assistance efforts, there is no indication that they touched the traditional 
framework of Thai social policy in any serious way. It is only after the Thai 
government began to develop programs in response to the political threat from the 
left that some departures from the traditional pattern seem to be emerging. 
Summary 
The general underdevelopment of the Thai IMP in both its non-
occupational and occupational sectors appear consistent with the religious and 
cultural values of the country that relegates the problems of the physical world to 
a marginal, if not totally inconsequential, realm and stresses the individual, rather 
than societal, responsibility for solving problems and meeting needs. 
There were other factors also contributing to the under-development of the 
Thai IMP. One such factor was abundant land resources that gave rise to the 
assumption that anyone can earn a living if he so wished. This reinforced the 
more basic attitude of individual responsibility just mentioned. The relative 
unresponsiveness of the ruling class to popular needs, which, too, derives from 
the Thai religious precepts, was another. 
The comparatively high levels of provisions for public employees and the 
charity-oriented "other social services" could be directly linked with the 
patrimonial nature of Thai society in which the officialdom reserves special 
privileges for itself based on the assumption of its moral superiority and intrinsic 
right and in which it is incumbent upon the same officialdom to provide public 
services as patrimonial prebends. 
The above factors affected the development, or rather the non-
development, of occupational measures as well. In this respect, however, there 
were two compounding factors: the ethnic Thais' bias against ethnic Chinese who 
make up almost the entire wage-earning sector; and the family-oriented 
organization of industrial production units, which is not conducive to 
contractualizing the employer-employee relationship. The workmen's 
compensation and sickness and maternity provisions based on employers' 
voluntary assumption of responsibility for employees are in keeping with the 
patrimonial orientation of the society. 
UNITED ARAB REpUBLIC 
Delineation of the IMP 
During the period under consideration (1952-68) there were five 
components in the non-occupational category and at least two different types of 
provisions in the occupational one. These, in terms of their latest available 
expenditures and population coverage, are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15. IMPCs, Costs and Population Coverage (UAR) 
Year of Public EXj2enditure Population % of Total 
Data LE (million) % of GNP Covered Population 
Non-Occuj2ational 
1. Education 1970 136.8 4.2 5,040,681 15 
expenditure per enrolled 1966 US$58 (1968) 
pupil 
2. Health 1970 55.4 2.2 
3. Price Subsidy 1967 36.0 1.4 Universal 
4. Family Allowances 1960 1.68 0.1 
5. Other Social Affairs 1964 1.76 0.1 
Occuj2ational 
6. Public Employees 1960 23.98 1.6 
Pensions & Provident 
Fund 
7. Social Insurance 1960 7.59 0.5 
(Workmen's compensation, 
sickness & 
maternity, invalidity, old age, 
death & unemployment) 
8. Profit-Sharing 
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1965 and 1971, sections on Public Finance; UN, Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics, 1969, Part D, pp.819-864; UN, World Economic Survey, 
1969-70, Table 25, p.65; ILO, The Cost of Social Security, 1964, pp.200-201. 
With an outlay of LE136.8 million or about 4.2 percent of the GNP in 
1970, public education had the largest share of social service expenditures and, in 
1968, the total school population was 5,040,681 or about 15 percent of the total 
population. The cost per head for primary school children in 1966 was 
US$58.00. 
Public health took up LE55.4 million or about 2.2 percent of the GNP in 
1970. Although the rate of utilization is not available, public health facilities 
and services are open to all and, for a majority of the rural population, they 
represent the first and basic resources of health care. The services are cost-free 
except where they are provided as part of mUlti-purpose rural center programs. 
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In the last context, the community to be served contributes with a building site 
and manpower for the construction of the center with its own clinic, dispensary, 
and a small capacity ofbeds.! 
In 1967, the last year for which the expenditure data are available, price 
subsidies absorbed LE36 million or about 1.4 percent of the GNP. This measure 
was first adopted during World War II in order to control prices, but had been 
turned into a device for reducing the cost of living for all the households after the 
War. 2 Subsequent to 1967, however, the expenditure for this program 
disappeared from the government budget presumably because it was abandoned 
due to lack of funds, which has been a serious problem since that time.3 But 
because it was in effect during practically the whole period with which this study 
is concerned, it will be treated as a component of the UAR's IMP throughout the 
following discussion. 
A scheme of "family allowance" has been in effect since 1955, but 
expenditure data on this is unavailable after 1960.4 Despite the designation, it is 
not a system of family allowance in the conventional sense. Designed to provide 
financial assistance and medical care to children and the aged without financial 
resources, it is a modified form of public assistance rather than a measure with 
any universal implication. Its total cost for 1960 was LE1.68 million or 0.1 
percent of the GNP. Along with the category of "Other Social Affairs", which 
includes public assistance which absorbed a similar level of expenditure in 1964 
(LE1.76 million or 0.1 %), it is one ofUAR's minor measures.s 
In 1960, the year of last available data, the total receipts for various 
insurance schemes were LE7.59 million or 0.5 percent of the GNP of that year. 
The total amount of pensions granted to public employees through the pension 
fund and the receipts by the public employees from the provident fund amounted 
to LE23.98 million or 1.6 percent of the GNP for the same year. Data 
concerning population coverage are not available for any of these measures, but it 
is evident that, in or around 1960, the outlays for the public employee pensions 
(Beatrice McCown Mattison, "Rural Social Centers in Egypt", The Middle East Journal 
(MEl), Vo1.5, No.4 (Autumn 1951), pp. 466-467. 
2UN Yearbook, 1971, p. 646. See general footnote to Table 193. 
3Major economic indices including total and per capita products, their annual rates of growth, 
fixed capital formation, private consumption, exports, etc., declined from around 1967 or a few 
years before. See UN, op. cit., 1970, Tables 178-181, pp.571-592. 
4ILO, The Cost o/Social Security, 1955-60, Geneva, 1964, pp. 200-201. 
SExpenditure for "Other Social Affairs" disappears from listings of governmental 
expenditures after 1964, as did those for Family allowances. This suggests either a budgetary 
reorganization or an abolition of the measures. In the absence of necessary confirmation, these 
components are retained in the IMP. 
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and the provident fund far outweighed those for the measures for the general 
sector, probably because the latter was just promulgated only a year before. 
Profit-sharing is probably an important source of income supplement to 
those with access to such measures and, therefore, is treated in this study as a non-
contingency income maintenance device similar to work-related and non-
contributory family allowances. The only difference between the two is that, in 
the latter, the benefit rate is predetermined while, in the former, it fluctuates 
depending on annual profit margins of each ofthe establishments concerned. 
As to how much is actually transferred to workers by their employers 
under this provision, pertinent data has not been available. It is known, 
however, that the employees are entitled to 25% of all business profits in cash and 
services. The measure requires that 10% be paid out in cash but that no single 
worker's share exceeds LE50; that 5% be expended for local amenities and 
"regional social services"; and that 10% be allocated to a central social service for 
workers which includes social security.6 This provision thus reinforces social 
insurance in more than one way. It provides workers with an income 
supplement as well as ensuring the employer contribution to the existing social 
insuraI).ce schemes. 
Before continuing with the country discussion, it seems appropriate to 
clarify why this study has chosen the particular period of Egypt (UAR) that it has 
for examination and, to do so, it is necessary to consider briefly the 
developmental histories of the country's various IMP components just reviewed. 
UAR's IMPCs developed in two distinct phases. The first phase 
coincides with the period of constitutional monarchy (1922-1952).7 Education 
was declared free and compulsory at the very outset of the period and was so 
provided in the 1923 Constitution. It was not implemented until much later, 
however. According to one source, between 1922 and 1950, the government 
budget for education rose by more than 1,000% and the number of pupils enrolled 
in elementary schools by 1,300%.8 The liberal Wafd Party9, which held power 
6 The u.s. Army Area Handbook for the U.A.R., Government Printing Office, 1964, p.313; 
Anover AbdeI-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, Vintage Books, New York, 1968, p.152; I-larry 
Hopkins, Egypt: The Crucible, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, pp. 223, 346; Peter Mansfield, 
Nasser's Egypt, Penguin Books, 1965, p.153. 
7The formal dissolution of the monarchy was not until June 18, 1953, but its rule ended with 
the success of the military coup d'etat in July 1952. 
8 John S. Badean, The Revolt Against Democracy", Columbia Journal of International Affairs 
(ClIA), Vol. XIII, No.2, 1959, p.IS3. 
9Meaning the "delegation" party, it grew out of the independence movement of the early 20th 
century. During the independence movement period and some years thereafter, the Wafd 
represented the interest of a wide spectrum of the Egyptian society and advocated progressive 
socio-economic programs. Subsequently, however, the upper and upper-middle class leadership 
128 
for seven years during the monarchy, has been credited with this. to Government 
intervention in the health field did not get under way until the waning years of the 
monarchy. It was undertaken by the Fellah Department of the then newly 
established Ministry of Social Affairs and health service was built into the multi-
purpose program of rural social centers that was projected in large numbers at that 
time. As to how far this effort had progressed before the overthrow of the 
monarchy, the available material is highly inconsistent. 11 It is clear, however, 
that the decision to carry out such a program had been made and that there was a 
marked rise in the public health expenditure during this period to indicate that the 
decision was implemented to some extent. 12 
During 1948-52, the cumulative expenditure for price subsidies was 
greater than that for public health by LE12 million (see Table 16). The 
subsidies, in other words, represented the second most important measure, after 
education, during the monarchy.· This is significant because the measure is more 
of a universal provision than either public education or public health. 13 In the 
year of the government change-over, the expenditures for education, price 
subsidies and public health as percentages of the total government budget were 
12.4%, 7.8% and 3% respectively. 
A number of labor laws that had been in force since the period of the 
British protectorate were amended in the 1920s and 1930s to improve the position 
of workers in general. As far as their income protection was concerned, 
however, there was only the workmen's compensation. As first enacted in 1936, 
it was a voluntary provision covering industrial accidents. It was amended in 
1942 to make it compulsory and the 1950 law (Act No.117) enacted by the Wafd 
government extended the protection to occupational diseases. 14 A non-
of the party became alienated from the peasants and the urban wage earners among its 
constituency. See Council of Foreign Relations, Political Handbook of the World, 1953, p.63; 
Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society, Vintage Books (paperback), New York, 1968, 
pp.18-19. 
10 Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 19; Harry Hopkins, op. cit., p. 118. 
liThe number of rural social centers that are said to have existed in or around 1952 varies 
from several to 150. The majority of sources lean toward the latter figure, however. See 
Mattison,op. cit., p.464; UN, Social progress Through Social Change, (Bureau of Social Affairs) 
New York, 1955, pp.54-56; Hopkins, op.cit., p.120; James L. Iwan, "From Social Welfare to 
Local Government: The United Arab Republic", MEJ, Vol. XXII, No.3, (Summer 1968), pp.265-
277. 
12Between 1948 and 1950 alone, the expenditures rose by LE2.76 million, from LE5.81 to 
LE8.57 million. See UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1953, Table 165, p.442. 
13Hopkins, op. cit., p. 118. 
14p. J.Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, Praeger, New York, 1968, pp. 339-401; 
Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 144~145; ILO, Legislative Series, 1950 (A-M), section on Egypt. 
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contributory pension scheme covering all categories of dependents, i.e., widows 
with children, orphans, the disabled and the aged, was also promulgated in 1950 
(Act No.116)15 but was allowed to lapse without ever having been enforced. 16 
Table 16. Government Expenditures on Price Subsidies, Education and Health (UAR) 
Price Subsidies Education Health 
LE(m) % of %of LE(m) %of %of LE(m) % of % of 
GNP Budget GNP Budget GNP Budget 
1939 --- --- 4.53 11.21 2.45 6.0 
1948 3.98 4.20 11.91 12.60 5.81 6.14 
1949 13.84 8.78 16.32 10.35 7.51 4.76 
1950 7.11 4.34 19.02 11.61 8.57 5.23 
1951 
--- --- --- --- --- ---
1952 18.05 2.1 7.79 28.76 3.3 12.43 8.93 1.0 3.86 
1953 15.50 7.52 25.84 12.54 7.91 3.84 
1954 7.80 3.95 22.74 11.53 6.02 3.05 
1955 4.94 2.19 27.60 12.22 8.10 3.59 
1956 6.30 2.30 30.00 10.98 8.36 3.06 
1957 3.00 1.08 31.10 11.18 8.34 3.00 
1958 2.07 0.69 33.93 11.38 7.83 2.63 
1959 6.71 2.41 35.33 12.69 8.35 3.00 
1960 8.91 3.10 42.73 2.9 14.85 8.33 2.90 
1961 9.00 0.6 3.05 50.16 3.3 17.25 11.76 0.8 3.98 
1962 16.65 5.00 55.39 16.64 12.85 3.86 
1963 36.51 8.50 60.21 14.02 18.40 4.29 
1964 32.40 6.78 60.90 12.74 22.09 4.62 
1965 35.0 4.72 85.60 11.53 35.3 4.75 
1966 35.0 4.07 100.1 11.63 37.5 4.36 
1967 36.0 1.4 3.80 104.4 4.2 11.01 38.7 1.6 4.08 
1968 --- --- --- 127.0 20.30 50.2 8.03 
1969 --- --- --- 137.1 20.47 53.5 7.99 
1970 --- --- 136.8 22.00 55.4 8.91 
1971 
--- ---
141.0 20.46 58.0 8.42 
Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1954-71, Budget Facts and Public Debt (Public Finance 
Section); UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969, pp.819, 864. 
The second phase corresponds to the period of the Revolutionary Council 
and the Republic under Nasser (1952-68). All three of the non-occupational 
measures of the previous phase remained effective during this period. Their 
expenditures, however, went through varying degrees and duration of decline 
immediately following the coup. In real terms, the expenditure for education fell 
by LE6 million between 1952 and 1954 and did not begin to rise to any 
significant extent until around 1960 when it stood at LE42.73 million, as 
compared with the 1952 level of LE28.76 million (see Table 16). In 1967 it 
was LEI 04.4 million or 4.2 percent of the GNP representing a rise above the 1952 
1SILO,op. cit. 
16Mohamed Wasfy, "Social Security in the United Arab Republic", ISSAB, June 1960, pp. 
319-331; Vatikiotis,op. cit., p. 401. 
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level by approximately 3.6 times in real terms and one percentage point of the 
GNP. 17 
There have not been significant substantive changes in key social indices. 
Where in 1952, the adult literacy rate was approximately 25%, it was 20% in the 
early 1960s. The school enrollment for all the levels was about 45% of the 
relevant age group in 1952, whereas, in 1965, it was 46% of the relevant age 
group for the primary level, 34% of the same for the secondary level, and IS% of 
the secondary enrollment for the tertiary level. 18 The ratio of enrollment, in 
other words, did not improve in 13 years. In real terms, however, the primary 
school population doubled between 1953 and 1961 alone, seeming to indicate that 
the stagnant enrollment ratio may have been due to a tremendous increase in the 
number of school age children. 
The health expenditure also declined in the first few years of the coup 
d'etat but returned to just below the 1952 level by 1955, to remain there until 
1960 when it rose to LES.33 million or approximately 0.6 percent of the GNP. 
This GNP share represented a decline from the 1952 level by almost half. It 
began to rise significantly from 1963 onward, however, and had reached LE3S.7 
million or about 1.6 percent of the GNP in 1967. This was an increase of 
LE29.77 million over the 1952 outlay.19 
Despite the relative stability of expenditures during most of the period 
under consideration, the indications are that a good deal was accomplished in 
terms of expanding health facilities, personnel and services. The public health 
units of varying degrees of comprehensiveness numbered well over 1,200 in 1964 
serving 10,000 to 15,000 persons each.2o But this was only half way toward the 
final goal of establishing 2,500 units, each unit serving 5,000 persons within a 
radius of 3 kilometers.21 In the same year, drinking water was brought to almost 
all the villages and, by 1966, the entire rural population of 17 million had access 
to clean water. This compared favorably to the situation of 1952 when only 2 
17The national source, Annuaire Statistiqlle Egyptiennes, gives consistently higher figures for 
the same type of educational expenditures. In 1959-60, for example, the total government 
expenditure for education was LE47, 175,700. See Annuaire Statistiqlle Egyptiennes, 1959, 
Table I, p.9. 
18Hopkins, op.cit, p. 118; UN, World Economic Survey, op.cit., Tables A 10-11, pp. 204-207; 
UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 203, pp.755-775. 
19The figures for health expenditure in Annuaire Statistiqlle Egyptienne and other national 
sources are markedly higher than those used. 
20Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, Penguin Books, 1965, p. 110; Hopkins, op. cit, pp. 120- . 
121. 
2lMansfield, op. cit. 
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million had access to potable water. 22 The numbers of inhabitants per physician 
and per hospital bed in 1966 were 2,200 and 560 respectively?3 This was a 
considerable improvement over the situation of 1951-1952 when the number of 
persons per physician was 4,000 and the population per hospital bed was 600.24 
Given the rapid population growth throughout the period (2.8% annually during 
1960-1969), even the very modest change in the population-hospital bed ratio 
must be regarded an accomplishment. 
Price subsidies were kept at a minimum level for the better part of the 
Nasser period. The expenditure fell by LE16 million between 1952 and 1958, to 
work its way up to twice the 1952 level by 1967. At LE36 million in that year, it 
nevertheless represented only 1.4 percent of the GNP as compared to 2.1 percent 
of the GNP in 1952. By and large, the subsidies played a diminishing role 
during this period. 
From the above, it is possible to conclude that, in education and health, 
there have been some gains in the second phase, if only in terms of keeping 
abreast of the rapidly expanding needs of the rapidly increasing population. The 
gains have been somewhat more substantial in the health field in that the rural 
sanitary standard received a boost by the installation of safe drinking water 
facilities and that the physician-popUlation ratio declined by almost 100%. These 
are the areas of public need where the Nasser government poured significant 
proportions of its resources and energy. By comparison, the subsidies were 
relegated to a minor role throughout the period. Even when the expenditures for 
them were at a peak, they did not achieve the importance of the first phase. 
The above measures, however, do not necessarily mark the second phase. 
What really distinguishes it is the evolution, through stages, of a comprehensive 
system of occupational measures designed to award direct cash and service 
benefits to wage-earners and salaried employees. The first stage was the 
establishment of the Workers' Insurance and Provident Funds in 1955.25 These 
funds were first implemented in urban centers and extended to other areas 
graduall y. 26 
The second stage was the 1959 promulgation of the Social Insurance Code 
(Law No.92). The Code repealed all earlier legislation and established a unified 
system of compulsory social insurance covering old age, invalidity, survivors, 
22Mansfie1d, op. cit., p. Ill. 
23UN, World Economic Survey, 1969-1970, Statistical Annex, Table 2.7, p. 196. 
241bid. 
2S/SSAB, November 1955, pp.408-41O. 
26Hopkins, op. cit., p. 312; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 401. 
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industrial accidents, sickness and maternity (enabling provIsIons only) and 
unemployment (enabling provisions only). The public employee pension and 
provident funds were introduced in 1960, following the passage of the general 
legislative scheme. 
Stage three included the introduction of the profit-sharing scheme (Law 
N 0.111), which was part of a larger package of legislation frequently referred to 
as the Socialist Law of 1961. The package included, among others, a highly 
progressive tax system (Law No.lI5), a maximum ceiling on salaries (Law 
No.l13), and a radical tax increase on building rentals in conjunction with a 
significant reduction in rents (Law No.129). The specifics of the profit-sharing 
scheme were as given earlier. 
In the final stage, the Social Insurance Code of 1959 was amended (Law 
No.63 of 1964) to extend coverage and improve benefits. Under this Code, 
sickness, maternity and unemployment insurance have been upgraded to provide 
both cash and service benefits. 
From the foregoing, it can be said that the more significant development in 
the UAR's IMP came during the second phase and its main features included: 
i. Continued attention to education and health service, with significant 
gains over the previous phase. 
ii. Playing down of price subsidies which tended to favor the high 
consumption sector. 
iii. Notable strides in the occupational sector that included a 
comprehensive system of social insurance and a non-contributory and 
non-contingency profit-sharing scheme. 
IV. Addition of unemployment insurance in the social security system. 
v. A high contribution rate and an equally high benefit level of social 
insurance, and 
VI. Extensive population coverage of social insurance schemes (with the 
exception of the unemployment insurance). 
The following discussion of underlying factors will be largely in regard to 
these aspects of the IMP in the second phase. 
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Underlying Factors 
The present discussion will first be concerned with some aspects of the 
socio-political conditions that led up to the coup d'etat of July 23, 1952. This is 
necessary partly because it is difficult to understand the events of the Nasser years 
without knowing something about the previous years and partly because many of 
the forces that came together during the period were the same forces that 
contributed to whatever advances were made in the social field in the preceding 
period. 
In many respects, social policy developments in the UAR have always 
been direct outcomes of power politics involving the power that is, the power that 
would be, and the masses providing the power base. Social policies and 
programs have been the means to an end. Labor unions existed in the UAR 
since 1899.27 Around the time of formal independence from the British in 1922, 
they constituted a political force significant enough for contending parties to seek 
control. Between 1925 and 1935, at least four separate trade union organizations 
were formed under the wings of as many political parties or factions. 28 The 
various governments spanning that period either promised or actually studied 
measures to improve the conditions oflabor.29 
What actually came out of the period, however, was the 1933 bill to limit 
work hours and the 1936 law providing for industrial accident compensation.3o 
This pattern repeated itself in the subsequent years. The ruling groups 31 
continued to seek and obtain control of the labor organizations, promised benefits 
and at times went as far as to enact laws to fulfill that promise, but they were 
either part of a measure to place labor ever more closely under official purview or 
were countered by later laws to curb its strength and activities.32 The net gains 
27For details of the history of Egyptian labor, see Gabriel Baer, Studies in the Social History 
of Modern Egypt, 1969, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969; Mansfield, op. cit., p.170; 
Vatikiotis,op. cit., pp. 335-407. 
281ncluding the Ittihad, Liberal, Wafd, and Egyptian Labor parties. See Vatiokiotis, op. cit. 
29 Among the measures promised were workers' housings, hospitals, schools for 
industrial workers, protection against sickness and industrial accidents, and further regulation of 
child labor and the employment of women. See Ibid, p. 338. 
3 0lbid. , pp. 339,401. 
310utside the Palace, the reigns of government went back and forth between the Wafd, the 
Shaab, the Saadist, and other parties led by the upper class (landowning and industrial) elements. 
The Wafd had in its constituency large segments of the fellahin, urban workers, as well as the 
middle-class. See Political Handbook of World, op.cit. Issues up to 1953. 
32For instance, in 1930, the Sidqi government established the Bureau of Labor, but placed it 
under the authority of the Ministry of Interior for control purposes; the Trade Union Law of 1942 
officially recognized unions but officially forbade the formation of a lobar federation as well as 
prohibiting political activities; a 1944 law provided for minimum wages, over-time, paid holidays, 
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therefore were minimal in the end. This pattern was not confined to the official 
relationship vis-a-vis the organized labor but extended to its dealings with the 
public at large, as the legislation of the Upper-Constituency Missions for 
Dependents (Act No.16 of 1950) exemplifies. 
What were some of the factors associated with this two-handed attitude on 
the part of the ruling group? At the risk of oversimplification, they can all be 
boiled down to conflicting interests. On the one hand were the pressing needs of 
the fellahin (peasantry) and the working class which have been increasingly 
articulate in their demands since the days of the national independence movement. 
They had become radicalized by the nationalist and leftist intelligentsia who 
stimulated and led them.33 On the other hand were the interests of the ruling 
class. Under the circumstances, the various governments offered labor and the 
public palliatives in the hope of maintaining their support as well as preventing 
their further radicalization, but were never able to undertake a wholehearted 
reform. 
The primarily political interpretation above of the social policy 
development of the monarchy period might be challenged on the ground that there 
have been some significant progress in the education and health fields, as 
indicated earlier. Although there is no particular work to call upon to support 
this, it seems reasonable to apply the same explicator to the seemingly contrasting 
development. That is, not being averse to progress per se, the ruling parties, 
especially the Wafd, which stood for reform and development, were able to 
pursue consistent, if somewhat slow-paced, policies in the areas of education and 
health because the consequences of such policies did not pose an immediate threat 
to the status quo. 
The point to be carried forward to the discussion of the Nasser years is that 
if it was the interest of the ruling group that largely prevented the enactment of 
any significant occupational income maintenance measure during the monarchy, it 
was the interest of another ruling group that contributed to the adoption of such 
measures in the subsequent period. This, in its specific manifestation and the 
changing position of labor in relation to it, will be the subject of the following 
discussion. A discussion of other factors, also associated with the development of 
the IMP in the Nasser period, both precedes and follows it. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all the factors pertain to the IMP as a whole. 
cost ofliving allowances, free medical services at places of work, etc., but at the same time the 
Wafd government resorted to exercising emergency powers to jail union leaders; in 1950 a new 
law dealing with collective labor contracts and cost of living allowances was passed, but so was 
another law, in 1951, to curb the workers' right to strike. See Vatikiotis, op. cit., p.340, Hopkins, 
op.cit., p.145 and Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p.4l. 
33 Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp.l0-20, 42-43, and 63-64; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 311-342. 
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1. Nasser and the "Free Officers": Orientation of the Political Leadership 
A first step toward understanding any ruling group's political interests 
or requisites is to understand something of the psychological, ideological, class 
and other orientations, affiliations and commitments. This is a complex and 
difficult task and, for this reason, no one person's work in this area can or should 
be regarded as definitive. There are some consensus of views however, 
concerning Nasser and other leaders of the military coup that are pertinent to the 
present purpose. 
Most of the so-called "Free Officers" were sons of small land-owners 
in the provinces and government employees of various categories. A few of 
them were sons and grandsons of Army officers. Two had come from the upper 
class. Ideologically, some were involved in pro-Axis activities during the 
Second World War. Others were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Young Egypt. 34 A few belong to Marxist and other leftist groups. 35 As a 
group, however, the military regime reflected the middle-class; perhaps partly 
because Nasser himself was from that class, and, in this respect, the present 
leadership was not that far apart from the previous one. 
What set it apart was that it was a leadership in active search of a new 
solution to Egypt's old and new problems. In the words of Hopkins, it reflected 
"the sector of middle-class with its head, so to speak, in the West, but its feet on 
the native soil." 
The initial thrust and strategy of the leadership in the conduct of 
overall national affairs and its later change of course seem explicable given the 
dualistic orientation of the leaders. Following the seizure of power, the military 
regime had sought only to purify the existing order without necessarily 
repudiating the upper and middle class at large. In fact, the regime had counted 
on the support of the latter sectors in carrying out its self-appointed tasks.36 
Even land reform, the principal project of the junta, had been carried out in 1952 
in the expectation that the capital diverted from the agrarian sector would be 
34Both are extremist nationalist. 
35Abdel-Malek,op. cit., p. xxi; Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp.375-376; Hopkins, op. cit., p. 231. 
36That the regime had counted on the establishment support was evident, in part, in the fact 
that General Naguib, who figure-headed the junta, was part of the mainstream of the monarchy 
period and Ali Maher, head of the first post-coup cabinet, was an independent of the upper 
bourgeoisie and had formed a government before. Also Dr. Abdel-Jalilal-Emari was retained as 
Finance Minister from the previous government although his views on matters of finance were 
anything but progressive. See "Egypt Since the Coup d'etat of 1952". The World Today, 
Vol.lO, No.4 (Apr. 1954), pp. 140-143. Also see Vatikiotis, op. cit., p.378. 
136 
invested in industry by basically cooperative landowners seeking new outlets for 
their money.37 
2. The leadership requisites and its changing orientation 
a. Internal resistance 
The junta was sorely disappointed in its hopes with regards to the 
old establishment. Its resistance was strong and those among its members who 
participated in the new regime made every effort to co-opt or sabotage its aims 
and programs for their own ends.38 The diverted capital did not get invested in 
industry: they escaped abroad instead. The economic situation became 
extremely unstable. There were anti-government demonstrations and a counter-
coup plot in the Army. On January 16, 1953, the junta was forced to dissolve all 
political parties and confiscate their funds and announce a three year 
postponement of the restoration of democratic rule. 39 This was an 
acknowledgment of the total collapse of the junta's initial expectations and 
strategy and marked the beginning of its active cultivation of other sources of 
support, most notably labor. A year later, in 1954, the effort paid off when labor 
played a critical role in the showdown between Naguib and Nasser. The trade 
unions staged a massive demonstration in support of the latter and finally handed 
him the reign ofpower.4o 
One might ask what is the point of all this as far as the social 
policies of the period are concerned? It is simply this: in 1955 the military 
regime took the first significant step toward providing income protection for the 
workers in the form of compulsory insurance and provident funds, as indicated 
earlier. The implications are fairly clear. First, because of the basically rural 
middle-class orientation of the new leadership, the urban wage-earning sector had 
not received its attention as early as the fellahin which was handed the Agrarian 
Reform within two months of the COUp.41 Second, when it did, it was "in 
acknowledgment of its support in the critical stage of his (Nasser's) political 
development.,,42 It was the leader's power requisite that was decisive in the 
adoption of policies concerning labor and its needs. 
37Ma\Colm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt", ME}" Vol. 16, No.2 
(Spring 1962), pp.130-131. 
38 The World Today, op. cit. 
39/bid., p.142; Yatikiotis, op. cit., p.144. 
4oYatikiotis,op. cit., pp. 153-155. 
4lrnc\uded land redistribution as welI as tenancy reform. 
42Yatikiotis,op. cit., p. 155. 
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The subsequent Nasser-Labor relationship and its bearing on social 
legislation will be discussed later. For now, it seems appropriate to consider 
another factor that entered into the political requisite parameter of the leadership 
and contributed to its radicalization, eventually influencing its later policies in the 
social and economic fields. 
b. External confluence 
The factor in question has to do with the position in which Nasser 
and his regime found themselves in relation to foreign powers and its impact on 
Egypt's economy. In line with the generally moderate domestic policies in the 
early years,43 the regime initially adopted a conciliatory stance vis-a-vis the 
foreign powers, especially Great Britain, France and the United States. As to the 
underlying reasons, one source states, 
From the outset there seems to have been no doubt in the minds of 
the Army leaders that the long-term development of Egyptian 
economy could only be achieved with Western capital, and that 
confidence must be created at home and abroad to obtain it ... 44 
Specific steps were taken to encourage investment from abroad.4s 
In this sphere, too, however, the expectations went unfulfilled. Foreign private 
capital continued to stay away and all the likely official sources of external aid, 
such as the United States, Great Britain, and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, attached conditions to their aid proposals which 
were unacceptable to the regime. The USSR was an alternative source, but the 
basically anti-Communist leadership had preferred to tum to the West. In 
December 1955, the United States and Great Britain had finally come through 
with a pledge involving US$70 million. They abrogated that pledge half a year 
later, however. 
Profoundly dismayed, Nasser and his colleagues reacted by 
announcing the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and demanding the 
43Even the land redistribution was not based on confiscation, although the terms of 
compensation changed in later years in disfavor of the original owners, perhaps reflecting the 
radicalization of the regime. See Bent Hansen & Girgis A. Marzouk, Development and 
Economic Policy in UAR (Egypt), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1965, pp.85, 
90; Hopkins, op. cit., p.279; Mansfield, op. cit., p.176. 
44The World Today, op.cit, p.144. 
45The steps included the granting of long term visas to foreign residents, the repeal of the 
1947 law limiting foreign capital in any firm to 49%, a 7 year tax exemption to industrial 
companies, the transfer of profit in foreign currency, etc. See Ibid., pp.144-145; Vatikiotis, 
op.cit., pp.394-395; Abdel-Malek, op. cit., pp.89-91. 
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evacuation of the British troops from the Canal base. As a result, the Suez War 
began three months later. The United States intercession and the Soviet 
ultimatum cut short the invasion plan of the British and French expeditionary 
corps and, in two months, the nationalization of the Canal Company and the 
evacuation of the Canal Zone were complete. Subsequently, Nasser and his 
regime turned more and more to the "non-aligned" world and the socialist bloc for 
financial, technical, political and moral support.46 A rapid radicalization of 
policies in all fields accompanied this shift. The 1959 Social Insurance Code, 
the profit-sharing provision of the 1961 Socialist Law and the revised and 
upgraded Social Insurance Code of 1964 all came on the crest of this new wave. 
It is clear from the foregoing that the radicalization of the 
military regime since the Suez War was not so much a result of a new ideological 
allegiance as it was "a consequence of the impact of external events upon Egypt 
and of the clear failure of the regime's policy to stimulate economic development 
by encouraging private native and foreign enterprise.,,47 
These then were the main ingredients that transformed the 
orientation of the military leadership with its implications for the IMP 
development. What then is the substance of the orientation itself? The answer 
has been implicit in the above discussion, but the subject warrants a more explicit 
treatment in view of its prominence in the Egyptian affairs in general and in social 
policies in particular. It will be considered following the discussion of the 
internal political alignment next, which apropos provides an explanation of the 
importance of the leadership ideology in the UAR. 
c. Internal alignment and the place of labor: Its implications for 
social security development 
Having failed to rally the traditional parties around his cause and 
faced with growing demonstrations of their opposition to his regime, Nasser's 
reaction was more than merely to dissolve the parties and call a moratorium on 
the election. He proceeded to destroy the opposition and more or less 
succeeded. In the words of Abdel-Malek, 
(Nasser) ousted the King from power with his clique of 
aristocrats, neutralized and isolated the landed bourgeoisie even 
while calling on it to assume anew fimction in industry, destroyed 
the Moslem Brotherhood, oriented as it was toward the past and 
(being) guilty of xenophobia and religious fanaticism, decimated 
46Abdel-Malek, op. cit, pp. 101-108; The World Today, op. cit, p. 145; Vatikiotis, op. cit, pp. 
396-397. 
47Vatikiotis,op. cit, p. 396. 
the ranks of the Communist organizations that had been aroused 
by the Chinese example ... 48 
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The one sector of the old ruling group excepted from a similar 
treatment was the formerly independent industrial wing of the upper bourgeoisie, 
notably those represented in the Misr and the Abbud complexes. This important 
modem sector of industry cooperated fully with the new regime and, in time, 
evolved into key agents of industrial development within the structure of a 
nationalized economy.49 
Of the two remaining sources of support, the fellahin was won over 
first through the comprehensive land reform and subsequently by absorbing more 
or less the entire agrarian sector into the highly subsidized production and 
marketing cooperatives.50 The landless workers were slowly brought under the 
agricultural workers union which, by the mid 1960s, began to participate in the 
Trade Union Confederation of Egypt. 51 
The beginning relationship of labor with Nasser was mentioned 
earlier. As the shape of his political support came into clearer view, the workers, 
particularly organized labor, turned out to be his mainstay. Outside the military 
itself, organized labor was the only force of consequence which Nasser could 
mobilize on his own and his regime's behalf. The students constituted such a 
force also, but they were volatile and not easily manageable. Labor formed 
rallies, stage demonstrations for Nasser and even provided a rich seedbed for 
people's representatives to the National Assembly as required by the National 
Charter of 1962.52 
Nasser was therefore determined to ~ive the union's status and 
pushed forward their leaders on to the national scene. 3 More significantly, with 
the formation of the Arab Socialist Union in 1963, labor, along with the fellahin, 
was given unprecedented scope for participation in the political and economic 
decision making processes. It was required under the new Charter that half of 
480p. cit., p.1 04. 
49/bid., pp.\05, 112-115, 130. 
50Hansen & Marzouk, op. cit., pp. 91-92; Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 100-114. 
5IHopkins,op. cit., pp. 313-316. 
52The U.S. Army Area Handbook, op.cit., p.331; Vatikiotis, Egypt 1966: The Assessment of 
a Revolution - An Interpretative Essay", The World Today, June 1966, p.246. 
53 An indication of this push was the appointment in 1962 of Anwar Salama, a veteran trade 
union leader and President of the Petroleum Workers Union, as the Minister of Labor. The 
election in 1963 of Ali Sayed, second-in-command of the Petroleum Workers Union, as the 
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly was another such indication. 
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the deputies elected to the Assembly be workers or fellahs54 and that, in industrial 
and commercial establishments, the workers be represented on their boards to 
protect their interests. 55 
To be precise about the nature of the military-labor or Nasser-labor 
coalition though, labor's position, despite its advanced status just described, was 
not that of a body standing on its own feet. Rather, it was that of a group co-
opted by the ruling elites. Thus, the government-labor relationship was 
generally characterized by paternalism on one side and docile submission on the 
other.56 
Labor's position, in other words, was not too different from what it 
had always been in relation to the old ruling groups. Only this time, it was 
awarded with privileges and benefits in the forms of a fuller participation in the 
national affairs and a solid system of income maintenance provisions. 
d. Ideology of the leadership: Its implications on social policy 
The officers of the coup d' etat straddled two worlds in their 
collective orientation, as indicated earlier. In this respect, the officers were 
fairly typical of the main ideological current of their time and place. Hopkins 
who uses the term "Egyptian nationalism" to describe the main current gives the 
following analysis of its dualistic character: 
If the Egyptian nationalism was finally "polished" in the salons 
of Paris, it had been born in the Nile Valley of the conjunction 
between a sense of outrage and the promise of Islam: if the names 
of Rousseau and Locke were later added to its texts, its true line 
of descent ran back to the Koran and the Crusades ... 
The founding father of Egyptian nationalism, namely Colonel 
Arabi, Saad Zaghoul, Mohamed Ali, Nasser, are all sons of Islam 
at heart as well as in soul. They have been trained in Islam and 
El Azhar, its fount, the hidden heart of Egyptian life. 
Yet if El Azhar still appeared the secret key to so much in Egypt, it 
was a key which would no longer fit the doors of either present or 
future. The nation-state, the joint-stock company, the assembly-
54Vatikiois, Some Political Consequences of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt", Political and 
Social Change in Modern Egypt, P.M. Holt ed., Oxford Press, London, 1968, pp. 379-380. 
55The U.S. Army Area Handbook, op. cit, p. 332; Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, p. 
403. 
56Hopkins,op. cit, p. 359; Vatikiotis, op. cit, p. 400. 
line, were institutions unknown to the Koran - in whose sacred 
text interest is sinful "usury" ... 
Since Egypt, geographically placed as she was, could not 
withstand the advance of the modern world, what happened was 
that the Islamic institutions were simply by-passed ... 57 
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Born of such a world, the military leaders were nevertheless more 
and more propelled toward the modem stream, largely of necessity,58 while a 
good part of the society, the former aristocracy, the middle class and even 
segments of the lower class, clung to the traditional one. 
The modernism on the part of the leaders had at least two 
discernible facets. One was the drive toward industrialization and development. 
The other was the amalgam of hopes, aspirations, values and outlooks embodied 
in "Arab Socialism". The first impulse was prominent from the beginning. 
This, in fact, was a major factor underlying the Free Officers' seizure of power 
itself and their initial strategy with regards to the traditional parties inside and the 
Western powers outside. Upon the failure of the initial strategy toward 
industrialization and development, the military regime not only had need of new 
sources of support, but to restructure the society as a whole in order to mobilize it 
toward the same end. Also, it had yet to legitimize its authority and consolidate 
its power. Arab Socialism was the ideological framework which, it was hoped, 
would enable the regime to accomplish these tasks. 
The last ideology is of interest to the present discussion because its 
evolution is closely tied to the evolution of the income maintenance program in 
the UAR. First of all, it may be recalled that the timing of the enactments of the 
first and second Social Insurance Codes (1959 and 1964) generally coincided with 
the years in which the Socialist Charter (National Charter of 1962) and the Arab 
Socialist Union, respectively, and the constitutional and organizational 
translations of Arab Socialism, were conceived and brought into being. It may 
also be recalled that the profit-sharing provision for the workers was an integral 
part of the "Socialist Law" of 1961. Finally, it was seen that there was a general 
step-up of both educational and health expenditures since around 1960-1963, 
perhaps indicating heightened public efforts in these fields subsequent to this 
period. It therefore seems propitious to understand what the ideology consists of. 
Its premises are clearly evident first in the Constitution of 1956. 
1t embodies the concept of the Egyptian nation as based on the abolition of 
570p. cit., pp. 228-229. 
58"The Socialist solution of the problem of social development in Egypt - with a view to 
achieving progress in a revolutionary way - was never a question of free choice. The socialist 
solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspirations of the masses and 
the changing nature of the world in the second part of the twentieth century ... " (Section 6 of the 
National Charter.) 
142 
imperialism, feudalism, monopoly, and the control of capitalist influence over the 
system of government, and the establishment of a strong army, social justice and a 
democratic society.. More pertinently for the present purpose, it defines certain 
fundamental values of the Egyptian society which include a planned economy, the 
state ownership of natural resources, an equitable distribution of national wealth, 
and a comprehensive social security program. 59 
The Charter of 1962 is more cogent in stating the terms of Arab 
Socialism. But basically it affirms the premises of popular participation and 
representation at all levels of the political structure and the imperative that the 
state must represent the interests of all popular forces, including farmers, workers, 
intellectuals, national capitalists, members of organized professions and soldiers. 
Arab Socialism is concerned with values and the construction of a whole moral 
world. 60 But it is also an ideology with concrete .guidelines for socio-economic 
policies and programs. In it, the compelling preoccupations are with 
independence from all external controls, economic modernization and 
development for the purpose of effecting social justice, equitable sharing of 
national wealth, and freedom from anxiety as to future security. As for 
democracy, it is not defined in terms of individual freedom and traditional 
parliamentary structures, but in terms of social and economic justice. In order to 
establish this justice, political life has to be centralized and regimented. 61 
Given these tenets at the heart of Arab Socialism it is only 
consistent that such a wide range and rather high benefit level (financed by a high 
rate of contributions) Social Insurance Schemes were adopted to protect workers' 
incomes and that a high level investment in health and education was carried out 
during this period. Also, the particular form that one of the provisions took, i.e. 
profit-sharing, which is related neither to contribution nor to the level of wage, 
but only on a per capita basis with a maximum ceiling, seems fitting to the 
concept of justice contained in the ideology. 
There has been an effort to integrate or even equate the ideology of 
Arab Socialism with that of Islam62 and, as late as the mid 1960s, certain 
government ministries, including the Ministry of Social Affairs, had plans for 
59Constitution of Egypt, 1956. See Preamble and Chapter Two - The Fundamental Values 
of Egyptian Society. 
60Hopkins, op. cit., p. 226. 
6ISharabi,op. cit., p. 482. 
62Such as finding parallels between the Prophet's condemnation of usury and speculation and 
the control of the public sector; Islam's stress on the brotherhood of man and restraint in personal 
consumption and the income-limitation and redistribution; the Koranic duty of Zakat and social 
insurance and the welfare state; and the Islamic emphasis on collectivity and the cooperatives and 
trade unions. See Hopkins, op. cit., p. 246. 
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installing Islamic consultants whose duty would be to find new texts for 01d.63 
As far as the decisions in the income maintenance field were concerned, however, 
the traditional stream in modem Egyptian ideology, concepts and values, appear 
to have had no serious impact so far. 
e. Pertinent socio-economic conditions 
There have been significant changes in various economic 
indicators between 1952 and the early years of the 1960s. Whether anyone 
explicitly attributes the adoption of the various income maintenance measures 
during the period to these changes or not, it is reasonable to assume that they 
entered into the decision parameters of the policy-makers. Table 17 shows the 
changes in six economic indicators. 
Table 17. Selected Economic Indicators, around 1952 and 1960 (UAR) 
1. Index Numbers of Total Product 
(at constant prices, 1963=100) 
2. Index Numbers of Industrial Production 
(1963=100) 
3. Rate of Industrialization 
(contribution to the GNP) 
4. Number of Workers in Shops Hiring More 
Than 10 Persons 
5. Wages in non-agricultural sectors 
(piasters per week) 
6. Unemployment 














Source: UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1964, pp.546-548, and Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 
1969, Vol.lI, International Tables, pp.166-169, for 1; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1970, Table 
51, pp.167-176 for 2; P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, p.311 for 3; H. Hopkins, 
Egypt - The Crucible, p.251 for 4; ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1971, Table 19, p.553 
for 5; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1964, Table 24 and 1970, Table 24, pp.1 06-1 07 for 6. 
The growth of the total product index at an annual average rate of 
about 4.9 was in no way impressive and, in fact, the government had been faced 
with mountin§ debts, both internal and external, during the period of 
consideration.6 But various indices point to an accelerated industrial expansion. 
The index for industrial production rose by nearly five times and its contribution 
to the GNP doubled from 10% in 1952 to 20% in 1962. More significantly, for 
the present discussion, the size of the non-agricultural labor force grew from 
630p. cit., p. 385. 
64The total internal debt increased from $500 million in 1952 to $1.45 billion in 1962-63 and 
between 1960 and 1963 alone, the government's net drawings from external loans totaled $205.6 
million. See The United States Army Area Handbook, op. cit., p. 336. 
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about two million in 1952 to 3.4 million in 196065 . The number of workers in 
establishments employing more than 10 persons alone almost doubled between 
1952 and 1963. Perhaps due to this expansion, unemployment declined from 
4.0% of the total labor force in 1959 to 1.9% in 1964. 
What is significant about the above statistics is that there has been 
an accelerated growth in the industrial sector, by plan, as well as an 
accompanying rise in the industrial labor force over the eight year period of 
1952-1960 when the social security measures for workers were successively 
introduced and revised through stages, as discussed earlier. What is more, this 
development occurred despite not so favorable economic conditions in general 
and government budget situation in particular. 
It may be also noted that the unemployment insurance with its 
enabling provisions was enacted in 1959 when the level of unemployment was 
fairly high (4.9% of the total labor force) and amended to include cash benefits as 
well in 1964 when the level was down (to 1.9%). That the measure was adopted at 
all despite the particular levels of unemployment and even upgraded later is 
highly significant and represents a clear departure from the trends among 
underdeveloped countries where unemployment insurance is for all practical 
purposes unknown. 
Summary 
Absorbing considerably more than 10 percent of the GNP, the UAR's 
income maintenance program is well developed both in the non-occupational and 
occupational sectors. During the period under consideration, the most significant 
steps taken were in the occupational sector. While non-occupational provisions 
such as education and public health also gained over the previous period, much of 
the advance in this area was overtaken by a high rate of population growth. The 
price subsidies which favored the high consumption sector were relegated to a 
minor role during much of the period, but were restored to a substantial level of 
expenditure in the last several years, before presumably being abolished. 
The underlying factors of vanous income maintenance program 
components were as follows, 
1. In the decisions concerning education, health and price subsidies, the 
needs and resource factors impacted directly on the leadership class where the 
latter's orientation and commitment to reform and development predisposed it to 
action (programs) without necessitating pressures from other sources. Public 
demand, in this connection, existed implicitly, but it did not become a political 
65ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1971, Table 2-A, p.58; Vatikiotis, The Modern History 
of Egypt, op. cit., p. 322. 
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pressure because, in this particular area, the leaders' identification with public 
need was optimal, the military regime having come into power at least in part to 
respond to this need in the first place. 
2. The evolution of occupational measures was attributable first and last 
to political requisites of the leadership. As it needed labor support for its 
political legitimization and its pursuit of development objectives, the leadership 
interacted sympathetically with income maintenance needs of the workers. The 
rising industrial labor force and its needs were transmitted directly to the 
leadership to reinforce political requisite factors already in operation. Such a 
direct and effective channeling of labor needs to the leadership was possible again 
because of the latter's political and economic development requisites. 
3. The overall international and external political situation which drove 
the military regime into a coalition with labor and contributed toward radicalizing 
it must also be regarded as an indirect underlying factor of work-related social 
security provisions. 
4. Political requisites of the leadership and its radical outlook had very 
much to do with the choice of the profit-sharing provision for the workers. The 
economic context in which the workers were partners in the decision-making 
processes of business establishments appears to have been significant in relation 
to the principle of profit-sharing. However, this, too, must be regarded a 
secondary factor in that the context itself was determined by the leadership 
requisites and orientation. 
In short, the partnership of existing needs and the leadership orientation 
was present in all decisions concerning either the income maintenance laws 
passed but unenforced by previous governments or the introduction and 
implementation of the new ones during the Nasser period. The interaction 
between the leadership's political and development requisites and pressure groups 
was prominent in association with the development of work-related measures. 
External political factors contributed to the same work-related measures indirectly 
by influencing the leadership orientation. 
CHAPTER VI 
CROSS-NA TIONAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts a substantive overview of the income maintenance 
program types and the factors that have been associated with their evolvements in 
the study group as a whole. In doing so, attention will be first given to the 
classification of the country IMPs according to the four basic models introduced 
in Chapter 3. It may be recalled that Model A is the least developed of the 
model types consisting of underdeveloped non-occupational and occupational 
component sectors. Models Band C are more or less on the same semi-developed 
level, especially in terms of total GNP shares involved (7.7 and 7.8% 
respectively), but differ as to their sector alignments. The best developed model 
type is Model D. In this, the income maintenance program components are 
developed in both sectors. 
Following the classification of IMPs by model types will be a systematic 
evaluation of all the factors presumed to underly the choice of one or another of 
the model types. At this stage, the underlying factors will be treated singly, 
except in the case of some that will be considered jointly for reasons to be 
clarified in due course of the discussion. 
The last part examines the patterns of factor combination as they relate to 
the model types or individual components. A summary at the end includes a 
frequency count as they may be suggestive of relative strengths of individual 
factors and their combination patterns. 
CLASSIFICATION OF INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS BY 
TYPE OF MODEL 
In classifying the income maintenance programs of the study countries by 
the model types, the principal criterion of program evaluation was the level of 
expenditure. But such other criteria as the number and type of components and 
the relative balance between the occupational and non-occupational sectors have 
also been taken into account, particularly where expenditure data was either 
unavailable or ambiguous. 
Table 18 shows each country's IMP in terms of its sector alignment, 
expenditure level, population coverage, developmental ranking, and model types. 
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A program sector was regarded either developed (D) or underdeveloped (UID) 
depending on whether its level of expenditure was above or below the group 
average. For non-occupational sectors of income maintenance programs (N/O), 
the group average was 7.1 % of the GNP while, for occupational sectors (0), the 
average was 2.3% of the GNP. 
Table 18. Evaluation of the IMP by Level of Expenditure & Number of Components 
Country Program Current Number Cost Level of IMP Type 
Sector of Components (% of the GNP) Development 
Bolivia N/O 3 3.8 + PA U/D C 
0 5 4.0 + Commissary D 
Ceylon N/O 4 12.1 D D 
0 4 3.5 +WI S/M* D 
Ghana N/O 3 6.5 UfD A 
0 3 1.0 U/D 
Mauritius N/O 6 6.7 + PH D B 
0 2 1.0 U/D 
Thailand N/O 3 5.5 U/D A 
0 3 UfD 
UAR N/O 5 8.0 D D 
0 6 2.1 D 
...... _-_._ .. _----_._ ..... _ .. _---_ ....... __ ..... _---_.-_ .. _------_ .. _--_ .. __ ... __ . __ ...•...•..•..........•... _ ......... _ ... _ ...•.. _-...........• -_ ..... __ ..... _ ......... __ ... _--_._-----_ .. -
Group average of cost: N/O -- 7.1% of the GNP 
0 -- 2.3% of the GNP 
In Mauritius, GNP share level alone was insufficient to evaluate the non-
occupational sector of its IMP. Specifically, in the years between 1963 and 
1967, the combined expenditure for all non-occupational components represented 
approximately 6.7% of the GNP. This was 0.4% below the group average. The 
sector, however, was regarded D because the expenditure for that sector was 
exclusive of the cost of public health and its components were highly developed, 
consisting of demo grants for the aged and the blind as well as a negative tax type 
family allowance system. 
A similar problem was encountered in the UAR where the occupational 
sector of the IMP took up 2.1 % of the GNP, 0.2% short of the group average 
(2.3%). Here, the sector was ranked D based on the fact that the expenditure 
data were not up-to-date, therefore likely to under-represent the actual level, and 
that they did not include the cash transfers taking place directly between 
employers and employees under the profit-sharing proVISIOn. The 
comprehensiveness of the occupatiop.al components was another compensating 
factor. 
In Ghana, the expenditure level of the non-occupational sector of the IMP 
was short of the group average by 0.6% only, but there was no compensating 
factor to permit a cross-over into the other side of the average. The data was 
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fairly recent so that it could not be regarded as under-representing the actual level 
either, and the component types were not particularly innovative. This was in 
addition to the fact that the percentage gap in this instance was greater than in the 
first two countries. Accordingly, the sector was rated UID. 
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADOPTION OF 
INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MODELS OR COMPONENTS 
a. Per capita income and the IMPMs 
The relationship emerging between the level of per capita income 
and the IMPM was as follows, 
Table 19. Ranking of Study Countries' IMPMs 




United Arab Republic 










The IMPs of Group A encompassed three model types. This bore 
out the impression with which this study began: levels of national resource and 
IMPMs are not necessarily related. The fact that, in Group B, there were as 
many models as there were countries and that the best ranking models (Ds) were 
found in Group A rather than in Group B all seemed to strengthen the assumption 
of an absence of or even a negative association between the two variables. 
This is not to suggest that economic variables as a whole were 
unrelated to the IMPs. There were specific instances in which one or more of 
them were positively associated, which will be duly identified. For the present, 
however, it seems appropriate to consider an overall relationship between per 
capita income level, social indicators, and IMPMs, since it will provide a base 
upon which other findings may be layered. 
b. Per capita income, level of need, and the IMPMs 
Table 20 shows that the distribution of levels of social indicators 
by per capita income and IMPM has no meaningful pattern. The levels of need 
as measured by a combined index of five indicators were both low (L) and very 
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low (VL) for each of the three ranks of models, A, Bore, and D. Since the 
level of per capita income was already found unrelated to model types, this means 
that there is no association among the level of per capita income, the level of 
need, and the model types. 
Table 20. Distribution of the Levels of Social Indicators by Per Capita Income and IMPM 
Social Indicators Model Types of US$137- Model Types of US$209-
157 Per Capita Group 211 Per Capita Group 
A C D D A B 
Calories in daily food supply N.D. - - - - + 
Health Services2 - + + - - + 
Infant Mortalit/ + - + - N.D. -
Adult Uterac/ + - + - - + 
Unemploymene + N.D. - + + -
-ieveiTCiTNeecr-·-----···----··-·----_ ................. _ .... _---------_._--------_ .......................... ----------_ .. -L VL L VL VL L 
N.D. = No data available; + = above group average; - = below; L = low; VL = very low 
1. Above or below caloric needs, as derived from UN, World Economic Survey, 1969/70, Table A.B. 
2. Above or below group average of social indicator levels 
3. Determined by + or - count of social indicators. If + outnumbers -, the level is low. If-
outnumbers +, the level is very low. 
c. Literacy rate and expenditures on education 
The relationship between the literacy rate and the level of public 
expenditure on education was unclear in the study. In three countries where the 
literacy rate was above the group average, the level of expenditure was also above 
average in one and under average in two. In the remaining countries where the 
rate was under average, the level of expenditure was also below average in one 
and above average in two. In other words, the above-average-literacy group 
tended to under-spend, while the below-average-literacy group tended to spend 
more. 








This is an unexpected outcome if the assumption was that an above 
average literacy rate is attained through an above average investment in 
education. As it is, the reasonable interpretation may be that the first group 
under-spends because it no longer needs to spend as much as far as basic 
education is concerned, while the second spends more because it has some 
catching up to do in terms of raising the literacy rate. 
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The relationship between the two variables are just diffuse enough 
to warrant the assumption that in order for it to be effective, literacy rates may 
need to combine strength with other factors. In fact, this was the case in a 
number of countries of the study group, but its discussion will be deferred to the 
section concerning inter-factor relationships. 
d. Level of health service and health expenditure 
In three out of the five countries for which data was available, 
there was a correspondence between the levels of health service (measured by 
physician- and hospital bed-population ratios) and the public expenditures on it. 
In Ghana and Thailand, both the service and expenditure levels were below 
average, while in Ceylon, they were both above average. Of the remaining two 
countries, Bolivia's service level was above average and its expenditure level 
below average. The situation was reversed in the UAR. 








The above might mean that, on the whole, the level of health 
service is a result of the investment made in it, but a poor level of service does not 
necessarily cause governments to make a higher investment to improve it. This 
contrasts with the situation in the education sector. 
A fuller account as to what governments respond to in the health 
field is available in the section concerning inter-factor relationships. 
e. Unemployment 
There were two countries in which the level of unemployment and 
its effects on income maintenance program could be examined. In Mauritius, a 
high level of unemployment, resulting in an inordinate rise in the relief roll, had 
led to the introduction of the family allowance system, a measure designed to 
absorb at least part of the needs arising from the problem. In the UAR, the 
response to unemployment was more direct; i.e. a contributory unemployment 
insurance. It should be noted, however, that, in the latter, the rate of 
unemployment was not at all high. It was short of the study group average of 
1.05% of the total population by 0.3% 
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In the remainder of the countries, there were no measures 
specifically responding to unemployment needs. 
The above would suggest that there is no direct connection 
between the level of unemployment and income protection measures, although 
governments attempt to cope with the problem indirectly either through an overall 
economic policy or such cover-all measures as public assistance. If the case of 
the DAR suggests anything, it may be to the effect that its adoption of 
unemployment insurance was more from preference than from an urgent need 
calling for it, just as the adoption of family allowances in Bolivia might have been 
the same. As far as high unemployment countries such as Ceylon and Mauritius 
were concerned, a likely explanation for the absence of measures specifically 
addressing the problem is that such measures would not only be economically 
impractical, but essentially unproductive in terms of solving the basic problem. 
f. Availability of cash reserves 
Beyond the per capita income-IMPM relationship already 
considered, there were specific instances of cash reserves serving as an underlying 
factor for the development of income maintenance program components. For 
instance, both in Ceylon and Ghana, the availability of post-WW II or post-
colonial cash reserves referred to earlier encouraged and enabled the newly 
independent governments to either implement or project expansion and reform of 
educational programs. Where such reserves were unavailable, introduction of 
some occupational measures was delayed, as in the case of Bolivia. There were 
also indications that the adoption of provident funds in Ceylon and Ghana had 
been due to the government's inability to assume greater financial responsibilities 
which other types of measures, such as social insurance, would require. These 
instances, however, need to be kept in perspective by comparisons with Bolivia 
and the DAR where resources are equally limited but comprehensive social 
security systems were nevertheless adopted. 
g. Wage level 
Among five countries for which wage data were available, low 
level of wage was associated with low level of occupational components in two 
countries. In the remaining three, there was no such association. 
The cross-tabulation on Table 23 is suggestive of an ambiguous 
relationship between the variables. But the fact that, in Mauritius, low wages 
were specifically cited as a reason for not adopting social insurance needs to be 
kept in mind. It is also to be noted that the Mauritian wage level was the lowest 
in the study group. 
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fable 23. Wage Level and the Level of Occupational 
Components 




~ I ... -----t.-.... --+ .. ---~·-····-·--
h. Size ofthe working sector (non-agricultural) 
The number of salaried and wage-earning employees in the non-
agricultural sector proportional to the total population varied from 4.9% in 
Thailand to 14.2% in Mauritius. The group average was 8.9%. In two of the 
three above-average countries, the occupational measures were developed. In 
two of the three below-average countries, they were underdeveloped. If the 
UAR, with its proportion of the non-agricultural sector close to the group average 
at 8.5% and separated from the next low ranking country by 2.7% were to be 
regarded as among the above-average group, then the ratio in that group would 
improve to 3:1, and that in the below-average group to 2:0. 
Although the size of the non-agricultural working sector explicitly 
attributed as an underlying factor of occupational measures was not considered in 
any of the countries examined, the above tabulation would suggest a positive 
relationship between the variables involved. Of the economic variables 
considered so far, the present factor seems one of the strongest in association with 
level of occupational measures. 
1. Variations in the economic context 
Economic context played a significant part in the development of 
income maintenance programs or their components. In Bolivia, it was the 
significance of the mining industry in the overall national economy that had 
contributed to the power of mine workers and thus to the development of its IMP, 
particularly the occupational sector. A similar situation existed in Ceylon. But, 
there, the significant industry was tea-exporting and the group deriving power 
from it was the dock workers of Colombo. The dock workers constituted the 
core of the trade union movement in Ceylon and thus have been influential on 
government decisions concerning income maintenance measures, including rice 
subsidies and the provident fund. 
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In Ceylon and Mauritius, the dualistic economic structure, 
consisting of the estate and non-estate industries, had a definite connection with 
the development of dualistic health service systems. 
In Thailand, it was the economic context characterized by an 
abundance of cultivable land which has contributed to the general indifference of 
the country to statutory and otherwise public-sponsored income maintenance, 
whether in the non-occupational or occupational sector. 
Finally, in the UAR, there was ground for assuming that the choice 
of the profit-sharing provision as an occupational measure was associated with the 
socialistic economic context in which workers took part in the policy-making of 
business establishments. 
J. Trained personnel 
A shortage of trained personnel limited the pursuit of educational, 
health and other policies in a number of countries. In Bolivia, it restricted 
qualitative upgrading of education if not necessarily its quantitative expansion. 
Ceylon's policy of educational expansion suffered due to the limited number of 
trained teachers. In Ghana, there was restrained development of both 
educational and health services and this has been true in both the colonial and 
post-colonial periods. In the case of Mauritius, it was not simply a matter of a 
shortage of medical personnel inhibiting a program involving them, but a desire to 
maximize their service value that led to the reform of public assistance and the 
introduction of family allowances. 
The above illustrations provide ground for assuming that existence 
of trained personnel is a significant factor in program development and policy 
decisions. A cross-tabulation of the level of trained personnel, as measured by 
the number of third level school graduates, and the level of IMP development 
tended to support this assumption. In two of the countries whose numbers of 
graduates per 10,000 inhabitants were above the group average of 34, their IMPs 
were "developed" while in the four below-average countries two had semi-
developed IMPs (B and C) and the remaining two, underdeveloped ones. 
As to the countries whose IMPs were semi-developed despite low 
levels of trained personnel, Bolivia and Mauritius, the situation could be 
explained by the fact that both had access to technical resources from the outside, 
such as the United States and the United Nations in the case of the former and the 
United Kingdom in the case of the latter. In other words, levels of trained 
personnel in those countries were actually higher than can be measured by the 
number of their own third level graduates. This makes the association of the 
level of trained personnel with that of the IMP unequivocal in the study group. 
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k. Technical assistance 
Technical assistance separately contributed to specific measures in 
four of the study countries. In Bolivia, it helped develop health programs as well 
as the technical formulations of social insurance schemes. Its contributions in 
Ceylon and Ghana were similar: it had a major impact on health programs and on 
the formulations of the provident fund systems. In Mauritius, the contribution of 
technical assistance from its metropolitan area was perhaps all pervasive, but 
clearly evident, as far as the available material affords, in the formulation and 
adoption of family allowances. 
l. Socio-cultural and institutional factors 
The strength and impact of socio-cultural and institutional factors 
on the income maintenance program have been unrivaled in Thailand. There, 
the Buddhist religious ·precepts and the patrimonial socio-political structure and 
the Thai behavior traits deriving therefrom inhibited development of public and 
statutory social provisions. The family oriented organization of the industrial 
production units, which may also be related to the patrimonial social structure, 
was an additional factor hindering social security development. 
Considered separately from its religious derivation, patrimonialism 
with its authoritarian and paternalistic approach to problem solution is not unique 
to Thailand. It was present in all the countries considered in one form or 
another. The question then is why it has been such a powerful factor in Thailand 
but not in other countries. One possible answer is the degree of its strength. If 
a way can be found to quantify and measure the variable, it would provide a 
clearer insight into the matter. Even without such data, however, it is not too 
far-fetched to argue that in the study group, Thailand is a country most deeply-
rooted and entrenched in its traditional values. 
One of the obvious explanations may be that, unlike other 
countries in the group, Thailand has never been uprooted or seriously disrupted 
out of its tradition by any external invasion, occupation, or dependency affiliation. 
Another possible answer may be the relative weakness of other factors, such as 
economic necessity and rival political pressures, from either within or without. 
Regarding the last, it was indicated in the country discussion that, in recent years, 
the combined impact of the radical insurgency from within, the threat posed by 
the revolutionary conflict raging just outside its border, and the reform pressure 
from the United States, appears to be changing the direction of development 
policies of the country. It may be argued from this that, should these other 
factors gain strength sufficiently, the socio-cultural and institutional factors may 
wane in their influence vis-a-vis the income maintenance program outcomes. 
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m. Political structure 
Four of the study countries had Republican forms of government. 
One had a monarchy and one was a monarchy-affiliate. The association between 
political structure and the IMPM was diffuse. The Republics were represented 
by the IMPMs A, B, C, and D. In the monarchy and monarchy-affiliate, the 
Models were A and B. Unless consideration is given to the fact that both of the 
developed IMPMs (Ds) were found among the Republics, the political structure-
IMPM relationship would have to be regarded as insignificant. However, their 
existence in only the Republican settings provides grounds for not dismissing the 
possibility of a significant association outright. It may be significant that there 
are differences in the allocation of substantive political and policy-making powers 
and the degree of openness of the policy-making systems, rather than differences 
in the governmental and political organizational structures. 
n. Centralization v. decentralization 
It is difficult to measure the effect of political structure, such as 
centralization versus decentralization, on social policy in general and IMP 
development in particular. Accordingly, this study did not attempt to address the 
problem. Whatever observations are made in this respect therefore have only 
tenuous values. 
One way to roughly differentiate the countries in terms of 
centralization or decentralization was to go by the presence or absence of overt 
polarization in the polity. In Bolivia and Ceylon, the existence of functioning 
Marxist and other radical political parties prevented the governments from 
monopolizing policy-making powers. In the remaining countries, they were 
heavily concentrated in the hands of the ruler or the ruling group. A cross-
tabulation of these differences and the IMPM showed that dispersed political 
power was associated with IMP Models C and D, and concentrated power with A, 
B, and D. In other words, dispersed power was not associated with the 
underdeveloped IMPM (A) at all, whereas concentrated power was associated 
with it in two instances. The concentrated power, however, went with the 
developed IMPMs as well, suggesting the possibility of certain other factors also 
operating in the political context. Since this carries over to the question of inter-
variable relationships, further consideration will be deferred. 
o. Pressure groups 
It is difficult to consider the function of pressure groups in policy-
making separately from the question of political power allocations. It is being 
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discussed separately here because there was a difference in the properties of the 
two variables. That difference was between explicit and implicit functions of 
pressure groups which may and may not force power disbursement. This was 
illustrated in the DAR where organized labor as a pressure group was strong and 
played a decisive role in the power struggle between Naguib and Nasser, but 
subsequently its role has been no longer as a center of independent power but as a 
major and submissive supporter of the ruling leadership. This turned labor into a 
political client to whom the leadership awarded benefits and made concessions 
without necessarily conceding power. Thus, in the DAR, organized labor was a 
pressure group that could dispense with overt pressuring, such a labor unrest and 
strikes. 
Thus, taking the DAR as a country with a viable pressure group, 
the study countries divided themselves in two equal parts in terms of pressure 
group presence or absence. Of the countries with pressure groups, one had a 
semi-developed IMP and two developed IMPs. In the countries without 
significant pressure groups, a semi-developed IMP was present in one instance 
and underdeveloped IMPs in two instances. The pressure group-IMPM 
association was therefore fairly strong. The pattern of association remained the 
same when the pressure group was related to occupational components only. 
Civil service as an implicit pressure group was important in 
relation to provisions for public employees in all the countries studied. Civil 
service is clearly capable of powerful political pressure. This is partly because 
of the tradition of privilege accorded government bureaucracy and partly because 
its members are valuable to government leaders, not only in terms of their 
bureaucratic functions but also from the fact that they are often members of 
influential socio-political strata. 
p. Ideology 
Ideology divided the study group in the same way as did pressure 
groups, whether it was Marxism or radical nationalism such as Sinhalese 
nationalism in Ceylon. Its pattern of association with IMPM was identical. 
This was to be expected because in the study group radical ideology and pressure 
groups were inter-dependent variables, as shall be seen. 
q. Leadership orientation 
Overall, ideological and/or value orientations of the political 
leaders and leadership groups in the study have not been as varied as they might 
have been. They represented reformist or socialist outlooks with modernization 
or development objectives on one hand, and traditional outlooks (patrimonial ism) 
with or without modernization objectives on the other. The first type of 
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orientation was associated with IMP Models A, C, and two Ds, and the last with 
A and B. This association was suggestive of a positive relationship between the 
first type of orientation and better developed IMPs. The existence of an 
underdeveloped IMP in association with the same orientation indicates that a 
progressive leadership orientation is not a guarantee for equally progressive 
income maintenance policies and programs. It may be hypothesized in this 
regard that the outcome is likely to depend on the degree of leadership 
commitment to professed ideologies and values, as well as on other factors in the 
policy-making environment. 
In the one instance, Ghana, there was reason to believe that the 
leader's professed adherence to socialism was on a rhetorical rather than a 
practical level; therefore, his commitment was not substantial. If this can be 
accepted, then the leadership orientation-IMPM association, given the degree of 
commitment, would be stronger than is apparent in the study. 
The significance of leadership orientation in association with the 
IMP is even clearer from another perspective. In four countries, the introduction 
of new IMPCs and significant revisions in old ones occurred subsequent to 
leadership changeovers. In a fifth country, Thailand, there were at least two 
periods, around 1932 and 1954, when the introduction, or an attempt at it, of 
highly significant socio-economic policies and fairly comprehensive social 
security measures, respectively, followed leadership change-overs. Both 
attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, however, because they were either rejected 
at the outset or abrogated later by a different government. That said, the mere 
fact that these were attempted at all by a few specific leaders despite a long 
tradition to the contrary seems to support the point in question. 
r. Requisites of power 
Denoting various requirements for attammg or remammg in 
political power, this factor motivated all leaders and leadership groups of the 
study countries in their decisions concerning income maintenance programs. In 
Bolivia, the nation's entire economic policies, including nationalization of mines 
and land redistribution, and policies concerning social security have been largely 
determined by the leadership's need to stay viable politically. It was out of this 
need that the Paz government acceded to the demands of labor and the radical left 
and adopted the said policies and measures. In Ceylon, similar political 
necessities led to the launching of Sri Lanka's Freedom Party career on a coalition 
with Marxist parties and thus to the adoption of the socialist policy stance to begin 
with, and, later, caused the Banadaranaike government to back down on its rice 
subsidy cut-back proposal. 
In Ghana, adoptions of the Accelerated Education Plan, the 
curative emphasis in health programs and the provident fund, when it was finally 
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adopted, were variously connected with the leader's political and developmental 
purposes, and to quell increasing labor unrest. In Mauritius, it was not so much 
political necessity on the part of the colonial government and the bureaucracy to 
appease the public, but a desire not to go against the interest of the powerful sugar . 
industry, particularly the estate owners, that influenced policy decisions. 
The case of Thailand is similar to that of Mauritius. There, too, 
the ruling elite and the ruling class made decisions concerning social provisions 
according to what are required for maintaining the status quo on the basis of 
traditional values. In the UAR, it was Nasser's need to find a power base after 
having failed to secure it in the old establishment that obliged him to tum to labor 
internally and to the socialist bloc externally, with far-reaching consequences on 
social policy. 
Thus, the significance of power requisites in association with the 
IMP was as great as it can be within the limits of this study. 
s. Colonial influence 
Three of the study countries, Ceylon, Ghana and Mauritius, were 
formerly under the British colonial administration. The UAR was a protectorate 
of the same until 1921 and continued in varying degrees of voluntary and 
involuntary dependency statuses long after. It was not until after the 
confrontation of 1956 (the Suez War) that the dependency tie was dissolved. 
In Mauritius, colonial influence had been the predominant factor in 
the evolution of its IMP because it took place largely under the colonial 
administration. Its effect seems to have been particularly strong on education. 
Interestingly, the British rule had its strongest impact on education in other 
countries as well, particularly Ceylon and Ghana. In the UAR, indications are 
that its effects have been erased by the impact ofthe Nasser regime. 
The colonial impact was both positive and negative. In all the 
countries concerned, modem education was introduced and evolved to a 
significant degree by the colonial government, but its legacies in terms of 
program scope and relevance to existing educational needs were far from 
adequate. In Ceylon and Mauritius, the civil service-oriented educational 
approach, growing out of the colonial context, seemed to hinder adjustments of 
educational objectives and program contents to existing needs. 
t. Foreign aid 
Foreign aid often went with technical assistance and was a factor 
in the advancement of education and health services in Bolivia, Ceylon, Ghana, 
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and Thailand. However, apart from the way it affected the IMP or the IMPC in 
conjunction with technical assistance, which was discussed earlier, this variable 
was not explored separately because available data was highly selective and 
uneven between countries. For Bolivia, such data for a certain period was fairly 
complete but for other countries, such as Thailand, Ceylon, and the UAR, only 
fragmentary information was in view. Even if more information was obtainable, 
it was doubtful that an assessment of its relationship to the IMP can actually be 
made without explicit and full information as to the context in which the aid was 
provided. 
In two instances, in which such information was available to a 
limited degree, Bolivia and Thailand, foreign aid served to restrain radical policy 
impulse in one and to encourage reform in the other. 
FACTOR COMBINA nONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADOPTION OF 
INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAM MODELS OR COMPONENTS 
To make the following discussion intelligible, a number of 
clarifications are necessary at this point. First of all, unlike the foregoing section 
in which all the factors assumed to underlie either the IMP and/or IMPC decisions 
at the beginning of the study were reviewed, this section considers only those 
factors which were actually associated with such decisions. 
Secondly, as a way to simplify both the analysis and presentation of 
inter-factor relationships, it was decided to treat the factors of needs and resources 
as constants, thus dispensing with their separate and repeated inclusions in the 
relationships. This procedure is consistent with their roles in social policy-making 
in general and in the development of income maintenance programs in the study 
countries in particular. With rare exceptions when they either predominate or 
co-dominate policy decisions, the factors of needs and resources jointly serve as 
an ever present, if fluid, reference point for policy-makers, but not necessarily as 
decisive underlying factors. This was particularly so in the study group which 
was controlled by a fairly narrow range of per capita income to begin with, and in 
which needs are equally staggering in all the countries concerned, granting some 
insignificant variations in degree. The exceptional situations, however, will be 
separately delineated. 
The rest of the underlying factors were found in the study group in 
four patterns of relationships: inter-dependence, dependence, co-existence, and 
isolation. In association with a certain IMPM or IMPC, these patterns of 
relationships were not mutually exclusive. At times, two or more patterns 
influenced a single IMPC. But in the following, the relationships will be 
examined as separate units as much as possible, that is, within the bounds of 
certain organic linkages that exist between certain types of relational patterns 
which will become evident shortly. 
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1. Interdependence of Pressure Groups and Requisites of Power in 
Relation to IMPMs and/or IMPCs 
The most frequently occurring relationship was between pressure 
group demands and acquiescence by the political leadership out of political 
necessity. This was not necessarily an open-and-shut relationship in all the 
countries or even within one country. It had differential characteristics 
depending on whether the demand/pressure group factors were of a general nature 
(involving the public at large) or sector-specific (involving specific interest 
group(s)), and whether the demand/pressure group factors were explicit or 
implicit in making their views felt. 
The full extent to which these differentials may be significant 
cannot be known within the limits of this study. However, the differential of 
scope (general or specific) was meaningful in that the areas of needs represented 
by pressure groups and the areas of needs actually met by the leadership 
coincided in all instances where the factor combination under consideration 
applied. This was the case in all but one country, Thailand, where neither 
specific demands nor pressure groups were present. In Bolivia, where the 
predominant pressure group during the period studied was organized labor, it was 
the demands of this group, whether in the area of broad national policies or in that 
of labor legislation, that were responded to. In addition, it was the working sector 
represented by the same group, particularly the powerful miners, which received a 
greater share of the national revenue in terms of immediate benefits. 
In Ceylon, where a wide coalition of pressure groups joined in 
protesting the reduction of rice subsidies, it was this universal measure that was 
retained. Later, when the labor unions created pressure for social security, the 
result was a provident fund law .. The same pattern could be seen in Ghana and 
the UAR, and to a lesser degree in Mauritius where a muted labor demand for 
social security, particularly provisions for retirement and unemployment, obtained 
an indirect response in the forms of non-contributory old age pensions and the 
family allowances. This differential comparison indicates that the strength of 
pressure groups is an effective factor on income maintenance program 
development. 
As for the significance of distinguishing explicit pressure groups 
from implicit ones, this study was not equipped to examine its tangible effects on 
either the level or the type of benefits involved. The fact that there was a 
difference and that both types of groups brought about results poses an interesting 
problem. That is, if both types are indeed more or less equally effective and it 
can be assumed that there is some degree of waste involved in militant forms of 
pressure group action, then the former may be regarded preferable, at least to the 
relevant population sector. If so, an exploration into the conditions in which 
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such (implicit) group pressure can be effective may be useful, although not in the 
context of the present study. 
2. Interdependence of Pressure Group and Radical Polity Factors in 
Relation to IMPMs and IMPCs 
In four of the five countries where pressure groups existed, they did 
so in a generally radical political climate. The one exception was Mauritius. 
These factors are regarded as inter-dependent rather than coexistent or one 
dependent on the other based in part on the illustration provided by the 
exceptional context. In it, labor as a pressure group was muted because the 
traditional political context was able to counter its pressure. The consequence 
was that labor's demand for social security largely went unheeded although some 
of the needs stemming from low wages and high unemployment were met 
indirectly by way of old age and family allowances. In other words, there is 
reason to assume that the pressure group was ineffective without the support of a 
sympathetic polity. An illustration of much greater influence and activism was 
provided in Bolivia where a strong and radical labor movement was able to 
transform the polity at large by first radicalizing the political leadership, at least in 
its policy pledges, and then bringing the agrarian sector into its revolutionary 
movement. 
The above illustrations indicate that, in the study group, the two 
factors under consideration tended to reinforce one another. As for the effect of 
this particular relationship, the study finding indicates that it depends on which 
particular pressure group in a given political setting is asking for what. In 
Bolivia and Ceylon, it affected the development of their respective IMPs as a 
whole. In the UAR, it was effective mostly in relation to occupational measures. 
In Ghana, it was primarily in relation to education. It was not the relationship 
per se, in other words, but what it was aimed at that made the difference. 
There were a number of factors which contributed to the formation 
of pressure groups or a radicalization of polity, or both, but were without 
independent functions in relation to the IMPs or the IMPCs. For the sake of 
completing a relational pattern, these will be reviewed at this point. 
3. Interdependence of Socio-Cultural Values, Leadership 
Orientation and Power Requisites 
In the case of Thailand alone, these factors had to be regarded as 
interdependent because they reinforced one another in producing a general 
disinterest in public or statuary social provisions. At no serious risk of over-
simplification, it can be stated that Thai religious precepts and cultural values has 
an enormous influence.Their emphases on the salvation of the soul at the expense 
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of "this worldly" needs of the body, the power of meditation and ritual rather than 
that of grappling with tangible reality, and individual responsibility for solving 
one's own problems, served as powerful brakes on change. Their attribution of a 
priori morality and virtue to those in authority and power was fundamentally 
responsible for the apathy of the populace toward public or collective social 
provIsIons. This religiously and culturally conditioned passivity on the part of 
the populace suited very well the political requirements of the ruling elite or the 
ruling class at large, predisposed as they were to maintaining the status quo which 
enabled them to continue in their privileged position. They therefore encouraged 
and supported the existing religious precepts and cultural values by meticulously 
adhering to them. It was a case of "form over substance". 
4. Dependence of General Pressure Groups (the Public) on 
Development Impulse and Radical Ideology 
The world-wide resurgence of idealism and humanistic values in 
the first decade or so of the post-World War II period had profound effects on the 
peoples of many underdeveloped countries. Among other things, it persuaded 
them that certain fundamental social changes and changes in their living 
conditions hitherto characterized by unmitigated poverty may actually be 
achievable, and so moved them to desire and make efforts to realize the 
possibilities, or at least to share in the fruits of such efforts. As far as the 
masses were concerned, these trends manifested themselves in specific 
expectations such as better educational opportunities, better employment 
conditions, and greater responsibility on the part of the national leadership for 
providing the basic necessities of life. In at least four of the study countries, a 
combination of these trends which, for want of a better phrase, will be termed 
"development impulse", provided the fertile soil needed for the growth of 
organized pressure groups. 
More focused ideologies such as Marxism, Communism, and 
radical nationalism operated in a climate imbued with such impulses to stimulate 
less generalized pressure group formations. 
The effects of this particular dependency relationship on the 
IMPMs or the IMPCs are identical with those of the inter-dependent relationship 
between pressure groups and power requisite factors. The assumption here is that 
development impulses and radical ideology have no independent functions 
outside the relational context under consideration as far as they pertain to the 
IMPMs or the IMPCs. 
5. Dependence of Pressure Groups (Labor) on Radical Ideology, 
Role in Economy, Status in Political Coalition, 
Large Union Membership and Possession of Arms 
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In Bolivia and Ceylon where organized labor was a militant pressure 
group, it was closely affiliated with Marxist and Communist parties and therefore 
strongly under the influence of their ideologies. In the latter country in which 
the Sinhalese majority was also a militant pressure group, its radical nationalism 
was an additional influence on certain segments of labor. 
Marxist and socialist ideologies were present in Ghana and the UAR 
also, but they had no direct impact on organized labor. These ideologies were 
espoused in the said countries primarily by the political leadership and, in the case 
of the UAR, the leader's ideological stance had the effect of supporting the status 
of labor as it translated itself into socialist policies in the economic and political 
fields in which labor, as well as the rural masses, was given important roles to 
play. This was not the case in Ghana where the leader's espousal of socialism 
was regarded as not being substantive, as indicated earlier. Radical ideology, in 
other words, has been directly or indirectly contributory to the strength of labor as 
a pressure group in three of the study countries. 
Whether or not the workers constituting a pressure group collectively 
played any key role in the overall national economy was highly significant in 
determining the latter's strength and effectiveness vis-a-vis the IMPMs or the 
IMPCs. This was pointed out in the previous section as part of the discussion on 
economic context that affects income maintenance program developments. To 
reiterate briefly, Bolivian labor was strong as a pressure group during the Paz 
government (1952-56) because it consisted of workers in the mining industry 
which was, and still is, the most important sector of the Bolivian economy. 
Ceylonese labor was strong because it included a large number of dock workers 
who perform an essential function for the country's tea-export industry.I In the 
UAR, it was the imperative of industrialization and development felt by the 
political leadership that had made Egyptian labor essential in the national 
economy and gave it strength as a pressure group. 
The Ghanaian and Mauritian workers also performed some essential 
functions in the cocoa and sugar export industries respectively. But the power of 
this factor alone was insufficient to give them leverage as a pressure group. 
They needed the same supportive factors that their counterparts in other countries 
had, namely a sympathetic leadership group and/or a polity generally allied with 
their cause. Lacking these, the workers of Ghana and Mauritius, despite their roles 
in essential industries, exerted only minor influences on the IMPM or IMPC 
outcomes. In Mauritius, the situation was worse because of a number of 
countervailing factors, such as the existence of a powerful rival pressure group 
and a high rate of unemployment which placed the workers more or less under the 
mercy of the rival group, i.e. the estate owners. 
As for Thailand, it was indicated that the industrial wage-earners are 
without status in that country for more than one reason. First, there was the 
tradition of agrarian primacy which disposes ethnic Thais to disdain occupations 
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in the industrial and commercial sectors. As a consequence, the entire salaried and 
wage employee population in the private sector consists of ethnic minorities, 
mostly the Chinese. This contributed to further lowering the relative social 
and power position of urban workers. 
The size of trade union membership was an important factor impacting 
the relative strength of labor as a pressure group. In two of the countries where 
organized labor was strong, the union membership was large numerically, if not 
always as a proportion of the total labor force. During 1956-58, the union 
membership in the UAR was around 450,000. It is not clear what proportion of 
the urban wage-earners this represented in that period; presumably it was 
relatively small. By 1965, the membership had reached approximately 75% of 
the workers engaged in textile, paper, petroleum, and steel industries and 
commerce.) The situation in Ceylon was even more favorable. In 1958, the 
year of enactment of the provident fund, the union membership in the non-estate 
industries numbered 730,178 or close to 80% of all non-agricultural salaried 
employees and wage earners (see Table 9). Data concerning the membership of 
Bolivian trade unions was unavailable, but there is every reason to assume that it 
consisted of a vast majority of the wage-earning sector. 
In two of the countries where organized labor was weak as a pressure 
group, union membership as a proportion of the relevant working sector fell far 
below the level of the above countries. In Ghana, the total membership at the end 
of 1957, two years before the enactment of the provident fund, was 86,923 or 
about 31 % of the total employees in the non-agricultural sector, as indicated in the 
country discussion. The membership of the Mauritian employees unions and the 
government servants totaled only 36,206 or 23% of the relevant population in 
1962.2 Data was unavailable for Thailand, but it is safe to assume, for reasons 
detailed in the country discussion, that there is no significant labor movement or 
organization as such in that country. 
In the same three countries in which labor was strong as pressure groups, 
it played vital roles such as ushering in a government or bringing certain political 
leadership to power. Without the drive and muscle power of labor, Bolivia's 
MNR would not have succeeded in the revolution of 1952. The Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party was able to replace the UNP only in coalition with the Trotskyite 
parties, for which a significant segment of the organized labor was an active 
arm.In the Nasser-Naguib political show-down of the mid 1950s, the former owed 
his victory to the support of labor to a significant degree. In short, labor 
delivered the additional votes needed to form winning political coalitions. Labor 
IAbdel-Malek,op. cit., p. 135; Vatikiotis, Modern History o/Egypt, p.401; Hopkins, op. cit., 
p.357. 
2Annual Report o/the Ministry o/Labor and Social Security, 1963, Vol. n, Government 
Printer, Mauritius, Appendix III, pp. 16-18. 
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organizations continued to play important roles in the countries cited as long as 
the governments in question remained in power. 
Arms in the possession of the Bolivian labor movement at the time of the 
revolution and subsequently was a most tangible source of power for that group, 
which the latter was not averse to using in order to have their demands, including 
social security, met. This factor, however, was not operative in other countries. 
Thus, it was not always all of the factors cited together that contributed to 
pressure group strengths. However, the first four were consistently present in 
the three countries with strong pressure groups. 
6. Dependence of Pressure Groups (Civil Service) on Technical 
Expertise, Bureaucratic Functions, Traditional Privilege Factors 
The implicit but powerful nature of civil service as a pressure group and 
its dependence for strength on administrative and technical know-how, the 
performance of other bureaucratic functions useful to government leaders, and the 
socio-cultural and colonial traditions of bureaucratic privilege have been 
discussed in the previous section. It may be noted that an additional factor 
included in that part of the discussion has been excluded in the present context: 
the factor of civil service affiliation to influential socio-political strata of society. 
This factor is excluded because, while it is often present in the circumstance of 
civil-service as a pressure group and adds to the group's strength, it cannot be 
regarded a nuclei of factors that give civil service its unique position. 
In the five countries where civil service enjoyed comparatively high 
levels of social security benefits, i.e. Ceylon, Ghana, Mauritius, Thailand, and the 
UAR, all three factors appeared to contribute to the strength of civil service as a 
pressure group. This was particularly clear in the first four countries. The civil 
service factor seemed insignificant in Bolivia where there was no special or 
separate system of social security for public employees. 
7. Dependence of Radical Polity on Development Impulse, 
Radical Ideology and Progressive Leadership 
Those factors that went into developing a pressure group also went into 
making a radical polity. A progressive leadership was an additional contributing 
factor to the latter. In Bolivia, Ceylon, UAR, and, to a lesser degree, in Ghana, 
the coming into power of leaders determined, or at least willing, to break from 
tradition and bring about social change had the effect of transforming the 
countries' overall political climate. This could be seen most clearly in the case 
of the UAR where, during most of the period examined, overt pressure group 
activities such as those of the leftists and extreme nationalists had been 
166 
suppressed, and the transformation of the national context from 
feudalism/capitalism to socialism had been wrought primarily by the leadership 
which itself underwent a gradual transformation in orientation. In the other 
countries, the leadership contribution to the radicalization of polity was less 
dramatic. 
8. Dependence of Economic Organization on Socio-Cultural 
Values & Ethnic Bias 
Again in Thailand alone, economic organization, including the industrial 
production unit, was greatly influenced by a combination of socio-cultural values 
and ethnic bias. A disdain on the part of the ethnic Thai vis-it-vis mercantilism 
and purely cash based employment resulted in a private sector almost entirely 
composed of ethnic Chinese and other minority members who were barred from 
primary occupations such as government service, land ownership and farming, 
and the priesthood. Even in the public sector of industry, salaried and wage-
earning employees were minority group members. This ethnic factor in the 
organization of the Thai economy and in the composition of the wage-earning 
sector worked against the development of occupational measures in the country. 
The organization of the industrial production unit, which is usually small 
and family oriented, was due to a strong sense of family and kinship ties which 
still prevails in the country. 
In Thailand, and no where else in the study group, the above patterns of 
inter-factor relationships had paramount influences in the development of income 
maintenance policies and programs. 
9. Dependence of Economic Context on Leadership Orientation 
and Pressure Groups 
In Bolivia, the political leadership interested in nationalizing resources 
and organized labor and other groups on the left demanding economic 
reorganization along the lines of a socialist model jointly brought about a drastic 
change in the country's economy. That change, in tum, strengthened labor's 
position as a pressure group and affected the development of social security in the 
occupational sector. In the UAR, it was primarily the leadership which had seen 
fit to transform the economy into state capitalism, but the consequence, as far as 
income maintenance program was concerned, was the same. The new economic 
context, by requiring greater roles from labor, such as partnership in 
business/industrial management and as a source of manpower, raised the latter's 
status and thus its strength as an implicit pressure group.This, in tum, contributed 
to the adoption of a comprehensive social insurance system and the introduction 
of the profit-sharing measure. 
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The case of Ceylon is interesting in the same regard. The necessary 
ingredients for bringing about a radical change in the economic context were all 
there: Bandaranaike's coalition government was in fact pledged to nationalizing 
the economy, including the estate sector, and the coalition on the left actively 
sought to have the pledge redeemed. However, the economy was not 
nationalized during the period studied, at least not in the estate and foreign-owned 
business sectors. The reasons, which were largely economic, need not concern 
the present discussion in their entirety. The fact that is of concern is that in 
Ceylon, the ferments to change the economic context existed but did not actually 
effect the change. This was so because the ferments were comparatively weak, 
particularly as far as the leadership commitment toward economic nationalization 
was concerned, while countervailing factors were relatively strong. 
In short, the existence of the particular pattern of factor combination 
under consideration did not automatically lead to a radical change in the economic 
context so as to favor one pressure group or another with one type or another of 
IMP measures. 
10. Composite of Needs: Changing Family Structure, Population 
Growth, Unemployment, Administrative and Technical Problems 
In the study group, Mauritius was one country where decisions 
concerning income maintenance programs were to a significant degree 
determined by pressures of needs, per se. The introduction of the non-
contributory old age and blind pensions was in response to needs stemming from 
a changing family structure and the resultant loss of family functions of caring for 
the aged, as well as to the technical problem of applying a means-test equitably. 
The family allowances, which were targeted to non-taxpaying families with three 
children, were designed to meet various problems connected with a rapid rate of 
population growth and high unemployment. Specifically, they were designed to 
eliminate administrative obstacles to problem-solving found under the jurisdiction 
of the welfare department. 
11. Coexistence of Needs & Expert Recommendation Factors 
The introduction of the family allowances in Mauritius was not an 
automatic response to existing needs. It was also a response to specific expert 
recommendations. Based on a careful analysis of existing problems and available 
resources, Titmuss and Abdel-Smith made it clear that the particular measure, a 
modified negative tax system, covering three child-families only, could best 
address some of the urgent problems, such as population explosion and 
safeguarding the children's health.!t was felt this would lead to safeguarding the 
general health condition of the future labor force as well, and counter some of the 
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immediate effects of chronic unemployment. The colonial government of 
Mauritius had seen fit to act upon this particular recommendation. 
In thus pointing out the coexistence of needs and expert recommendation 
factors in association with a non-occupational component, it should be recalled 
that in the same policy-making context, other recommendations by the same 
expert team, including wide-ranging schemes of contributory social insurance, 
had not been adopted. This suggests an intervention of other factors in the 
policy-making environment. The weakness of labor as a pressure group, an 
absence of commitment on the part of the government authority, the 
predominance of the sugar industry whose interest runs counter to that of labor, 
and low wages, were likely the major factors. It was also pointed out in the 
country discussion that the Mauritian income maintenance program has tended to 
evolve in response to one type or another of manifest needs and demands, and to 
do so in such a way so as not to result in any direct benefit system for the 
workers. This again suggests the significance of the pressure group factor. 
12. Coexistence of Leadership Orientation and Technical 
Assistance/Foreign Aid Factors 
In the years following the Bolivian revolution of 1952, the above two 
factors worked together to advance education and health services of the country. 
More specifically, when the revolutionary policies of the first MNR government 
made it impossible for the United States, Bolivia's primary source of foreign aid 
and technical assistance, to continue in its customary role, the U.S. diverted its 
financial and technical resources to the education and health fields because 
activities in those areas were politically less controversial. Bolivia's health 
service appears to have particularly benefited from this circumstance. 
13. Coexistence of Leadership Orientation, Technical Assistance/ 
Foreign Aid and Economic Context Factors 
In Ceylon, a dualistic economic system (estate and non-estate) had a 
direct bearing on the development of the dualistic health service system. The 
leadership orientation and foreign aid factors contributed to the expansion and up-
grading of the services concerned. 
14. Coexistence of Colonial Influence, Public Demands (Pressure 
Groups), Leadership Orientation and Resource Factors 
All the above factors were already discussed individually. What needs 
to be pointed out about them here is the fact that in the development of 
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educational policies and programs in both Ceylon and Ghana, these factors acted 
together in influencing its course over a period of time. 
15. Coexistence of Resource and Technical Assistance Factors 
In the countries where technical assistance teams actively participated in 
the formulation and implementation of occupational measures, the teams 
generally had restraining effects on program development. This was because the 
team experts, being third parties, could be more objective and therefore better able 
to take into account the resource conditions of the countries concerned. There 
were reasons to assume that the choice of provident fund systems rather than 
social insurance measures as the preferred model of social security in Ceylon and 
Ghana was due to the combination of those factors. A delay in the introduction of 
social insurance in Bolivia also resulted from the same factor combination. 
SUMMARY 
The findings of the foregoing cross-national analysis may be summarized 
as follows, 
1. The decisions concerning income maintenance programs have most 
frequently been influenced by political factors. The presence or absence of 
pressure groups, a radical polity, and radical ideologies, on one hand, and the 
orientation of political leadership and its requisites of power, on the other, 
variously combined to affect all income maintenance program outcomes in the 
study group. Ofthe political variables, pressure group and leadership orientation 
factors often combined with certain non-political factors, such as resource and 
technical assistance factors, to influence the development of income maintenance 
programs or their components further. 
2. Economic factors were also significant in the development of income 
maintenance programs or their components. In most instances, their significance 
was of a secondary nature. For example, the availability of cash reserves 
provided an impetus for promoting education and health services in a number of 
countries where the desire or the will to do so already existed, but the absence of 
reserves did not prevent introductions of measures when they were called for by 
other factors in the policy-making context. Other economic variables such as the 
size of the wage-earning sector, the wage level, and the economic organization 
were either actually found or could be inferred from the data to be associated with 
the development or the underdevelopment of a number of occupational 
components. 
3. External factors such as colonial influence and foreign aid/technical 
assistance were significant in a number of countries. In Mauritius, which was 
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under the British rule during the period examined, the colonial factor was 
significant in connection with the overall income maintenance program 
development of that country. In the former colonial countries of Ceylon and 
Ghana, the colonial influence was visible in the areas of education, health service 
and provisions for public employees. The foreign aid technical assistance factor 
was also influential in education and health fields and in connection with 
technical formulations of social security schemes. The countries most affected 
by these external factors were Bolivia, Ceylon, and Ghana. Thailand was 
another country affected by the same factors, but it was primarily in the field of 
basic education. 
4. While factors of need served as reference points for all social policy 
makers, they played particularly important parts in Mauritius where an expert 
team was able to translate needs into specific program recommendations. The 
needs in question were those stemming from a rapid population growth, a high 
unemployment rate, the generally poor health condition of the population, the 
breakdown of the traditional family system, and certain administrative problems 
of coping with such needs. 
5. In one context only, religious precepts, socio-cultural values, and 
geographic isolation acted singly in relation to a few specific components. For 
the most part, however, the underlying factors functioned in varying combinations 
in influencing income maintenance program outcomes. 
The implications of the above findings as they relate to existing theories 
and hypotheses on the subject matter are various and are of some consequence. 
Since their discussion overlaps with the evaluation of this study's working 
conceptual model (presented in Chapter III) and its reformulation based on the 
foregoing analyses, however, it will be deferred to the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
It may be recalled that the working conceptual model with which this 
study began took into consideration one overriding proposition and two subsidiary 
ones. The overriding one consisted of a systems concept deriving primarily 
from the idea of the society as a problem-solving organism in which solutions for 
social problems were assumed to evolve from interaction among all component 
parts of the system, and not from the function(s) of one or more of the system 
components. The subsidiary propositions included a rational decision-making 
criterion based on factors of need, resources, efficiency, and other objective 
variables as well as an institutional criterion which gave prominence to the 
interaction between individual and institutional requirements. 
The propositions were drawn from a number of theories and concepts of 
public policy decision-making. To cite without elaboration, the theories and 
concepts included the Pareto criterion and related concepts, the role theory, the 
elite theory, the political self-interest theory, the organizational theory, notions on 
values and value commitments, ideology, culture, leadership orientation, power 
requisites, colonial influence and other external factors. 
The question at this point is how does the findings of this study relate to 
those theories and notions? 
EMERGING TRENDS 
To the extent that they are valid, the study findings support a concept of 
social policy determination in which political factors are predominant. In this 
study, it was above all the interdependence between pressure group roles and 
power requisites of the political leadership groups that was crucial in relation to 
either the development or underdevelopment of income maintenance programs. 
Other political factors, such as radical ideology, radical polity, development 
impulse, leadership orientation and commitment, status in political coalition, etc., 
were also highly significant as they influenced the development of pressure 
groups, relative to the strength of the power requisites of the leadership groups. 
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A combination of leadership orientation and pressure group factors was 
found to be effective in a number of countries in transforming economic contexts 
in favor of organized labor and, thus, contributed to the development of 
occupational measures in those countries. Leadership orientation was also 
significant together with national resource and technical assistance factors as 
those factors jointly promoted developments in the educational, health and social 
security fields. 
There were a number of less dominant, non-political trends influencing 
social policy which also emerged from the study. The first trend related to 
economic factors. To the extent that the availability or non-availability of cash 
reserves furthered or retarded the development of an income maintenance 
program, or one of its components, the function of that particular factor was 
significant and appeared to support an economic determinism. But in the sense 
that economic factors did not affect fundamental decisions as to whether a 
program should be introduced or not, but only as to how, how much, and when it 
should be introduced, the significance of the factor was secondary in the study. 
The importance of other economic factors such as wage levels and size of the 
wage-earning sector could only be inferred from the study findings. Indications 
were that they are positively associated with the development of work-related 
social security measures. 
No relationship could be found between the two variables of the level of 
economy, as measured by per capita income, and that of the income maintenance 
program. 
The findings concerning economic factors in relation to income 
maintenance program development indicate that the hypothesis of economic 
determinism may not be completely valid. In terms of l:! positive correlation 
between the level of either economy or resources and the level of program 
development, they were not generally valid although certain specific aspects were 
valid. Attempts to explain the data in dominant economic terms seems 
particularly limited in the context of the underdeveloped countries. It may be 
recalled that the Cutright study found a loose correlation between the level of the 
economy as measured by an index of energy consumption and a social security 
program index. He indicated, however, that within a limited range of economic 
levels such as the highly developed context, the correlation disappeared. Despite 
this finding, he hypothesized that in an undeveloped context, the level of the 
social security program index is likely to reflect the increments of economic 
growth. However, the findings of the present study do not support his 
hypothesis. 
Certain factors of need included in the study brought out no basic pattern 
of association with the development of income maintenance programs. There 
was only one country in which needs factors played a more definite part in 
connection with income maintenance program decisions, albeit with the 
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intercession of an expert team. In other settings, needs factors were seldom the 
most immediately underlying factors in program development. 
It is not clear whether the findings concerning an exceptional setting, such 
as Mauritius, provide ground for a separate hypothetical formulation. If it is 
correct that needs factors played a more significant part in Mauritius than in other 
countries, then it is possible to offer as an explanation the relative stability of 
contextual factors, be they economic, political or social in nature. Having been 
under British rule throughout this study period, Mauritius was not subject to the 
kind of political upheaval and instability that other countries in the study endured. 
In Mauritius, therefore, those factors which have been most active vis-a-vis 
income maintenance program development in other countries, i.e. political 
factors, remained quiescent and allowed the factors of need, which in other 
countries had secondary importance at best, to play more prominent a role. 
In connection with the Mauritian situation, it is tempting to hypothesize 
that in policy environments characterized by stability, regardless of how the 
stability may have been attained, social policy decisions are more need-oriented 
or rational. This may be a valid hypothesis as far as it goes. However, even in 
the need-oriented policy making situation of Mauritius, the real controlling factors 
were political. The alliance between the traditional forces, i.e. the colonial 
government and the sugar interests, was paramount in underpinning the socio-
political stability of Mauritius. In other words, even in the seemingly 
exceptional situation of needs-orientation, the controlling factors have been 
political ones. Thus, the hypothesis of need determination in situations of 
political stability should at best be regarded an elaboration of political 
determinism. 
If the above line of argument can be accepted, one of the questions that 
this study has raised regarding the possible difference between the factors 
underlying the "mutation" model of income maintenance program development 
and those underlying the "evolutionary" model of the same (see Chapter IV, p.47) 
may be answered. 
Basically, both models are influenced by the same factors. What 
distinguished the Mauritian situation from the others was the stability of the 
political factors in relation to other factors and it was this fact that made a gradual, 
rather than a sudden, development of income maintenance measures possible. 
Examples of Ceylon and Ghana provide support to this line of interpretation. In 
both countries, during the colonial rule, the income maintenance program 
development, particularly education and health services, was determined largely 
by need and resource factors. The reason was again the colonial control over 
these territories that served as a constant and held political factors stable. As soon 
as the constant came under challenge, as it was in Ghana during the several years 
prior to self-government, many of the decisions of the colonial government, 
including those pertaining to social provisions, were affected by political 
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considerations.! The challenge of the post-World War II world to the colonial 
powers had similar effects on British policies in these countries, especially in the 
areas of education and health services. 
As dominant as cultural factors have been in Thailand in influencing 
attitudes toward and the direction of income maintenance programs, they were not 
independent variables even in that context. They worked in interdependence 
with the political requisites of the ruling class. This particular finding would 
tend to discourage any entertainment of a concept of social policy determination 
involving a cultural determinism divorced from political factors. 
The influence of external factors other than colonial rule was also 
secondary in the study. Foreign aid and technical assistance factors helped to 
advance programs for which an interest on the part of the national leadership or 
the polity already existed, such as for education and health services. Foreign aid 
also affected technical formulations of occupational measures and the timing of 
their introduction. However, none of these factors had any fundamental influence. 
The present finding therefore would appear to limit and qualify the significance of 
foreign aid and technical assistance factors. By the same token, the importance 
of international cultural diffusion and standardization factors must also be 
regarded as secondary within the limits of this study. 
The problem now faced is one of integrating the various trends emerging 
from the study findings into an overall conceptual framework of social policy 
determination. As indicated earlier, the findings by and large support the notion 
of the primacy of political factors, such as argued by Rys. The core of the 
findings, however, appears to associate more specifically with the political self-
interest hypothesis of Downs, Riker, ElIsberg, and others. To state that the 
present findings give support to these hypotheses is not to suggest that the 
hypotheses both describe and explain the present findings in their entirety. 
Therein lies the problem. 
The concept of income maintenance policy determination more fully 
suggestive of the overall study findings is a more complex one. It may envisage 
the policy-making environment as a kinetic field in which the movements of and 
the relationships between all factors involved are controlled by a shifting balance 
of forces among the political factors. In this context, political self-interest, 
pressure group influence, radical polity, ideology, and the leadership orientation 
and commitment factors change shift in their relative strengths and directions, 
thus causing the income maintenance programs or their component(s) to either 
evolve or not to do so, or to grow, change features or whither away even over 
time. As the controlling political factors change/shift in their respective 
attributes and mutual relationships, and in their respective and/or collective aims, 
lOne example is the veteran's riot, supported and probably led by the leaders of the Ghanaian 
independence movement, and the veteran's pension which was a result ofthe riot. See the 
Watson Report, op.cit. 
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the non-political factors shift also. This occurs not only in terms of their relative 
strengths and dispositions in relation to the political factors but in relation to one 
another as well, thus undergoing changes in their powers of influence upon the 
programs or their components. 
The income maintenance program development in Bolivia over a period of 
time illustrates this concept of income maintenance policy determination. The 
powerful miners constituting the core of organized labor had been awarded a 
comparatively high level of social security benefits during the Paz government 
because of their role in the revolution that brought Paz and his Party (MNR) into 
power. Their status in the political coalition supporting the same government 
and other factors made labor a powerful pressure group. 
It was also indicated, however, that these awards had been significantly 
reduced during the governments of Siles and Barrientos. Why? Part of the 
reason lay in the shift away of national economic development priority from the 
mines to agricultural resettlement and the petroleum fields inland. The miners 
thus lost their key status in the national economy. This reduced labor's power as 
a pressure group. Another reason was the continuing problem of balance of 
payment deficits which necessitated massive economic aid from abroad, notably 
the United States. One of the conditions for such aid was a price stabilization 
policy involving a significant cut in the costly and economically unrealistic social 
security program and other benefits for the workers. 
That was not all. Perhaps the most important reason was the fact that 
neither Siles nor Barrientos upheld progressive ideologies or supported organized 
labor. As early as the first Paz government, Siles, representing the reformist-
elitist wing of the MNR had actively sought to undermine labor in order to 
prevent its radical programs from being implemented. Barrientos, on the other 
hand, represented something of a reaction to the Bolivian revolution. He played 
no part in it and had no ties to the MNR, which was still more or less bound by 
revolutionary commitments. 
It was these leadership factors which had no need of an alliance with the 
radical left, including labor, which opened the way for economic factors, such as 
capital needs and budgetary requirements, to come into play. It meant a greater 
economic dependence on the United States, with its economic and income 
maintenance policy ramifications, acceptable to the political leadership. 
Budgetary problems and balance of payment deficits plagued the Paz government 
just as badly in the post-revolutionary period, but the radical political climate had 
not allowed those problems to become prime factors in relation to income 
maintenance program decisions. 
Thus, in Bolivia,. the changing configuration of political factors over a 
period of time brought about changes in the relative powers of influence of some 
of the non-political factors such as resources and external constraint. 
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Certain recent developments in Thailand provide another illustration of the 
same perception of income maintenance policy determination. It was seen that 
in Thailand, socio-cultural values in alliance with political requisite factors 
dominated the income maintenance program development in the past. However, 
it was also indicated that more recently, certain other political factors, such as 
radical political pressures emanating from both within and without, and reform 
pressure from the outside, the last of which is itself a response to the same radical 
pressures, gained in strength. As a result, the power of cultural factors to 
influence the political disposition of the leadership toward social policies was 
lessened. 
Programs carried out in the past ten years represent some of the concrete 
results of this changing balance of forces among the political factors and 
consequent weakening of the cultural factors. The social security code pending 
reintroduction in 1974 may be yet another of such results. Whether the new 
trend will continue in the country and contribute to some fundamental social 
change, and, if it does, how fast and wide-ranging the change will be, may well 
depend on the workings of such other factors. Such factors include a continuously 
favorable economic condition, the rate of industrialization, ideological or value 
orientation, the power requisites of future political leadership, and the stability or 
instability of the external political situation. 
Here again, while the basic political factors - power reqUlsItes of the 
leadership and its orientation, pressure group influence - would continue to 
predominate, their relationship must be regarded changeable and responsive to the 
shifting balance of forces among all the factors and factor relationships involved. 
It is the thrust of forces generated by this changing configuration among 
underlying factors as a whole that is regarded as most significant in relation to the 
development of income maintenance programs. 
One might follow the same line of argument in reference to other national 
contexts but the point is already clear. The perception of a kinetic interaction 
among the underlying factors of income maintenance policy decisions controlled 
by a relative power disposition among the political factors closely corresponds to 
the findings of this study in their major as well as minor trends. This perception 
is not necessarily a departure from the overall systems hypothesis from which this 
study began. It is rather an elaboration of the same: it incorporates both the 
qualitative and quantitative differentials of the underlying factor functions and the 
functions of their inter-relationships as they relate to income maintenance 
program development. It also takes into account the factor and inter-factor 
variations over time. In short, it replaces the flat and time-limited (two 
dimensional) initial systems model with a four dimensional one which is capable 
of elucidating both the horizontal and vertical inter-factor alignments and/or 
relationships over time. 
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The politico-kinetic framework of income maintenance policy 
determination thus emerging will be presented schematically. Before doing so, 
however, an assessment of the initial model is in order. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WORKING CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The initial conceptual model based on literature review was well suited for 
the exploratory purposes of this study. By encompassing all possible aspects of 
the three basic propositions involved - the rational, the institutional, as well as the 
over-all systems aspect, the model helped to keep all pertinent variables visible. 
Alternative explanations and interpretations of any given variable remained open 
in terms of their relational possibilities in an ordered and easily definable 
structure. The model thus significantly aided both data exploration and analysis. 
The model was also highly useful in comparing the country findings, 
which were similar in many respects and dissimilar in others. Both the 
similarities and dissimilarities could be easily identified through the use of the 
model. It also facilitated the exposition of theoretical or conceptual implications 
of each country findings as the various domains of the model, separately and 
jointly, readily represented those theories and concepts. The findings needed 
only to be examined in relation to the model to understand the conceptual 
implications. 
Thus while the working model had a high utility value for the study, its 
overall findings brought out a number of limitations which need to be taken into 
account in the construction of the new conceptual model. The limitations were; 
1. The initial model does not adequately express the relative importance 
of the underlying factors and the inter-factor relational patterns. For instance, it 
was capable of expressing the combined effect of the pressure group, power 
requisites and resource factors on Ghana's Accelerated Education Plan, but 
incapable of differentiating the primary importance of the resource factor in that 
particular connection. 
2. It is not capable of differentiating whether an underlying factor or an 
inter-factor relationship impacts on program development directly or indirectly. 
Radical ideologies, for instance, influenced program development only through 
the role of pressure groups or radical polity factors. This could not be expressed 
differentially with the working model. 
3. It does not express the time sequence of various factorS in 
relation to the IMP or the IMPC. In the UAR, for instance, the radicalization of 
the political leadership preceded the nationalization of the economy and labor 
participation in economic decision-making, which in tum contributed to the 
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introduction of the profit-sharing provision. The initial model is not able to 
express this sequence. 
4. It does not reflect the prominent position the polity at large and/or the 
pressure groups have vis-a-vis income maintenance program development 
although it fully deserves to occupy a domain of its own, a domain on par in 
importance with the political leadership domain. 
5. It does not give expression to the two-way interactions that exist 
between all the major underlying factor domains, viz. the needs, 
resource/economic context domain, the political leadership domain, the 
polity/pressure group domain, the socio-cultural and institutional domain, and the 
external domain. 
6. It does not reflect the relative importance of the various domains in 
relation to income maintenance program outcomes. In the present study, it was 
the factors in the political leadership and polity/pressure group domains that had 
the primary impact on IMP and/or IMPC developments. Those in other domains 
exerted secondary or indirect influences on them. This differential underlying the 
various factor functions could not be properly discerned in the initial model. 
What conceptual framework would solve all or most of the above 
problems as well as adequately support the findings emerging from the present 
study? Among a number of alternative frameworks that suggest themselves, one 
particularly relevant framework is discussed below and represented in a schema. 
THE REVISED CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The outstanding feature of the revised conceptual model, which 
distinguishes the model from the initial one, is the equalization of the two political 
domains in terms of their effective function vis-a-vis the IMP and/or IMPC 
developments and the relegation of the other domains to the periphery. This 
structural configuration of the revised conceptual model best represents the co-
equal status of the two political domains and their primacy over the other domains 
in underlying the IMP or IMPC developments. 
The central place assigned to the political leadership parameters in the 
initial model no longer obtains in the revised one. The basis for the central 
position of the leadership parameters in the initial model was their strategic role 
presumed in relation to social policy-making. In the present framework, that 
position is not necessarily refuted, but is no longer regarded as the unitary source 
of such influence. Another source of similar influence amplifies the overall 
political context which is characterized by the will of the people at large, 
requirements of the polity, and pressure group factors. 
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The revised model is also duly cognizant of the interaction between the 
political leadership domain and the domain of needs, resources and economic 
context factors, as represented by the two-way arrows that transverse the two 
domains. 
Figure 3. The Revised Conceptual Model 
Socio-Cultural & Institutional Factors 













Political Leadership Factors * * 
Y 
External Factors*** 
*General will of the people; requirement of the polity; pressure group demands 
** Ideological/value orientations of the political leadership group; power requisites. 
** *International socio-economic context; foreign aid and technical assistance; 
pressures from outside. 
As with the initial model, the central impulses toward income 
maintenance policy-making and program development emanates from the needs, 
resources, and economic context domain and cuts through the political context and 
political leadership domains where the two converge to finally emerge in the 
social policy and program domains in the forms of income maintenance programs 
or their components, as expressed in the straight bold center arrows in the 
schematic representation, figure 3. This particular impulse must be regarded as 
intrinsic in all income maintenance policy formation situations and it is to this 
impulse to which all the underlying factors, individually and jointly, relate. 
The interdependence between the political factors in the two primary 
domains is shown in the schematic model by two-way bold arrows across the two 
domains concerned, while the relationships between the political domains and the 
mostly non-political domains, as well as between the mostly non-political 
domains themselves, are shown by the minor arrows. In other words, the two 
types of arrows denote, respectively, the primary and the secondary importance of 
the inter-domain relationships. All the variable domains are shown by one or 
another type of arrows, to be in relationships of general interaction. None of the 
non-political factors has direct access to the central impulse mentioned in the 
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study, indicating that they were effective only in coexistence, interdependence 
and dependence relationships with the political factors. 
In brief, the revised conceptual model thus recognizes: 
1. The predominance of the political factors in relation to the 
development of income maintenance programs or components of such 
programs; 
2. The co-equal status of political leadership and political context factors; 
3. The central significance of the interdependence between the two types 
of political factors; 
4. The secondary significance of the non-political factors and their 
relationships, whether among themselves or in relation to the political 
factors; and 
5. The dynamic nature of the configuration of all the underlying factors 
at any given point in time as well as over a period of time. 
The only aspect of the findings left unexpressed in the model is the 
indirect function of certain factors such as ideology, role or place of certain 
economic sectors or interest groups in a given economy that give support to, or 
detract from, the strength of pressure groups. (It is possible to represent this 
aspect in a three dimensional schema. For the present purpose, however, the 
revised conceptual model presented should suffice.) 
EMERGENCE OF A POLITICO-KINETIC PARADIGM OF 
INCOME MAINTENANCE POLICY FORMATION 
This has been a comparative study of income maintenance policy and/or 
program determination in six underdeveloped countries. Substantively, it 
attempted to explore and identify the factors that underlay governmental decisions 
regarding income maintenance provisions. Since research in the particular field 
is still in an early state, however, this study was also interested in developing a 
conceptual framework that will aid analyses of the subject matter. 
The study approach involving a descriptive analytical technique was 
determined by the type of material available. Existing international statistical 
data was only occasionally comparable and there were considerable 
inconsistencies in the data, depending on their sources. Qualitative materials 
were also generally uneven in variety and scarce in some instances. 
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Despite the shortcomings of materials and other limitations of the 
circumstances, this study was able to identify a number of trends of income 
maintenance policy determination which permit a generalization within the 
bounds of the countries studied and, to a lesser degree, the underdeveloped world 
at large. The trends were: 
i) Interdependence between the political context factors and those 
pertaining to the ideological and value orientations of the reigning political 
leadership or such groups and their power requisites; 
ii) Primacy of political factors over non-political factors such as needs, 
resources and economic context, socio-cultural and institutional characteristics, 
and external influence; 
iii) The existence of kinetic interactions among all the factors involved, 
which leave open the possibility of role shifts among them, especially at the 
domain level; and 
iv) The stability of the above pattern of inter-factor relationships both at a 
given point in time as well as over a period of time. 
The above trends supported political hypotheses in general and the 
political self-interest hypothesis of Downs, Riker, Ellsberg an~ others in 
particular. A number of other hypotheses stressing the significance of economic, 
cultural and external factors could be supported as subsidiaries of the first two. 
Although this study made no attempt to explore the utility criterion as a 
basis of income maintenance decision-making, the findings indicated that the 
criterion was in operation in the decision making situations in which political self-
interest served as the utility parameter. 
Ultimately, the above trends and observations together could be seen to 
support a systems hypothesis of income maintenance policy/program 
determination characterized by politico-kinetic dynamics among all the 
parameters associated with them. 
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ApPENDIX I 
SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS AND WELFARE EXPENDITURES IN 
LESS THAN US$300 PER CAPITA GDP COUNTRIES IN 1967 
(ApPROXIMATELY 80 COUNTRIES INVOLVED) 
Social Indicators Range 
Low 
Private Consumption, % ofGDP (1966-68 annual average) 44 
Infant mortality, per 1000 live births (in/around 1968) 19 
Number of inhabitants, per physician (around 1966) 900 
Estimated calories of per capita daily food supply, %of 79 
requirements (around 1967) 
Adult literacy rate (early 1960s) 2 
Source: UN, World Economic Survey, 1969170, pp. I 77-207. 
Social Welfare Expenditures 
Social security expenditures covering SI, PA, PH & 0.5 
administrative costs, % of GNP (in 1965/66 or 1966) 









Source: fLO, The Cost of Social Security, 1964-66, Geneva, 1972, pp.324-330; UN, World Economic 













SELECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN 
STUDY COUNTRIES (CIRCA 1966-1970) 
Group A (US$137-157) Group B (US$209-
211) 
Bolivia Ceylon Thailand UAR Ghana Mauritius 
Calorie content of per capita 86 98 --- 125 96 103 
average daily food supply, % of 
daily requirement (1967) 
Health facilities & personnel 
(circa 1966) 
population per hospital bed 400 320 1,090 560 770 240 
population per physician 
3,100 4,200 8,800 2,200 13,300 3,800 
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 7.7 4.8 2.8 11.9 --- 7.0 
live births (circa 1968) 
Private consumption, % of GNP 77 74 65 66 73 72 
(1966-68 Annual Average) 
Adult literacy rate (early 1960) 32 75 68 20 25 61 
Public expenditures on 3.5 5.0 2.6 4.2 3.8 3.2 
Education, % of GNP (in 1968-
70) 
Public expenditures on Health 0.3 2.0 0.5 2.2 1.1 ---
in 1968-70 (% of GNP) 
Third level graduates per 10,000 15.2 41.1 28.4 100.6 15.3 3.5 
inhabitants in 1968 
Unemployment, % of Total --- 2.5 0.08* .075 0.17 1.7* 
Population 
Wage Level (non-Agr. Sector) --- 6.95 7.49 331 16.15 5.06 
per week, in 1969 (US$) (manu- (incl.sal. 
facturing) emp.) 
Salaried and wage earning 9.2 10.9 4.9 8.5 . 5.8 14.2 
employees in non-agr. sector (% 
of total population) 
;;ource: UN, World Economic Survey, 1969-1970; UN, Statistical Yearbook, 1971, Table 2, 18, pp.410-427; 
ILO, Yearbook of Labor Statistics, Tables I, 2, 18 and 19; 
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